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Abstract: Why, when and how should control transactions be policed ex post
and by a judiciary? This article is the first to 1) articulate the doctrinal prerequisites for effective ex post judicial policing of fiduciaries in control transactions, and 2) theoretically unify two seemingly distinct approaches to police control transactions: the ex post judicial policing in the United States and the ex
ante policing by the Takeover Panel in the United Kingdom. Shareholder collective action and asymmetric information problems, and the extent of gatekeeping
by fiduciaries together determine the mode of third-party interventions, such as
those by judiciaries and the Takeover Panel, in control transactions. The Article’s analysis yields normative conclusions about how judiciaries in the United
States, including Delaware’s, should fine-tune gatekeeping by corporate fiduciaries in control transactions. It predicts that multijurisdictional shareholder litigation that seeks anticipatory adjudication will produce negative consequences.
Further, it gives policy makers outside of the United States the theoretical foundation for crafting third-party interventions in both types of control transactions, i.e., third-party acquisitions of control and controller freeze-outs, that are
optimal for their own jurisdictions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Why, when, and how should control transactions be policed ex post
and by a judiciary? Collective action and asymmetric information problems
and related agency problems often frustrate efficiency enhancing control
transactions and encourage efficiency destroying control transactions. These
happen particularly at the companies that have already been plagued with
the problems. There is no pure internal mechanism to correct these and a
third party intervention is due. It can be done ex post or ex ante.
This paper identifies normative prerequisites that a judiciary must meet
to effectively police ex post fiduciaries in acquisitions of companies1 with
dispersed shareholders and in freeze-outs of dispersed minority shareholders, both in cash (together “control transactions”). Collective action problems (CAPs) and asymmetric information problems (AIPs)—together twin
problems (TPs)—resulting from shareholder dispersion2 determine the prerequisites. The less empowered corporate fiduciaries are to gatekeep control
transactions for dispersed shareholders, the less the normative strength of
the prerequisites is. Delaware’s judiciary, while it meets the prerequisites
better than any other judiciaries and is the best in the United States, should
examine if its judicial standards give excessive gatekeeping powers to the
fiduciaries relative to its ability to address TPs relating to shareholder lawsuits against the fiduciaries in control transactions and thus less than optimal. Non-Delaware judiciaries, generally less capable of addressing the
TPs, should examine if they should follow Delaware’s judicial standards. It
predicts that multijurisdictional shareholder litigation that seeks anticipatory
adjudication will produce negative consequences. Jurisdictions outside the
United States may opt to limit the fiduciaries’ gatekeeping roles and abandon the ex post judicial policing if their judiciaries do not satisfy the normative prerequisites and resort to ex ante policing.
Part II first shows that the TPs and related agency problems create
unique governance dilemmas in relation to both types of control transactions. This is especially true when TPs and related agency problems preexist and induce control transactions as a solution. The dilemmas call for a
special governance regime for control transactions. In the United States,
federal tender offer and proxy solicitation rules partially address the dilemmas. Boards and controllers assume the roles of further addressing the TPs
In this paper, generally “corporation” and “company” are used interchangeably.
The nature and extent of the TPs depend on the shareholder base, which changes over time. In the
United States, there has been a reconcentration of share ownership. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance
Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 864, 865 (2013). This reconcentration, however, is in “intermediary institutions,” which are still “rationally reticent” and fail to “act like . . . ‘real’ owners.” Id. at 867, 888. If so,
the discussion in this paper should remain largely intact.
1
2
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in respective types of control transactions for dispersed shareholders. By
default, the task of policing the corporate fiduciaries falls upon judiciaries.
However, judicial policing takes place after the fiduciaries’ gatekeeping actions. This creates two related complications. First, the TPs tend to worsen
and gain momentum before the judicial intervention and make the intervention both more crucial and challenging. Second, the TPs and related agency
problems assume a different dimension of modalities if the fiduciaries gatekeep control transactions for dispersed shareholders and make judiciaries’
policing of the conduct of the fiduciaries even more crucial and challenging.
Part III identifies normative prerequisites for effective judicial policing. Ownership dispersion has “Powerful and Pervasive Effects” on
“M&A” litigation.3 TPs do not go away and again challenge the judiciaries
at the initiation and prosecution stage of the lawsuits (Stage I). Control
transactions involving companies with preexisting TPs are disproportionately represented among control transactions that require judicial policing. It is
crucially important to have solutions to the TPs at Stage I.4 In most instances, judicial relief is rendered following fiduciary actions. The TPs also challenge the judiciaries at the stage of implementing the ex post relief (Stage
II): restorative remedies are often superior to damage remedies, but the TPs
make restorative remedies impractical.5 Possible solutions are explored to
satisfy the normative prerequisites.
Part IV examines the solutions the Delaware judiciary uses. Delaware
has a robust discovery system to solve AIPs and an opt-out class action system with fee calculation and shifting mechanisms to solve CAPs, each relating to Stage I. The availability of anticipatory adjudication combined with
the judiciary’s speed, expertise, and flexibility allows it to take advantage of
a window of time between decisions by fiduciaries on control transactions
and shareholder actions on the transactions. Thus, the Delaware judiciary
satisfies the Stage II prerequisites. Moreover, in the context of anticipatory
adjudication—Delaware’s oft-criticized “indeterminacy”—is less of a problem and can even be beneficial. First, generally decisions are rendered ex
post fiduciaries’ decisions but ex ante irreparable damages, and the fiduciaries are not subject to financial liabilities. Second, “indeterminacy” prevents
opportunistic activities. Part IV then reveals that discovery and class action
are generally available in the United States to solve TPs at Stage I. NonDelaware judiciaries can render anticipatory relief. Unlike Delaware’s judiciary, however, the non-Delaware judiciaries typically lack the flexibility

3
John C. Coates IV, The Powerful and Pervasive Effects of Ownership on M&A (Harv. Law Sch.
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 669, 2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1544500.
4
Hereinafter, the prerequisites necessary to solve the TPs at Stage I the “Stage I prerequisites.”
5
Hereinafter, the prerequisites necessary to solve the TPs at Stage II the “Stage II prerequisites,” and
together with the Stage I prerequisites, the “prerequisites.”
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and expertise necessary to meet the Stage II prerequisites.
Part V examines whether judicial systems in non-U.S. jurisdictions
have strategies, tools, and attributes to meet the prerequisites. Japan will be
used to illustrate possible difficulties for non-U.S. jurisdictions to meet the
prerequisites. Discovery and opt-out class actions are uniquely American
institutions. Thus, many non-U.S. judiciaries lack key tools to meet the
Stage I prerequisites. These non-U.S. judiciaries at a minimum need to explore whether they have alternative tools to satisfy the Stage I prerequisites.
They should not let judiciaries assume, by default or not, the policing role
unless they are shown to be capable of playing that role. Non-U.S. judiciaries may engage in anticipatory adjudication. However, no other major judiciary appears to have the speed, expertise, and flexibility of the Delaware
judiciary.
The penultimate Part VI observes the relationship between the intensity of gatekeeping by fiduciaries and the required capability of judiciaries to
police the fiduciaries. The less empowered corporate fiduciaries are to gatekeep control transactions for dispersed shareholders, the less crucial and
demanding judiciaries’ policing roles become, and the less the normative
strength of the prerequisites becomes. This should mean that, under the
modified regime, the disadvantages of non-Delaware judiciaries in the
United States should become smaller. Non-Delaware jurisdictions in the
United States should consider cutting back the fiduciaries’ gatekeeping role
to level the playing field and to reduce the risk of errors in anticipatory adjudications. While it is the best, the Delaware judiciary is not perfect and is
unable to completely eliminate the TPs relating to the lawsuits and the
agency problems of the corporate fiduciaries. The more capable it is, the
more gatekeeping power it should be able to give to the fiduciaries and vice
versa. It seems beneficial to examine whether the judicial standards the
Delaware judiciary uses to police the fiduciaries are optimal. Internationally, the removal of the gatekeeping role makes ex ante policing possible, and
expert nonjudicial organs could become credible substitutes.
Finally, Part VII, based on the findings in the preceding parts, suggests
possible approaches for judicial and nonjudicial interventions in control
transactions.
II. TWIN PROBLEMS, DILEMMAS, EX POST JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION, AND ATTENDANT COMPLICATIONS
The sole or single owner standard theory has been implicitly or explicitly accepted to establish rules to enhance efficient acquisitions and discourage inefficient acquisitions.6 “The single-owner standard holds that an effi-

6

See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17 J. LEGAL
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cient sale is one that a willing buyer and seller would make were both parties free from coercion.”7 The sole owner does not suffer from CAPs and
suffers far less from AIPs or is well informed.8 Thus, under the sole owner
standard, CAPs and AIPs (together twin problems or TPs), in relation to
cash acquisitions of control, exist as “problems”: they tend to induce inefficient acquisitions, and thus it is desirable to eliminate or lessen them. Similarly, the TPs of minority shareholders, if the minority shareholders are given a strong say—such as a veto in freeze-outs—may unduly frustrate
efficiency-enhancing freeze-outs and induce inefficient freeze-outs. 9 How
do TPs adversely affect control transactions, and how should we address
those problems?
A. Governance Dilemmas
1. Acquisition of Companies with Wholly Dispersed Shareholders
Once a discussion for a potential control transaction is initiated, the
TPs tend to intensify. The control transactions raise complex business, financial, and legal issues that will exacerbate the TPs. The composition of
STUD. 165, 166–67 (1988).
7
Id. at 166. The theory’s first academic proponent was presumably Lucian Bebchuk. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1693, 1743–44 (1985) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy, 17 J. LEGAL. STUD. 197, 221–28 (1988) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 923, 981–88 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Case Against
Board Veto]. Under the market standard theory, “any offer above the target’s prebid market price should
succeed.” Schwartz, supra note 6, at 165. For the details of the market standard theory, see, for example,
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to
a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and
Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982).
8
Dispersed selling shareholders tend to be less informed than buyers. The academic proponents of
the sole owner standard appear to have focused more on the CAPs and far less on the AIPs. This, however, does not mean that AIPs are irrelevant to the efficiency. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted
Choice, supra note 7, at 1772 (“[A] mistaken estimate [of the independent target’s value] might of
course lead to an inefficient outcome.”). A sole owner as well as dispersed shareholders might suffer
from AIPs. Typically, however, the sole owner’s AIPs are infinitely far less than those of dispersed
shareholders. Moreover, the sole owner’s AIPs can be fixed quite easily and quickly when, for example,
the owner delves into the records of the company and has one-on-one discussions with the management.
This is not the case for the dispersed shareholders. But for their possible actual or potential conflict of
interest, the company’s management is best equipped to address the AIPs. However, in their view it is
difficult to eliminate the downside effects of the conflicts. See, e.g., id. at 1772–73; Bebchuk, The Case
Against Board Veto, supra note 7, at 999–1004; John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the
Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?−The Peculiar Divergences of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1741 n.53 (2007).
9
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 785, 804 n.73 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson & Gordon, Controlling Controlling].
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the shareholders becomes fluid as well, which may worsen the TPs, in particular the CAPs. Naturally, actual and potential third-party participants in
the control transactions are tempted to exploit the TPs. The problems persist
through shareholder decisions, if any, on such potential control transactions.
Corporate directors work for shareholders’ collective interests and are
capable of solving the TPs. 10 However, corporate directors suffer from
agency problems.11 At the precise moment when they could be most helpful
to shareholders in relation to control transactions, directors—particularly
nonindependent directors—have strong personal interests in the outcome of
such discussions that are not aligned with those of the shareholders, and
they may be tempted to act selfishly at the expense of the shareholders’
welfare.12 The TPs have already made it difficult for shareholders to monitor the directors, which could further exacerbate the director agency problems. Thus, the more the shareholders need help from the directors, the less
helpful the directors might possibly become.13 Unless a solution is found to
neutralize these related problems, they could stifle or skew the market for
corporate control and diminish efficiency-enhancing functions of control
transactions.14 A targeted scheme might be helpful to solve the dilemma.15

10

Directors may have other constituents to look after.
As to the term “agency problems,” see John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies,
in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ch. 2, § 2.1
(Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal
Strategies] (“[A]n agency problem—in the most general sense of the term—arises whenever the welfare
of one party, termed the ‘principal’, depends upon actions taken by another party, termed the ‘agent.’”).
See also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309–10 (1976).
12
See, e.g., Fernando Gomez & Maria Isabel Saez, The Enforcement of Management Passivity Duty
in Take-over Law: Class Action or Government Action?, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN EUROPE 261, 267 (Jügen G. Backhaus et al. eds., 2012).
13
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 84 VAND.
L. REV. 83, 104–08 (2004); Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, supra note 11, § 2.2.1
(describing interactions between CAPs and agency problems); ALESSO M. PACCES, RETHINKING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTROL POWERS §§ 1.1.1, 1.1.2.2 (2012)
(stating that AIPs make it possible for corporate agents to cheat and difficult for shareholders to monitor
the agents).
14
Once the directors assume gatekeeping functions, these problems may intensify. See infra Part
II.D.2.
15
See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search
for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 559 (2002) [hereinafter Black & Kraakman, Delaware’s
Takeover Law] (“[H]ostile takeover bids are a relatively recent arrival, which the corporate statutes
leave unaddressed.”). The lack of any independent institution that can credibly intervene may lead to
laws that heavily restrict the control transactions. See also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A SelfEnforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1930 (1996) [hereinafter Black &
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model] (“A prohibitive code simply bars many kinds of corporate behavior
that are open to abuse, such as self-dealing transactions and cash-out mergers.”).
11
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2. Acquisition of Minority Shares by Controllers
Under certain circumstances, controllers may find it efficient to completely own the companies.16 Company laws, however, may allow the minority shareholders a say, including a veto power, in connection with the
freeze-outs17 necessary to effect 100% ownership. In such cases, the TPs of
the minority shareholders may prevent the controllers from having effective
negotiations with the minority shareholders. The controllers, of course, may
try to exploit the TPs. Thus, unless a solution is put in place, the TPs of the
minority shareholders may let efficiency-decreasing freeze-outs move forward or prevent efficiency-enhancing freeze-outs from going forward. 18
Again, a targeted scheme might be helpful to solve the dilemma. 19
B. Governance Dilemmas Intensified
Preexisting CAPs and AIPs may induce control transactions. This is
because the control transactions could remove the TPs and improve the valFor various reasons to allow freeze-outs, see, for example, John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an
Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
1251, 1327–29 (1999) [hereinafter Coates, Minority Discounts]; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 113, 134 (1991) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]; Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large
Companies, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 352 (1996); Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2007) [hereinafter Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs].
Cf. Fernan Restrepo, Do Freezeouts Affect the Performance of the Controlling Shareholder? An Empirical Analysis 2 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford, Working Paper No. 184, 2014) (“[W]hether
or not freezeouts are efficiency generating transactions is a question that cannot be responded at the level of theory.”), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418846; Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE. L.J. 1354, 1365–70 (1978) (proposing a flat prohibition of pure
freeze-outs due to the minimal benefits relative to the great risks they engender). For unique incentives
controllers may have in the United Kingdom and Japan, see infra Part V.B.1.b.i.
17
The term is used to denote controller freeze-outs generally. The term “freeze-out” is used differently in the European Union. For the meaning of freeze-outs in the EU, see Directive 2004/25, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC)
art. 15 [hereinafter EU Takeover Directive]; Companies Act, 2006, c. 3, § 979 (U.K.).
18
Of course a free rider problem may also prevent efficiency-enhancing freeze-outs. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. ECON. 957, 983 (1994)
(hereinafter Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales). However, when the minority shareholders are not
dispersed and do not have TPs, the importance of the free rider issue may be small, since, not having
TPs, the minority shareholders are able and incentivized to make contributions commensurate with their
aggregate ownership percentage relative to the controller’s ownership percentage.
19
See supra note 15. Typically, minority shareholders do not have powers to oust controllers. See,
e.g., Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ch. 8, § 8.3.2 (Reinier Kraakman et al., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions] (stating that there is not much company law can do if the
controllers are unwilling to relinquish their position). As to Delaware, see Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) (“Clearly, a stockholder is under no duty to sell its holdings in a
corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder, merely because the sale would profit the minority.”).
16
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ues of the issuing companies. Thus, attempted control transactions involve a
disproportionately large number of companies with shareholders or minority shareholders with preexisting TPs. However, TPs themselves, combined
with other factors, may hamper the control transactions that are otherwise
efficiency enhancing. It is important to find an effective solution.
1. Acquisition of Companies with Wholly Dispersed Shareholders
Assume that there is a public company with dispersed shareholders
suffering from acute TPs. Assume further that the relevant corporation law
gives the shareholders a say with respect to certain business decisions. Due
to their TPs, the shareholders might have blocked efficiency-enhancing
transactions. The TPs might also have hampered shareholders’ ability to
elect qualified persons as directors. The TPs might have frustrated the
shareholders’ ability to monitor agents and might have allowed them to “act
opportunistically, skimping on the quality of [their] performance, or even
diverting to [themselves] what was promised to the principal.”20 There will
be those who believe that they are able to remove or significantly reduce the
TPs and agency problems by becoming sole owners. If so, they might value
the company more highly than the company’s market capitalization and
want to explore the purchase of the company at a price higher than the prevailing market price but lower than the value they would be able to achieve
after the ownership change.21 Such attempts are potentially efficiency enhancing. 22 In these situations, however, the TPs and the related agency
problems23 may magnify in the deal phases and hamper the transactions that
would remove the inefficiency attributable to the preexisting problems.
2. Acquisition of Minority Shares by Controllers
Controllers are tempted to exploit minority shareholders. To protect
minority shareholders, some jurisdictions may enact less enabling laws embedding procedural safeguards in shareholder approval requirements, such
20

Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, supra note 11, § 2.1 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 112–17; Armour et
al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, supra note 11, § 2.2.1.
22
See, e.g., Eli Ofek, Efficiency Gains in Unsuccessful Management Buyouts, 49 J. FIN. 637 (1994);
Gomez & Saez, supra note 12, at 264. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate
Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006) (indicating that takeovers are responsive only to certain kinds of governance problems and appropriate only for
very large problems),
http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/
257565/doc/slspublic/Controlling-Shareholders.pdf. Of course, the buy side may suffer from its own
agency costs.
23
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 162.
21
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as a supermajority voting requirement, a majority of the minority voting requirement, a prohibition of super voting shares, and a mandatory shareholder equality principle.24 In particular, related party transactions may be subject to strict procedural requirements. Due to their TPs, however, the
minority shareholders with the minority protections might unnecessarily veto25 the controllers’ proposals or otherwise restrict the controllers’ ability to
manage the companies efficiently. For example, the minorities might block
related party transactions that should benefit both.26 In addition, they might
unduly restrict private benefits to the controllers commensurate with the
benefits of the governance and other benefits they provide or the costs the
controllers incur.27 Freeze-outs can remove minority shareholders’ TPs and
related “passive agency problems”28 and achieve economic efficiency.29 In
these situations, however, the TPs in the deal phases may be correspondingly greater. If the minority shareholders are also given a say in the freeze-out
process, there could be a significant risk for the minority shareholders’ passive agency problems to magnify and block or otherwise skew efficiencyenhancing freeze-outs.

24
See generally, Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and
Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ch. 4, §§ 4.1.2–4.1.4 (Reinier Kraakman et al., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders]; Black & Kraakman, A SelfEnforcing Model, supra note 15, at 1958–60. As to rules in Delaware, see, for example, Gilson & Gordon, Controlling Controlling, supra note 9, at 789–93. For a brief description of rules in the United
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Canada, see Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 426–37 (2003). These protective measures may not be only for companies with dispersed minority shareholders. However, dispersed
minority shareholders have a stronger need for the protective measures.
25
This power is strong if a supermajority or a majority of the minority voting requirement is in place
with respect to certain corporate transactions. See, e.g., Goshen, supra note 24, at 402 (discussing possible adverse effects of a majority of the minority requirement).
26
See, e.g., id. at 400.
27
As to the validity of some level of controllers’ private benefits, see generally Ronald J. Gilson &
Alan Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible Commitments 3 (Columbia Law and Econ. Research
Paper No. 436, Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Research Paper No. 438, Yale Law and Econ. Research
Paper No. 461, Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law Working Paper No. 216, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2182781; Gilson, supra note 22, at 1652 (describing
controllers’ costs of monitoring, liquidity, and nondiversification). If the controllers are undercompensated for their governance role, minority shareholders are at least partially “free riding.” For the ranges
of private benefits in the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Germany, Italy, and France, see, for
example, Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders, supra note 24, §
4.3.2.1.
28
See, e.g., Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, supra note 11, § 2.1.
29
Hermalin & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 358–359; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 113 (giving examples of possible efficiency gains that may be achieved
through controllers’ minority freeze-outs). See also Coates, Minority Discounts, supra note 16, at 1327–
29.
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C. U.S. Model to Solve Governance Dilemmas
Globally, at present, there are two principal approaches to solve the
control transaction dilemmas. Under the Takeover Code in the United
Kingdom,30 the Takeover Panel assumes the role of a third-party institution
to solve or lessen the dilemmas and polices control transactions ex ante.31
The most salient features of the Takeover Code are a no-frustrating action
rule and a mandatory bid rule (U.K. MBR).32 “[T]he ‘no frustration’ rule . . .
operates so as to put the shareholders in the driving seat as far as decisionmaking on the offer is concerned.”33 However, the U.K. MBR simultaneously requires holders of 30% or more of the shares of a company to launch
a general offer for the remaining shares at the best price paid for shares during the preceding twelve months. The U.K. MBR minimizes shareholder
CAPs (collective action problems) and coercive effects that would otherwise result by assuring treatment of the shareholders left after the bidder’s
establishment of control (i.e., 30% ownership) over the target no less favorable than the treatment of any of the shareholders of the target when the
bidder is in the process of accumulating the control position.34 Under the
Takeover Code regime, a scheme of arrangement to effect a control transaction requires approval by a majority in number of shareholders representing
in the aggregate 75% in the value of the shares of each class of shareholders
present and voting as well as ex ante court sanction.35 The approach taken
by the Takeover Code is one that is less concerned with TPs of dispersed
shareholders and more concerned with agency problems of corporate fiduciaries or less confident in the ability to address the agency problems ex

30

THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE (11th ed. 2013),
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf [hereinafter THE TAKEOVER
CODE].
31
See Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 19, § 8.2.2.
32
THE TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 30, r. 9, at F1, r. 21.1, at I16. See discussion supra Part
V.B.1.b.i. (referring to the U.K. MBR in discussing Japanese tender offer rules).
33
Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 19, § 8.2.3.1. Note that the code does not prohibit prebid frustrating actions. This “exemption” apparently does not create any serious issue in the
United Kingdom. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1736.
34
See, e.g., Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 19, § 8.2.5.3, -4; PAUL L. DAVIES &
SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER & DAVIES PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW ¶ 28–46 (9th ed.
2012). This does not mean that the U.K. MBR addresses all structural coercion. See infra note 48. To the
extent that off-market purchases without a tender offer are restricted, unsolicited bidders are less likely
to establish large toehold stakes quickly. Thus, companies have more time to adopt defense measures.
For various strategies for crafting tender offer regulations, see Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions,
supra note 19, § 8.2.5.3.
35
Companies Act, 2006, c. 3, § 899 (U.K.). See also THE TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 30, app. 7.1.
For protection of minority shareholders in a scheme of arrangement, see, for example, Jennifer Payne,
Minority Shareholder Protection in Takeovers: A UK Perspective, 8 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 145, 152–
58 (2011).
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post.36 The EU Takeover Directive used the approach of the Takeover Code
as a prototype model. However, significant exceptions to such approach
were created in the EU Takeover Directive. For example, it permits EU
member countries to opt out of the no-frustration rule.37 Variations of the
approach under the Takeover Code have also been proposed.38
The other approach to address the control transaction dilemmas is one
that prevails in the United States. In the United States, two principal governance regimes regulate control transactions: state corporation law and
federal securities law. 39 Unlike the approach under the Takeover Code,
combined, they represent an approach that is concerned more with the TPs
of dispersed shareholders and less with the agency problems of gatekeeping
corporate boards or controllers, as the case may be, or that has more confidence in the ability to police the agents ex post.
Corporation laws in the United States generally follow an enabling
model,40 and a cash merger, including one in which a controller freezes out
minority shareholders, can be effected through a simple majority vote. 41
Boards of directors propose mergers to shareholders.42 Direct purchases of
shares are possible without any involvement of the board of the issuer company. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has tender offer rules 43 and
proxy rules.44 These rules focus primarily on the information and time necessary or helpful for shareholders to decide whether to tender or how to
vote their shares. Going private rules45 focus on disclosure. The tender offer
rules focus on protections against “Saturday night special” bids or “blitzkrieg tactics”46 and prescribe certain substantive rules as well.47 Thus, these
36

For a comparison of the U.S. approach and the U.K. approach with a focus on situations in which
there are no controllers, see Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1733–45 (with respect to corporate managers as agents); Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 19, § 8.2.1.
37
EU Takeover Directive, supra note 17, art. 12, para. 1. See also Luca Enriques et al., The Case for
an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an Application to the European Union), 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 85
(2014) (proposing a model that allows an entity-level choice for EU countries).
38
See, e.g., Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 7, at 1796–1801.
39
Hereinafter the model that prevails in the United States will be referred to as the U.S. model.
40
An enabling model is contrasted with a prohibitive model. See, e.g., Black & Kraakman, A SelfEnforcing Model, supra note 15, at 1930.
41
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2014).
42
See, e.g., § 251(b). In the case of short-form mergers, no shareholder approval of subsidiary corporations is required. § 253.
43
These provisions were added by the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), n(d)–(f) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14-d1 to 14d-103 (2014).
44
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 14b-2 (2014).
45
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2008).
46
See, e.g., Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1734, 1755.
47
For example, the best price rule is in place. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (2006). If shares exceeding the maximum limit are tendered in response to a partial bid, the bidder is subject to a proration requirement. 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-8 (2011).
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rules address the TPs described in Parts II.A. and II.B. above or issues the
TPs present. The rules, however, do not address the TPs comprehensively.
For example, unlike the U.K. MBR of the Takeover Code, the rules do not
focus on CAPs stemming from structural coercion of two-tier tender offers
or cascading tender offers.48 Further, unlike the U.K. rules, the Securities
Exchange Act rules—including the act’s going private rules—do not tighten
the corporate law rules regarding freeze-outs.
The roles to fill the gap and further reduce or remove issues arising out
of the TPs fall on the directors or the controllers as fiduciaries.49 Unlike the
Takeover Code, the tender offer rules do not have a no-frustrating action
rule. Corporation laws do not contain an outright prohibition of the boards’
use of a defense measure. While it is not completely settled if “substantive
coercion” should be recognized as a cognizable threat,50 Delaware generally
let directors gatekeep control transactions on behalf of shareholders. 51
48
For structural coercion, see, for example, Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 7;
Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard, supra note 7; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s
Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review, 44 BUS.
LAW. 259, 259 (1989). There may be residual CAPs that the U.K. MBR does not address. See, e.g.,
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 7, at 1737–38. Depending on the procedural requirements for freeze-outs, varying degrees of structural coercion also exist in the context of freeze-outs. For
discussions concerning Delaware corporations, see, for example, In re Pure Resources, Inc., S’holders
Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002); see also A. C. Pritchard, Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 83, 101–03 (2004); Gilson & Gordon, Controlling Controlling, supra note 9; Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2
(2005).
49
As to the relationships of the two regimes, see, for example, Armour & Skeel, supra note 8 (describing the history of the emergence of this dual control); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic
Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1578 (2005) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism] (arguing that “the relation between federal law and Delaware law is
symbiotic, rather than competitive”).
50
See, e.g., Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011); Guhan
Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 1113 YALE. L.J. 621 (2003) [hereinafter
Subramanian, Bargaining]; Black & Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law, supra note 15, at 561–63;
Enriques et al., The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law, supra note 37, at 10 n.24. For the concept of
“substantive coercion,” see infra note 73. Further, there is a renewed debate as to the extent of federal
preemption of poison pills. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional
Review of the Poison Pill, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (2014); Marty Lipton et al., A Response to Bebchuk and Jackson’s Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/03/13/aresponse-to-bebchuk-and-jacksons-toward-a-constitutional-review-of-the-poison-pill/; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert A. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill: A Reply to Wachtell
Lipton, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 17, 2014),
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/03/17/toward-a-constitutional-review-of-the-poison-pill-areply-to-wachtell-lipton/#more-61373.
51
One may call this decision-making approach a joint decision-making strategy. See, e.g., Davies &
Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 19, § 8.2.3.1. However, we should note that shareholders have a
chance to join the joint decision making with respect only to potential transactions that are presented to
them.
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Boards are also generally recognized as gatekeepers of control transactions
in other states.52 Similarly, if they own a sufficient number of shares, controllers—at their initiation—are empowered to unilaterally freeze out minority shareholders. 53 They may choose to craft ad hoc Gatekeeping and
other governance measures that address the TPs and related agency problems.54 Judiciaries confronting shareholder lawsuits55 police the Gatekeepers ex post relative to their decisions using as a nexus “fiduciary duty,” a
state law concept.56 This is how the governance dilemmas presented in control transactions are addressed in the United States.57
In the United States, the Delaware judiciary has played a dominant
role and has been known for its relative superiority in resolving shareholder
lawsuits against Gatekeepers. “65.6 percent of all Fortune 500 companies
are incorporated in Delaware, up from 58 percent in 2000. . . . And almost
89 percent of U.S. based Initial Public Offerings in 2014 chose Delaware as
their corporate home . . . .” 58 And Delaware law governs when shareholders
52
As to defense measures in states other than Delaware, see generally Michal Barzuza, The State of
State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1973 (2009).
53
Hereinafter these roles of the boards and controllers will be Gatekeeping, and directors and controllers playing such roles will be Gatekeepers. Any capitalized derivatives words shall be construed
accordingly. Stephen M. Bainbridge used the terms in the same manner. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006). Note, however, that “[t]he term has been widely used to refer to the outside professionals who serve the board or investors.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004).
54
See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 503, 525 (Del. Ch. 2013) (making the same point),
aff’d by Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). See also Davies & Hopt, Control
Transactions, supra note 19, §§ 8.1.2.4, 8.2.3.1.
55
Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1604–07; Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J.
White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1798 (2004). Confidential arbitration before the Chancery Court has been held
unconstitutional. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 U.S. 1551 (2014). For a comparison of the level of private enforcement in the United States with
that in the United Kingdom, see John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: A Comparative Empirical Analysis of the UK and the US, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 687 (2009).
56
To borrow a phrase from an article by Norman Veasey, former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, the state law side of the U.S. model “rests on a two-fold trust in the judiciary, and in the
board of directors.” Norman Veasey, Law and Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate Transactions, 10 U.
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002). There are state antitakeover statues that have the effect of reducing
structural coercion. Delaware’s antitakeover statute is of a different type. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
203(c) (2014).
57
See supra Parts II.A., II.B. This approach can be said to allocate “the real authority to a court.”
Enriques et al., The Case for Unbiased Takeover Law, supra note 37, at 4. As this paper will show,
however, such a court may prove to be a paper tiger.
58
DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF CORP., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT (2015),
https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2014%20Annual%20Report.pdf. Most of such corporations,
however, are headquartered outside Delaware. The percentage seems to favorably compare with those
reported in the New York Times in 1969. See Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 891 (1969) (stating, based on the New York Times, Jan. 12,
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of a Delaware corporation can sue directors or controlling shareholders alleging their violations of fiduciary duties, including those relating to control
transactions.59 This does not mean that the Delaware judiciary has a monopoly over such disputes. 60 In fact, plaintiffs often choose to litigate in
federal or non-Delaware state courts.61 However, this should not indicate
that the quality or effectiveness of the judicial proceedings in that state is in
decline, 62 and the Delaware judiciary is still dominating cases involving
corporate control transactions involving public Delaware companies.63
1969, that “one third of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and almost half of the
nation’s one hundred largest industrial concerns” are Delaware corporations).
59
See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982); see also, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, The
Reach of State Corporate Law beyond State Borders: Reflections upon Federalism, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1149, 1159–60 (2009) (describing the internal affairs doctrine).
60
John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1351–53 (2012) [hereinafter
Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act]; Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias,
and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 155–56 (2011) [hereinafter
Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits] (stating that since the vast majority of publicly held Delaware corporations’ headquarters are in states other than Delaware, they “generally have sufficient contracts for personal jurisdiction before at least two courts, allowing plaintiffs to bring suits out of Delaware”). Delaware’s judiciary has jurisdiction over directors of Delaware corporations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
3114(a) (2014).
61
See, e.g., John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605,
609–10 (2012) [hereinafter Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?]. For statistical information,
see OLGA KOUMRIAN, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 3
(2015),
https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/897c61ef-bfde-46e6-a2b85f94906c6ee2/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2014-Review.pdf.
62
For possible reasons for the decline in the recent past, see, for example, Armour et al., Delaware’s
Balancing Act, supra note 60, at 1380. See also Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, supra
note 61, at 651 (an empirical study suggesting relationships between Delaware’s tough stance on fees
and its diminished deference to the first to file advantage, on the one hand, and the filing of lawsuits
with courts outside Delaware, on the other). The suggested reasons seem to suggest that “plaintiffs’
counsel seeks to avoid Delaware’s recent turn towards more aggressive policing of agency costs in acquisition related shareholder litigation, as well as to improve their relative position in the competition for
fees.” Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 60, at 139. In fact, the shift away from Delaware might
have been attributable in part to the relative inexperience of non-Delaware courts to apply Delaware law.
See, e.g., id. at 155 (suggesting the creation of possible settlement value if a judge in a non-Delaware
court is unfamiliar with Delaware law and fails to dismiss weak claims).
63
Under a recent Delaware Chancery Court decision, forum selection bylaws designating a court in
Delaware as the exclusive forum for litigation relating to internal affairs can be valid. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). In a subsequent decision, the court
also held that a forum selection bylaw designating courts in the state in which the headquarters of the
Delaware corporation reside is valid both facially and as applied. City of Providence v. First Citizens
Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229 (Del. Ch. 2014) (permitting a bylaw change that designated the state in
which the corporation’s headquarters is). These bylaw changes, on balance, are more likely to increase
the dominance of the Delaware judiciary. In 2015, Delaware amended its corporation law to expressly
permit Delaware corporations to have a forum selection clause in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws designating Delaware as the exclusive state in which all internal corporate claims may be brought
and to expressly prohibit them from having provisions in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws prohibiting such claims from being brought in Delaware. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2015). This legisla-
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When the Securities Exchange Act and Delaware governance law are
combined, they are in large measure consistent with the sole owner standard.64 In Delaware, for example, in In re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine Jr. stated:
Delaware law has seen directors as well-positioned to understand
the value of the target company, to compensate for the disaggregated nature of stockholders by acting as a negotiating and auctioning proxy for them, and as a bulwark against structural coercion. Relatedly, dispersed stockholders have been viewed as
poorly positioned to protect and, yes, sometimes, even to think
for themselves.65
Are there challenges to implementing the sole owner standard in judicial proceedings?
Control transactions typically are effected in one step—a cash merger
or its equivalent—or in two steps—a direct share purchase through a tender
offer from shareholders followed by a cash merger or its equivalent cashout transaction. Regardless of the forms, however, they typically have the
following key dates under the U.S. model: (1) the date on which the process
for a possible control transaction is initiated (the initiation date), (2) the date
on which Gatekeepers decide to or decide not to let the shareholders make a
collective decision on the transaction (the Gatekeeper decision date), (3) the
date on which shareholders make a collective decision based on the Gatekeepers’ decision on the Gatekeeper decision date (the shareholder decision
date), and (4) the date on which the control transaction is completed after
the shareholders’ favorable collective decision on the shareholder decision
date (the completion date). As to (3) above, if the relevant transaction is in
the form of a one-step acquisition, the shareholders’ collective decision is
made at a shareholders meeting. If it is in the form of a two-step acquisition, the shareholders’ collective decision to approve the transaction may
have to be made in two stages. The first stage decision is made by tendering
a number of shares enough to meet the minimum tender condition of the
relevant tender offer. If the bidder fails to accumulate enough shares to entitle him or her to effect the second step without having shareholder approval,
the second stage decision must be made at a shareholders meeting to aption appears to overrule the City of Providence decision. In 2014, there was a marked increase in the
percentage of “M&A litigation” filed in Delaware compared to several preceding years. KOUMRIAN,
supra note 61, at 3. “This is likely are result of wide spread adoption of forum provisions in corporate
bylaws . . . .” Id.
64
See Schwartz, supra note 6. However, commentators have differed significantly as to the utility
and risks associated with the use of target directors. For examples of contrasting positions, see Martin
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 103 (1979); Bebchuk, The Case
Against Board Veto, supra note 7. See also supra note 50.
65
808 A.2d 421, 441 (Del. Ch. 2003). See also In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 503, 525
(making the same point).
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prove the second step cash squeeze out. Regardless of the need to have such
a shareholders meeting, the acquisition of shares is made in two stages. The
five successive phases the key dates create will be referred to as Preinitiation Phase, the Gatekeeping Phase, the Shareholder Deliberation Phase, the
Execution Phase, and the Postcompletion Phase. 66 As described below,
these phases may have unique TPs and dynamics.
Chart 1
Transaction Flow and Timing of a Court Decision
A Initiation

Preinitiation

Court
Decision

B Gatekeeper C Shareholder D Completion
Decision
Decision

Gatekeeping

Shareholder
Deliberation

Precompletion

Postcompletion

1. Before C
2. Before D
3. After

D

A hallmark of the U.S. approach is to let Gatekeepers make initial decisions. This is consistent with the ripeness requirement applicable generally to judiciaries in the United States.67 Thus, judiciaries intervene in any
dispute between the shareholders and the Gatekeepers only on or after the
Gatekeeper decision date.
D. Ex Post Judicial Policing: Amplified Needs and Difficulties
1. Preexisting Problems Amplified and Ex post Judicial Policing
Becoming Both More Crucial and More Challenging
As stated,68 among non-freeze-out control transactions, those involving
companies with preexisting TPs and related director agency problems are

66

See infra Chart I.
See, e.g., Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 740 (Del. Ch. 2007) (citing 15 JAMES WM. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 101.76[1][a], ¶ 101.76[2] (3d ed. 2006) (denying a request for
declaratory judgment confirming the validity of a bylaw change proposed to shareholders stating that the
dispute was unripe)).
68
See supra Part II.B.1.
67
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disproportionately represented. As also stated,69 among freeze-outs, those
involving companies with minority shareholders with preexisting TPs are
disproportionately represented. The preexisting TPs and agency problems
tend to persist and intensify during the Gatekeeping Phase and the Shareholder Deliberation Phase. The buyers are also tempted to exploit the problems. This is likely to mean that among the companies requiring effective
ex post judicial policing, the companies with the preexisting TPs will be
more disproportionately represented. The ex post judicial policing must be
able to effectively address the TPs at Stage I.70
2. Gatekeeping Activities Make Policing More Challenging
Once directors or controllers assume Gatekeeping roles, the TPs and
related agency problems take on vastly different modalities. This affects the
attributes the judiciaries need to police them effectively.
3. Acquisition of Companies with Dispersed Shareholders:
Directors Acting as Gatekeepers
Once directors are given a Gatekeeping role, they can and sometimes
must adopt defense measures, and the TPs and related agency problems
during deal phases could take on vastly different modalities.71 First, shareholder AIPs could dramatically worsen during the Gatekeeping Phase and
the Shareholder Deliberation Phase. Deal-related communication with existing bidders or proposed or potential bidders will be primarily with the target
boards. Negotiations will be delicate and nuanced and often will have elements of a mind game. Many deal points will need to be negotiated. In addition, directors are unable to disclose everything they know. For example,
they may have to posture from time to time and to maintain their negotiating leverage, should not show all of their cards during the Shareholder Deliberation Phase. They may have to comply with contractual confidentiality
obligations. It is advisable not to disclose information to preserve attorneyclient privilege or to maintain its propriety value.72 Moreover, it may be difficult to communicate certain types of information accurately to the shareholders.73 Deal negotiations may move quickly. Thus, during these phases
69

See supra Part II.B.2.
Note that if any preexisting agency problem involves a breach of fiduciary duty, it could also suggest the judiciary’s inability to police the agency problem associated with the control transaction.
71
Cf. supra Parts II.A.1., II.B.1.
72
See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in
Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 58 n.19 (1985) (“[M]anagement
may have access to valuable information that cannot be made publicly available without destroying its
value.”).
73
For example, when they resist unsolicited overtures, boards may argue the existence of a substan70
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the information asymmetry between the Gatekeepers and the shareholders
will become greater than when the boards are not acting as Gatekeepers.
Second, shareholder CAPs may worsen due to rapid and less predictable developments, increased fluidity of the shareholder bases, asymmetric
information, and possible exploitations of the problems by third parties,
such as actual and potential bidders. Third, potential agency costs relating
to boards’ Gatekeeping function become higher. During the Gatekeeping
Phase and the Shareholder Deliberation Phase, there is “the omnipresent
specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests.”74 Board
members perform complex tasks, their discretions are wide, and they often
act behind the scenes. This increases the potential agency costs.75 Note that
the conduct the potential conflicts engender include those that might exacerbate the TPs. For example, the directors may be tempted to be less upfront about what they are doing than when they do not act as Gatekeepers.
They may choose to time various events to make coordination among
shareholders difficult. Control transactions may be induced by the target
boards’ agency problems.76 In these situations, unless the targets’ directors
are completely oblivious to their possible predicaments, they tend to be
even more conscious of their job security. If so, the agents have even more
acute conflicts of interest77 and may attempt to block the proposed transactions or curry favor with the bidders, in each case more so than when they
do not act as Gatekeepers. Fourth, third parties—including existing, proposed, and potential bidders—may be more strongly tempted to exploit the
tive coercion, which assumes “an informational disparity between target managers and shareholders.”
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is
There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 260 (1989). Substantive coercion is
“the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve management’s representations of intrinsic value.” Id. at 267. See also Black & Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover
Law, supra note 15, at 523. Noted commentators, however, have argued that the substantive coercion
argument does not have an empirical foundation in the modern marketplace in the United States. See,
e.g., Subramanian, Bargaining, supra note 50, at 633–35.
74
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). For final period problems,
see, for example, Black & Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law, supra note 15, at 559 (stating that the
decisions the directors have to make are “decisions that place . . . directors in a final period problem,
where agency costs are likely to be high,” and that “[c]ontrol contests and board decisions to reject all
bidders raise final period problems similar to those that arise in mergers and sales of all or substantially
all assets, and could plausibly call for similar regulatory treatment”); Bebchuk, The Case Against Board
Veto, supra note 7, at 991 (referring to this as “ex post agency costs”).
75
See, e.g., Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, supra note 11, § 2.1. (“The greater the complexity of the tasks undertaken by the agent, and the greater the discretion the agent must be
given, the larger these ‘agency costs’ are likely to be.”).
76
See supra Part II.B.1.
77
See Gomez & Saez, supra note 12, at 284–85. In addition to “conflicted motives,” the agents may
also suffer from “cognitive biases”; “[u]nderperforming managers can be reluctant to acknowledge mistake, rather explaining bad strategy as market misvaluation.” Enriques et al., The Case for an Unbiased
Takeover Law, supra note 37, at 10.
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conflicts of interest than when they do not act as Gatekeepers.78 Finally,
these four modalities combine to magnify the risk that the Gatekeepers will
engage in “pretextual justifications.”79
4. Acquisition of Minority Shares by Controllers: Controllers
Acting as Gatekeepers
In the United States, freeze-outs can be effected in one step or in two
steps. 80 If the controllers choose to effect a freeze-out through one-step
transactions, as long as they already own the requisite percentage of shares
that assures a favorable voting result, voting decisions by minority shareholders do not affect the outcome.81 In a tender offer by the controllers, minority shareholders can choose not to tender their shares. If, however, the
controllers already own the requisite percentage of shares that assures a favorable voting result, the minority shareholders’ decisions as to the tender
offers do not affect the outcome. Thus, these are self-dealing transactions in
which the controllers have the most acute conflicts of interest but are not
subject to an outright prohibition. In the self-dealing context, minority
shareholders are generally in riskier positions than the shareholders in control transactions in which board members act as Gatekeepers. All the complications described in Part II.D.2.a. exist in their extreme forms. Robust
judicial policing is necessary to protect minority shareholders.
III. EX POST JUDICIAL POLICING OF GATEKEEPERS: TWIN
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
As shown, under the U.S. model, judiciaries capable of effectively policing Gatekeepers are crucially important. Are shareholder lawsuits to police Gatekeepers unique? If so, what prerequisites do judicial systems need
to meet to effectively police the Gatekeepers?

78

See, e.g., Subramanian, Bargaining, supra note 50, at 664–65.
See, e.g., In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The Topps board’s
negotiating posture and factual misrepresentations are more redolent of pretext, than of a sincere desire
to comply with their Revlon duties.”); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch.
2010) (stating that in situations where heightened scrutiny applies, “the court seeks . . . to . . . smoke out
mere pretextual justifications for improperly motivated decisions”). If the directors are permitted to consider the interests of constituents other than the shareholders, they should be able to come up with any
number of pretexts that are on the surface not facetious.
80
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2014); Bainbridge, supra note 53, at 20.
81
However, minority shareholders might vote against the freeze-outs to exercise appraisal rights.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2014).
79
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A. Twin Problems re Initiation and Prosecution of Lawsuits
1. Twin Problems
For a judiciary to perform the policing function described above, 82
someone has to file and prosecute a lawsuit against the Gatekeepers. However, TPs also plague the initiation and prosecution of shareholder lawsuits.
As stated,83 among the companies requiring effective ex post judicial policing, those having preexisting problems tend to be disproportionately represented. The preexisting TPs could be further carried over to the initiation
and prosecution of the lawsuits to police the Gatekeepers. Effective mechanisms must exist to solve the TPs.
(a) Collective Action Problems
Shareholders may have direct claims84 against the Gatekeepers. However, they face CAPs. A lawsuit is costly, time consuming, and often unpredictable as to both the process and the outcome. Shareholder lawsuits
against Gatekeepers alleging the breach of fiduciary duties are inordinately
technical and complex and often are fast moving. Frequently, they have to
be filed quickly to preserve the status quo and require quick tactical decisions.85 It is typically against strongly motivated, well-financed, and wellcoordinated defendants.86 Free riders may emerge. If one conducts a costbenefit analysis, typically it does not make sense for a small shareholder to
file a lawsuit individually and to invest sufficient time and other resources
in the lawsuit.87 A fluid shareholder base exacerbates the CAPs.88 There82

See supra text accompanying notes 54–57.
See supra Part II.B.
84
Shareholders may be able to derivatively sue corporate fiduciaries to enforce the claims of corporations against the corporate fiduciaries. However, in the context of M&As generally, there are often
situations in which the shareholders suffer but the companies do not suffer from the Gatekeepers’ misconducts. Thus, in general derivative suits are less important than direct suits. For example, in Delaware
derivative suits against fiduciaries involving public company acquisitions represent a minor portion
when compared to class actions. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of
Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 167–69 (2004)
[hereinafter Thompson & Thomas, The New Look]. In addition, there may be restrictive rules relating to
filing of derivative suits. As to the hurdles of Delaware’s appraisal rights, see Gilson & Gordon, Controlling Controlling, supra note 9, at 798–99; Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 48, at 30–31.
85
See infra Part III.C.2.
86
“[I]t is not necessarily true . . . that parties with greater financial resources are unable to improve
their position before a judge by hiring a more skilled or articulate legal advocate.” John Armour et al.,
The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical
Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 230 (2011) [hereinafter Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile
Takeover Regimes] (citation omitted).
87
There may be shareholders who have large and unique stakes. For example, unsolicited suitors,
83
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fore, unless the judicial system has features or tools to neutralize the CAPs,
the expected shareholder-initiated judicial policing will not materialize.
(b) Asymmetric Information Problems
Shareholders also face acute AIPs when they decide whether they
should file lawsuits and when they prosecute such lawsuits. The most sensitive and delicate facts crucial to the court’s determination on the merits of
the shareholders’ fiduciary duty claims against Gatekeepers are in the hands
(or minds) of the fiduciaries or those on the fiduciaries’ side. Shareholders
are not necessarily privy to the intricacies of the Gatekeepers’ decisionmaking processes during the Gatekeeping Phase.89 Of course, extensive disclosures may be made to the public. Such information, however, is typically
insufficient to evaluate whether the Gatekeepers have complied with their
duties. Moreover, it is difficult for shareholders to know if the disclosure is
adequate90 unless they have access to undisclosed information. 91 In addition, agents may try to finesse their public disclosure to avoid giving any
hint of impropriety.92 In short, shareholder lawsuits are “‘outsider-lookingin’ litigation”93 and are plagued by acute AIPs.94
while their shareholding interests are small, have a big stake in the outcome of their challenge against
board members. They may want to prosecute their own lawsuits, particularly if they can seek anticipatory relief. For such examples in Delaware, see infra note 171 and accompanying text.
88
See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and
Class Action Settlements, 59 U. FLA. L. REV. 71, 74–77 (2007); Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, supra
note 60, at 153; PACCES, supra note 13, § 5.5.2.1; Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1791.
89
Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracts and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the
Evolution of Novel Contract Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170, 207 (2013) (“[T]he emphasis is on process
rather than detailed rules.”). “[T]he focus is on process rather than on substantive facts.” Id. at 208
90
For example, when the applicability of a substantive judicial standard depends on a shareholder
decision made on an informed basis, plaintiff shareholders may have to know facts that have not been
disclosed to them. See, e.g., In re Pure Resources, Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 450–51 (Del. Ch.
2002) (14D-9’s failure to disclose material information). Absent a means to find such facts that have not
been publicly disclosed, such a substantive judicial standard does not work.
91
See, e.g., Bernard Black, The Core Institutions That Support Strong Securities Markets, 55 BUS.
LAW. 1565, 1574 (2000) (stating that “[p]roving misdisclosure often requires information that is buried
in the company’s records”).
92
See id. at 1588–89, 1601–02.
93
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors and Scope, 52
ALA. L. REV. 529, 610 (2001). Major proxy advisory firms have class action services. See, e.g., Maximize Recoveries and Meet Fiduciary Responsibilities with Securities Class Action Services, INST’L
S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., http://www.issgovernance.com/scas; Right Claim, GLASS, LEWIS & CO., LLC,
http://www.glasslewis.com/solutions/right-claim. However, their roles in shareholder class actions relating to control transactions appear to have been limited.
94
For impacts of information asymmetry between parties on dispute resolution, see, for example,
Keith N. Hylton, Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 33
(2006); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND. J.
ECON. 404 (1984).
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Since the Gatekeepers’ tasks are complex and their discretion is wide,
their agency costs can become heavy.95 Accordingly, the tasks of the judiciary to police the agency problems become complex and intricate. The judiciary will not be able to render decisions with confidence unless it has full
factual information. This means in particular that shareholders in the process of litigation need to have a strong means to obtain relevant information, including information in the hands (or minds) of defendants.
2. Solutions
(a) Solutions to Collective Action Problems
Opt-out class actions with an appropriate cost arrangement could
greatly reduce CAPs at the initiation and prosecution phase of shareholder
lawsuits.96 John Coffee stated that an opt-out class action “is usually justified as necessary to solve collective action problems that render small
claimants rationally apathetic.”97
While not much attention has been paid to this, restorative and anticipatory relief also helps reduce CAPs with respect to the initiation and prosecution of lawsuits. As will be discussed,98 however, in most shareholder
lawsuits against Gatekeepers restorative relief is not desirable.
Typically, anticipatory relief has direct or indirect effects or impacts
that are helpful to all the shareholders and reduce CAPs. For example, if an
injunction is issued, other shareholders can receive the immediate benefits
of and essentially free ride on the decision. This is true if the particular jurisdiction does not have the concept of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).99 If a declaratory judgment is issued in a jurisdiction where issue preclusion is recognized, other shareholders can rely on its precedential
value. 100 Even if issue preclusion is not recognized, in most shareholder
suits in the context of control transactions “there are questions of law or fact

95

See supra text accompanying note 75.
See, e.g., Black, supra note 91, at 1574, 1601–02 (advocating the use of a class action or similar
system to support a strong securities market). Class action is a type of aggregate litigation. For various
types of aggregate litigation, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 298–304 (2010).
97
See Coffee, supra note 96, at 298.
98
See infra Part III.B.
99
For the anticipatory effect of issue preclusion, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 700 (1994) [hereinafter Landes &
Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication].
100
As to the preclusive effects of such determinations, see, for example, Samuel R. Bray, Preventive
Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1291–96 (2010). The preclusive effects are generally broad since
shareholder suits tend to have common legal or factual issues.
96
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common to the [shareholders].” 101 Thus, unless the defendant thinks the
case was erroneously decided and the judgment is timely, the defendant
may refrain from taking actions that would cause damages or may take actions to reverse the course of earlier actions to prevent such damage, which
benefits other shareholders.102
Depending on the allocation or calculation of the costs of class actions,
potential plaintiffs could be reluctant to file lawsuits, or they may not have
lawyers who are willing to represent them. A contingent fee arrangement is
helpful but not enough.103 First, the plaintiffs want to make sure that if they
lose they do not have to pay fees for the defendants’ lawyers.104 Second, if
they win they need to come up with the money to pay the contingent fees to
their own lawyers under the American Rule.105
There is yet another issue. As expected, in opt-out class actions most
typically the lawyers representing the classes drive the process. Nominal
plaintiffs possess neither the requisite expertise nor strong incentives or resources to effectively monitor and control their lawyers in such suits. Further, depending on the financial arrangement, the stakes of plaintiffs’ lawyers in the lawsuits may be far greater than those of the named shareholders
and are not completely aligned with those of the shareholders in the class.106
Thus, another agency problem will emerge, but the TPs hamper the ability
of the shareholders in the class to monitor the agents. Further, in class actions seeking anticipatory relief, plaintiffs’ lawyers have to make quick decisions on a wider range of issues than in class actions seeking monetary
payments only. This could increase the attorney agency costs. Generally, a
generalist court less knowledgeable than plaintiff lawyers is not able to effectively control the attorney agency costs. A specialist court can help alleviate the attorney agency costs in class actions against the Gatekeepers.

101

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
This is not to suggest that all the shareholders have the same goals. In some situations, they may
want to pursue different remedies. See, e.g., Kingsbridge Capital Group v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 1989
Del. Ch. LEXIS 87, at *4–5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1989).
103
Cf. Black, supra note 91, at 1574 (“Contingent fee arrangements are a useful supplement to the
class action procedure, but in my judgment not essential.”).
104
Under the English Rule, losers pay winners’ attorney fees. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 96, at 292
n.8. For the history of the English Rule, see also John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee
Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570–71 (1993).
105
As to the American Rule, see Vargo, supra note 104, at 1571. For the history of the American
Rule, see id. at 1575–78.
106
As to the agency costs of various players in shareholder lawsuits, see Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1768–73 (2012). For agency problems in and alternatives to
opt-out class action lawsuits in general, see Coffee, supra note 96.
102
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(b) Solutions to Asymmetric Information Problems
In an adversarial system, one approach to alleviate shareholder AIPs is
to allow the shareholder plaintiffs to demand relevant information from the
defendants and third parties. A negative inference can be used to incentivize
a party that has asymmetrically more information to produce evidence.107
Thus, shifting the burden of proof108 to the Gatekeepers—the parties that
have asymmetrically more information—is also likely to reduce the AIPs.
The burden shifting could be especially effective when self-dealings are involved.109 It should have a dramatic effect in jurisdictions where the threshold for the burden of proof is high.110 In the context of corporate control
lawsuits against Gatekeepers, burden shifting is not necessarily unfair: typically in anticipation of shareholder lawsuits they are often in a position to
create and maintain records to prepare, defend, and exonerate themselves
against meritless lawsuits.
The need for the means to uncover facts in the possession of Gatekeepers or third parties of course exists with respect to facts that plaintiffs
have to prove. The same need, however, also exists with respect to facts that
the defendants have to prove: the plaintiffs might have to undermine the
credibility of the proof the defendants have offered.
B. Twin Problems re Ex Post Restorative Relief to Undo a
Shareholder Collective Decision or Transaction
1. Twin Problems
On the Gatekeeper decision date, Gatekeepers may decide to let share107
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, How Presumptions Should Be Allocated: Burden of Proof, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 632 (1994) (Res ipsa
loquitur “arose to offset systematic biases that were introduced into litigation as a function of access to
evidence,” and it “persists in these post-discovery days because of its added incentive to the full production of information, which is at the heart of modern litigation theory”). See also id. at 636 (stating that in
a prediscovery time in the United States, res ipsa loquitur was a tool for the court to uncover facts otherwise unavailable); see also Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 6 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1045, 1054–55 (1991) (describing burden shifting in relation to duty of loyalty cases due to AIPs).
108
In this article, unless otherwise specifically noted, “burden of proof” means the burden of persuasion or risk of nonpersuasion and does not include the duty of producing evidence or the production
burden. For explanations of the concept, see Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51,
51 (1961); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477,
1502–07 (1999).
109
Black, supra note 91, at 1588–89. The use of circumstantial evidence should also be permissible.
Id.
110
See Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 243, 248 (2004) (“Any high standard of proof makes burdens of proof critical to outcome.”).
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holders consider a proposed control transaction and make a collective decision on it.111 Gatekeepers’ breaches of their fiduciary duties, however, may
adversely affect the integrity of the shareholders’ collective decision. For
example, conflicts of interest might have caused the Gatekeepers to make
recommendations to shareholders that they should not have made. The
Gatekeepers may have failed to make a fair disclosure to the shareholders.
In two-step freeze-outs controllers’ tender offers in the first steps might
have been coercive.
Typically, however, the TPs will make it costly and time-consuming to
undo the shareholder collective decision, repeat the Shareholder Deliberation Phase, and restore integrity to the shareholders’ collective decision.112
This should become clear if one notes that the Shareholder Deliberation
Phase is unnecessary in the absence of dispersed shareholders. One will also note that the reversal should be much simpler if shareholders are not dispersed.
Once control transactions are completed and the Postcompletion Phase
commences, it is generally even more impractical, disruptive, costly, and
time-consuming to restore the status quo ante. There will be related transactions and other important changes simultaneously with or soon after the
completion date.113 These will make the reversal difficult even when the
ownership is not dispersed and no TPs exist. The TPs, however, make the
reversal particularly difficult.114 In the case of tender offers, promptly after
the tender offer periods, shares and money change hands. In the case of
one-step mergers, pursuant to the merger agreements, the transactions are
effected and shares change hands in due course. The TPs make the task of
reversing the transfer of shares no small task.115

111

See supra Part II.C.
In fact, due to the TPs, collective decisions tend to be formed over a period leading up to the day
of reckoning. Thus, any court decision to fix such decision-making processes is somewhat “restorative”
even if the court decision is made before the shareholder decision date. In view of this restorative nature,
as the shareholder decision date comes close, the court may become increasingly reluctant to disrupt the
timing of that date. See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 60, at 1367 (describing a
plaintiff’s lawyer’s complaint that “it was hard to get a preliminary injunction hearing in merger cases
until shortly before the shareholder vote, when there was almost no chance the judge would delay the
vote”).
113
When financial buyers are involved, simultaneously with the closings, for example, the shares
and/or assets of the targets may be pledged to secure the loans the proceeds of which are used to pay the
purchase prices.
114
Cf. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981) (indicating a possibility of
rescission of the sales of shares pursuant to a tender offer), overruled in part on other grounds by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
115
Typically, courts do not get into the details of the enormity and complexity of the undoing of
completed transactions. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (stating in
relation to a controller freeze-out merger approved by a majority of the minority shareholder vote based
on deficient disclosure that “[s]ince it is apparent that this long completed [freeze-out merger] transac112
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No less importantly, at least as to non-freeze-out control transactions, 116 the control transaction opportunities might entirely disappear if
courts are to undo the distorted shareholder decisions or transactions approved by such decisions. If so, restorative remedies may create situations
worse for the shareholders than when such remedies are not ordered.
2. Solutions
We need to explore whether there are adequate alternative remedies.
Major alternatives worthy of examination are damage and anticipatory remedies.
C. Inadequacy and Inefficiency of Ex Post Damage Relief
1. Inadequacy and Inefficiency
(a) Adequacy of Ex Post Damage Relief
(i) Directors as Gatekeepers
Damage remedies are often inadequate or inappropriate for breach of
fiduciary duties by directors committed in connection with control transactions. “[I]n corporate law [standards of conduct and standards of review]
often diverge. The reasons are rooted in policy interests. First, directors
must make decisions in an environment of imperfect information. Second, . . . any risk of liability would likely dwarf the incentives for assuming
the role.”117 Therefore a relaxed standard is typically used to judge whether
tion is too involved to undo, and in view of the Chancellor’s discretion, the award, if any, should be in
the form of monetary damages based upon entire fairness standards, i.e., fair dealing and fair price”);
Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981) (stating that rescission of the sales of
shares pursuant to a tender offer is not feasible due to a subsequent merger of the target into another
company and other changes), overruled in part on other grounds by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983); Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1062 (Del. Ch. 1987) (assuming
implicitly that a shareholders’ collective decision on a self-tender offer suffering from inadequate disclosure and coerciveness cannot “easily be undone”); Elster v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 128 A.2d 801, 805
(Del. Ch. 1957) (“In cases involving the sale of corporate assets or their merger with those of another
corporation, slight delay may in itself lead to the denying of a motion for injunctive relief where such an
order would involve a complex undoing of an accomplished corporate act.”); In re Siliconix Inc.,
S’holders Litig., 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *66 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (stating that a completed exchange offer is difficult to unwind). For the difficulties in undoing M&A deals involving public targets
when there is a contractual breach, see John C. Coates IV, Managing Disputes Through Contract: Evidence from M&A, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 295, 311–12 (2012).
116
As to freeze-outs, no other bidders will surface unless controllers decide to sell their positions.
117
William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1296 (2001) [hereinafter Allen et al., Function Over Form]
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directors made a legally cognizable error in business judgments.118 To further reduce the risk of liability, statutory exemptions may be created. For
example, it may be wise to exculpate directors from claims for damages
arising out of a violation of their fiduciary duties unless such a violation
constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty or an act or inaction taken in bad
faith.119
In addition, damage awards are not adequate to compensate the victims
if the directors are unable to satisfy the monetary obligations. Directors may
be wealthy but not wealthy enough to pay such damages out of their pockets. Directors’ and officers’ insurance has exclusions,120 may be too expensive, or may not cover the full liability. The insurers may become insolvent.121 The companies may not indemnify directors against the payment of
such damages.122 Therefore, there are situations in which the feasibility and
adequacy of nonmonetary relief should be explored.123

(footnote omitted). See also Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of
Shareholders as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH ch. 3, § 3.6.1 (Reinier Kraakman et al., 2d ed. 2009) (text accompanying notes 128–32).
118
Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 117, at 1296.
119
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014). As to Japan, see, for example, Kaisha-hō
[Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 427 (Japan) (allowing corporations to have preset limits on
the amounts of damages payable by nonexecutive directors for breach of fiduciary duties not amounting
to gross negligence through provisions in articles of incorporation).
120
The exclusions may include liabilities arising out of “deliberately fraudulent misconduct” and
“transactions resulting in an individual receiving any personal benefit or advantage to which he is not
legally entitled.” See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2007); Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 2: Court Procedures, Indemnification and Insurance, and Administrative and Criminal Liability (Report to The Russian Securities
Agency), 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 77–79 (2008) [hereinafter Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 2]; Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1055, 1085–88 (2006).
121
Id. at 1088.
122
Id. at 1093–94. For surveys of directors’ liability, including indemnification, see generally
DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY: A WORLDWIDE REVIEW (Alexander Loos ed., 2d ed. 2010); Bernard Black et
al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1: Substantive Grounds for Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 614 (2007) [hereinafter Black et al.,
Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1]; Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and
Company Officials Part 2, supra note 120.
123
If anticipatory adjudication is available and rendered against director decisions, those decisions
may be subject to reputational sanctions. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors
in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholders Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV.
1465, 1488–90 (2007); Allen et al., Function over Form, supra note 117, at 451 n.10 (“Directors are
reputationally sensitive and likely will try to avoid making decisions that could be enjoined by a
court.”). The reputational sanction, however, will be weak if the public is not properly sensitized. See
Gomez & Saez, supra note 12, at 285–87.
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(ii) Controllers as Gatekeepers
Controllers may owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders.124 Controllers’ failures to discharge their fiduciary duties in relation to freeze-outs
typically means that the shareholders would have been better off if it had
not been for such failures. Unlike directors, however, controllers are more
likely to have resources to pay damages from their failures to observe their
fiduciary duties in the transactions.
(b) Efficiency of Ex Post Damage Relief
(i) Directors as Gatekeepers
The efficient breach hypothesis—the claim that “loss-based measures”
are superior “because they enable the parties to avoid performance that is
more costly than the benefit created”125 or “court-ordered expectation damages (a liability rule) lead parties to maintain or abandon prior agreements
efficiently”126—has long been an influential principle.127 There has been a
contractual understanding of fiduciary duties:128 “[t]he duty of loyalty replaces detailed contractual terms, and courts flesh out the duty of loyalty by
prescribing the actions the parties themselves would have preferred if bargaining were cheap and all promises fully enforced. The usual economic assessments of contractual terms and remedies then apply.”129 There can be
instances in which fiduciary duties may be efficiently breached.130
Importantly, however, a simple calculation shows that unless self124
In Delaware controllers owe duties to minority shareholders. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. For Japan, under the prevailing view, the answer is no. See infra note 417 and accompanying
text.
125
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425,
441 (1993) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty].
126
Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the
Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 384–85 (2005).
127
For a short history and development of the hypothesis, see id. at 384 n.11. See also Alan
Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting
for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369 (1990). There has been a recent lively debate as to the validity of the theory. For a short list of critics of the efficient breach hypothesis, see Daniel Markovits &
Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV.
1929, 1940 n.5 (2011).
128
See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 441–44.
129
Id. at 427. See also Cooter & Freedman, supra note 107, at 1048–49; John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 28
(1999).
130
However, damage remedies appropriate for the breaches are not necessarily expectation damages
and can be damages short of full restitution damages. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and
Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 442–44.
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dealing is involved,131 the efficient breach theory in most instances does not
justify directors’ breaches of their duty of loyalty. In these situations any
surpluses created or losses avoided by the breach are not likely to be sufficient to compensate the shareholders for the losses the breach would
cause.132
For example, suppose the directors of a company decide to sell the
company they serve to one bidder over another bidder. The terms the two
bidders proposed are identical except that the second bidder indicates a
willingness to offer a price substantially more than the price the first bidder
offers. The directors choose the first bidder, since the first bidder has indicated a willingness to keep the incumbent directors after the acquisition.
Ordinarily, possible losses to the shareholders substantially exceed any gain
the directors realize from the job security the first bidder offers the directors. For the same reason, if directors of a target company deploy or maintain a poison pill to protect their jobs, the economic value of the job security
is likely to be substantially outweighed by the shareholders’ loss of the opportunity to be bought out by the bidder.133
When directors acting as Gatekeepers are in breach of their fiduciary
duties, the negotiations with bidders have been skewed. This could lead to
less optimal transactions than when the directors discharge their duties in
negotiating the deal. This rationale is also applicable to a breach of the duty
to disclose.
In the first example above, depending on the circumstance,134 if the
court orders an injunction, it may encourage the directors to renegotiate
with the bidder in compliance with their fiduciary duties. In the second example above, in most instances if the court issues an injunction to redeem
the poison pill, the directors may be encouraged to negotiate with the hostile bidder and possibly others in a manner consistent with their duties. In
many instances timely issued and appropriately crafted remedies resulting
from anticipatory adjudications135 should be more efficient than expectation
131
For an example of the definition of self-dealing, see Luca Enriques, The Law on Company Directors’ Self-Dealing: A Comparative Analysis, 2 INT’L & COMP. L.J. 298, 299 (2000). Management buyouts (MBOs) are self-dealing transactions. It is easy to conceive situations where Kaldor-Hicks efficiency exists; the buyers’ gains will exceed the losses of the target shareholders. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 42 (6th ed. 2012).
132
No Kaldor-Hicks efficiency exists.
133
This should follow from the following proposition: “[T]he amounts that you need to pay managers to do the right thing are generally small compared to the benefits that doing the right thing creates for
shareholders.” Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill:
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 901 (2002).
134
Of course, by the time of the decision the second bidder might have lost interest in the target, and
there may be no other prospective bidders. In a case like this, it may be disadvantageous to the shareholders if the court issues an injunction.
135
The terminology is borrowed from Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99.
While Landes and Posner did not define the term, the concept includes declaratory judgment, temporary
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damages even if the directors are fully capable of paying the damages.136
In addition, even in self-dealing transactions, such as management
buyouts (MBOs), where there could be net surpluses from a breach, there
are circumstances beyond the reach of the theory.137 For example, damages
from a failure to observe the duty to disclose are difficult to measure.138 It
may be difficult for a court to reconstruct a likely transaction scenario that
would have ensued had there been no violation of fiduciary duties. For example, in discussing whether the irreparable injury requirement for a preliminary injunction is satisfied in a case involving a breach of the Revlon
duty, the Delaware Chancery Court stated:
No doubt there is the chance to formulate a rational remedy down
the line, but that chance involves great cost, time, and, unavoidably, a large degree of imprecision and speculation. After-the-fact
inquiries into what might have been had directors tested the market adequately or stockholders been given all the material information necessarily involve reasoned guesswork.139
restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction. Id. Such adjudication is contrasted
with “ex post adjudication.” Id. at 685. The concept includes administrative and other types of nonjudicial adjudication. In this paper the term denotes adjudication in a lawsuit against a Gatekeeper relating to
his or her adherence to his or her fiduciary duties in performing Gatekeeping activities and of the types
Landes and Posner contemplate. The concept therefore is different from the “preventive adjudication”
that Samuel Bray used. See Bray, supra note 100, at 1300 n.100. Bray contrasts the concept with “remedial adjudication” that “correct[s] past harm” and does not include injunction. Id. at 1276. Anticipatory
adjudication also differs from “restorative adjudication,” which restores the status quo and includes both
rescission and mandatory injunction. See generally, e.g., DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A.
PITTENGER, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY §§
12.02[c], 12.04[a] (2014). With respect to a typical fiduciary duty lawsuit against Gatekeepers seeking
anticipatory adjudication, “the facts bearing on the plaintiff’s entitlement to judgment have already occurred . . . .” Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99, at 699. “[C]ases . . . in which
the facts bearing on legal entitlement are in existence rather than contingent even though no one has yet
been injured . . . .” Id.
136
Anticipatory adjudication may have yet another efficiency gain: there is no need to calculate
damages. See Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99, at 699; William Savitt, The
Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 570, 583 n.41 (2012). Richard
Brooks and Warren Schwartz pointed out certain efficiency gains from preliminary injunctions. See
Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 126, at 384–85. The efficiency gains, however, are those derived in the
context of and assume the existence of decisions on the merits after trial and are different from those
described here.
137
See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 445.
138
See, e.g., In re Anderson, Clayton S’holders’ Litig., 519 A.2d 669, 676 (Del. Ch. 1986). In the
REX II Tokyo High Court decision, the court recognized breach of the duty to disclose but stated that
plaintiffs failed to prove damages from the breach. See infra note 577.
139
In re Netsmart Technologies, Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 207 (Del. Ch. 2007). See also
Coates, supra note 3, at 17 (pointing out that “damages from broken deals are hard to estimate and
prove” as a factor to make the parties to agreements to acquire companies with dispersed shareholders
prefer to have specific performance remedies in the agreements); MASAKAZU SHIRAI, YŪKŌTEKIBAISHŪ
NO BAMEN NI OKERU TORISHIMARIYAKU NI TAISURU KIRITSU [RULES APPLICABLE TO DIRECTOR
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If so, it will be also difficult to calculate damages. Anticipatory corrections, however, should lead to informed shareholder decisions. 140 In instances like this, “[t]ransaction forcing remedies” may be superior.141 This
is particularly true if the dispersed shareholders suffering from the TPs have
agents—such as independent directors—who can effectively negotiate for
them. Restorative remedies and anticipatory remedies can be contractforcing remedies.
(ii) Controllers as Gatekeepers
In freeze-outs, unless a special self-help mechanism is chosen to be
adopted,142 controllers engage in self-dealing transactions and there can be
no real negotiation, and no re-negotiation will be induced. Further, unlike
the situations described above, 143 there is a real possibility that the selfdealing transactions in which the controllers breach their duties to the minority shareholders will create net surpluses. 144 Therefore, there is a real
likelihood of an efficient breach. In addition, controllers typically have resources to pay the monetary awards after the transactions.145 Thus, the need
for anticipatory adjudication is less than when the Gatekeepers are directors
in relation to non-freeze-out control transactions.146

CONDUCTS IN FRIENDLY ACQUISITIONS] 510 n.1765 (2013).
140
Cf. Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical
Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015) (suggesting that Delaware’s disclosure
only settlements in relation to mergers have not meaningfully changed shareholder voting).
141
See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 445. See also
Edelman v. Freuhauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (issuing a preliminary injunction (i) enjoining
the use of corporate funds and attempts to preempt a bidding contest designed to assist a management
group’s defensive MBO and to prevent a third-party hostile bidder from acquiring the company, a Michigan corporation, and (ii) opening a fair auction process). Often, however, damage remedies may still be
superior. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 433, 442–43
(regarding management’s self-dealing transactions, including MBOs).
142
For example, the use of both an independent committee approval and a majority of the minority
condition may remove the self-dealing nature. See, e.g., In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 503
(Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d by Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). See also Gilson &
Gordon, Controlling Controlling, supra note 9, at 804 (stating that an independent negotiating committee and a rigorous judicial review serve to ensure that the minority will receive “some portion of the gain
that would result from bargaining in a bilateral monopoly”).
143
See supra Part III.C.1.b.i.
144
See supra Parts II.A.2., II.B.2.
145
See supra Part III.C.1.a.ii.
146
See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 433 (stating that
remedies for a majority shareholder’s breach of his or her duty to minority shareholders are usually loss
based).
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2. Solutions
As described above in the context of lawsuits against Gatekeepers,
damage relief rendered for breach of fiduciary duties is frequently inadequate or inefficient. This is particularly true when control transactions are
not self-dealing transactions. As aforementioned, restorative remedies are
often impractical, costly, inadequate, and inefficient. Further, if they are enforced, restorative remedies may cause great harm to third parties who have
entered into contracts with the companies.147
Anticipatory adjudication rendered during the Shareholder Deliberation Phase will reduce or preempt circumstances in which the court would
have no choice other than to award damage relief even if such relief would
be inadequate or inefficient. 148 It may induce renegotiations untainted by
conduct in breach of fiduciary duties.149 Further, it may reduce hardships to
third-party contractors if restorative relief is rendered.150
In anticipatory adjudication rendered in the context of control transactions, predictability is less of a concern since the court expresses its view
before decisions of Gatekeepers can have real negative consequences. No
irreversible shareholder decisions have been made. Often their breach of fiduciary duties has not yet caused fatal, irreparable damages.151 Anticipatory
adjudication has an added benefit of allowing the court to render decisions
tailored to the specific circumstances.152
147

See, e.g., Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate
Lock-Ups, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1999); Celia R. Taylor, “A Delicate Interplay”: Resolving the Contract and Corporate Law Tension Mergers, 74 TUL. L. REV. 561 (1999).
148
The ex post aspect sometimes creates a less-than-ideal situation in which, due to deal dynamics,
it is too late for the court to fashion anticipatory relief. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41
A.3d 432, 449–52 (Del. Ch. 2012). See also supra note 112.
149
See supra Part III.C.1.b.i
150
See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 842 (Del. Ch. 2011) (indicating
the possibility for a contractual right of a third party to prevail over the interests of shareholders once the
challenged transaction has been completed and thus an egg has been scrambled). See infra text accompanying note 260. See also supra note 148.
151
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 250–51 (1985); Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1085 (2000) (indicating that an injunction, a
form of anticipatory relief, does not require as much predictability as a damage remedy). Ehud Kamar
stresses the importance of predictability in business planning and strongly suspects the suboptimality of
Delaware’s indeterminacy. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1919–23 (1998). Significantly, however, Kamar failed to recognize
that predictability is less important if judicial determination is in the form of anticipatory adjudication.
See also Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 881–87 (1981) [hereinafter Gilson, Structural Approach] (describing possible demerits of specific rules).
152
See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 151, at 1084 (“Corporate law in particular, because of the essentially
unlimited range of structural possibilities, may make ex ante specification difficult.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
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Anticipatory relief, however, has to be timely, and the window available for the adjudication is often narrow.153 In particular, with respect to control transactions that the Gatekeepers have agreed to let shareholders decide, the adjudication must be made before the shareholders’ collective
decisions. To reduce TPs relating to the shareholder decisions, the U.S.
model gives a minimum window of time leading up to the decisions.154 In
lawsuits seeking anticipatory relief, “time is of the essence,” and the court
renders decisions “on the fly.”155 Thus, the court that handles lawsuits seeking anticipatory relief must be equipped to move quickly. It may not have
time to hold a trial or other formal fact-finding proceedings. Further, anticipatory adjudication generally has greater administrative and error costs. 156
If interlocutory injunctions are erroneously rendered, often due to deal dynamics ultimately attributable to TPs, they are likely to cause irreversible
consequences.157 Delay in the timing of the initiation of the adjudication
may increase the ripeness of the matter and reduce such costs. However,
that will further shorten the window of time to render the adjudication. In
addition, crafting injunctive remedies requires intimate knowledge of deal
documents and familiarity with deal dynamics.158
Specialized judges help remove or alleviate these potential risks. 159
Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in
the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1275 (2001) (“Complex human behavior rarely lends itself to bright-line
rules.”). Lack of predictability, however, also creates the need for anticipatory adjudication to avoid dire
adverse consequences that might result from corporate fiduciaries’ misapplication or misinterpretation
of fiduciary duty law.
153
In the context of a hostile offer, the bidder does not necessarily have a fixed deadline. However,
if another bidder surfaces all of a sudden, it becomes necessary for the dispute to be resolved before the
shareholder action on the other bid. Further, it is costly for the hostile bidder to maintain the hostile bid
for a prolonged period. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 922–23 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards].
154
See supra Part II.C.
155
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Fine Art of Judging: William T. Allen, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 914,
916 (1997) [hereinafter Gilson, The Fine Art] (“[T]he Court of Chancery was, de facto, the court of first
and last resort for many takeover contests and was restructuring corporate law on the fly.”).
156
Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99, at 685.
157
First, a window of time to correct the errors that control transactions can afford to have is too
short for the court to render final decisions. Second, the erroneous decisions tend to have immediate and
irreversible effects on the deal dynamics of a transaction. See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note
135, § 10.02 (referring to “the powerful and often sweeping effects that such a conclusion and the issuance of an interim injunction can engender”).
158
See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 449–52 (Ch. Ct. 2012).
159
There can be “specialist” judges in courts of general jurisdiction. See Edward K. Cheng, The
Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519 (2008) (stating that judges are more specialized
than popularly understood and discussing the merits and demerits of specialization). See also Rochelle
C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1995).
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They are familiar with both typical fact patterns160 and legal issues, and do
not require time to get up to speed.161 This also helps reduce court administrative costs.162 It may be difficult to have time to appeal lower court decisions.163 Thus, it would be desirable if such specialists existed at the level of
the court of first instance.
There is yet another factor that would complicate the administration of
anticipatory adjudication in shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers: such
adjudication often must be made in response to class action lawsuits. The
judiciary has to address the agency problems of the attorneys representing
the classes. 164 Class action lawsuits seeking anticipatory relief present
unique agency problems compared to class actions seeking damage relief.
This is because the attorneys have to make judgments on wide-ranging issues, including business issues, and negotiate with the Gatekeepers and
possibly other parties to craft tailored equitable remedies. Judges handling
such lawsuits deal with wide-ranging issues and exercise wider discretion
than judges in damage suits. Again, specialist judges are the answer to the
need to deal with such agency problems in the fast-moving and complex judicial proceedings.
D. Summary
TPs continue to plague control transactions during shareholder lawsuits to resolve agency problems closely related to such TPs. They plague
lawsuits at both Stage I and Stage II. Conceptually, it is easy to identify solutions for the TPs at Stage I. As to Stage II, damage relief as an alternative
to restorative relief is often inadequate and inappropriate, particularly with
respect to lawsuits involving third-party acquisitions. Often anticipatory relief substantially sidesteps the adverse consequences of restorative relief relating to control transactions. It may also induce economically efficient
transactions. However, the relief imposes a heavy burden on the judiciary

160
This may be important in relation to decisions, such as interlocutory injunctions, that are issued
without a full fact-finding proceeding. For example, specialist judges are able to contextualize statements in deposition transcripts. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private
Benefits of Control: Ex ante Control Mechanisms versus Ex post Transaction Review, 169 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL ECON. 160, 178 (2013) (describing a situation in which a specialist judge does not need a
trial to reach an accurate result but an inexpert judge may reach a wrong result even after a trial).
161
See Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99, at 713; Cheng, supra note 159,
at 548–90.
162
See Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99, at 714. The greater administrative cost may be unavoidable. However, the sizes of the stakes in shareholder class actions against Gatekeepers may warrant the greater cost.
163
See Gilson, The Fine Art, supra note 155, at 915–16 (stating that many preliminary injunction
cases did not have a chance to reach the Delaware Supreme Court).
164
See infra Part IV.A.1.a.i.
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and requires the judiciary to have special attributes.
IV. UNITED STATES
A. Delaware
1. Strategies to Reduce the Twin Problems of Initiation and
Prosecution of Lawsuits
(a) Collective Action Problems re Initiation and Prosecution of
Lawsuits
(i) Class Actions
Under Delaware’s judge-made law, directors of Delaware corporations
owe fiduciary duties to the company shareholders as well as to the corporations.165 Similarly, controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to corporations and minority shareholders.166 Shareholders167 and corporations generally have standing to file direct lawsuits to enforce their rights against the
fiduciaries.
In contested acquisitions unsolicited suitors often file lawsuits against
the targets’ directors to seek anticipatory relief, such as preliminary injunctions.168 The suitors’ standing in such lawsuits is based on their ownership
of shares in the target companies. Economically, however, it is not their
share ownership that justifies the lawsuits. Rather, their large stakes as hostile suitors economically justifies the lawsuits.169 In these situations, other
165

See, e.g., Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1122 n.54 (Del. Ch. 2004).
See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–15 (Del. 1994).
167
See, e.g., Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 199 A.2d 760, 766 (Del. Ch. 1964) (stating that beneficial
owners of shares, such as those holding shares under street names, have standing as shareholders). Cf.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(c) (2014) (“The stock ledger shall be the only evidence as to who are the
stockholders entitled by this section to examine the list required by this section or to vote in person or by
proxy at any meeting of stockholders”); see also, § 262 (providing that a record holder has an appraisal
right). However, shareholders do not have standing to sue for breaches committed before they became
shareholders. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 809 A.2d 1163, 1169–70 (Del. Ch.
2002). With respect to derivative suits, this position is codified. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2014).
168
See Thompson & Thomas, The New Look, supra note 84, at 169 tbl.2. A significant percentage of
the direct individual lawsuits were “by bidders either in hostile transactions or in second bidder situations.” Id. at 174.
169
See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc., 809 A.2d at 1172 (indicating in a decision denying a hostile bidder’s
standing that bidders’ interests as shareholders are often “immaterial”). See also EDWARD WELCH ET
AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION UNDER DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW § 3.02[B]
(2012) [hereinafter WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION]. The prospects of the
monetary and other costs, however, might discourage potential bidders from launching the bids. Note
166
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shareholders will benefit from the lawsuits, particularly if the bidders win
anticipatory relief.170 However, the interests of the unsolicited suitors and
the other shareholders may diverge.171 More importantly, these lucky situations are hard to come by.
Delaware’s opt-out class actions,172 combined with a regime for the
calculation of fees for the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the allocation of the costs
of the lawsuits,173 greatly alleviate shareholder CAPs in relation to the initiation and maintenance of individual (versus derivative) shareholder lawsuits against corporate fiduciaries.174 The “decisions are res judicata as to
the entire class.” 175 The Delaware judiciary is keenly aware of the importance of its opt-out class action regime. For example, the Chancery
Court recently stated that “[t]he class action mechanism originated in equity
practice and is particularly important to the substantive law of corporations
as a mechanism to address collective action problems.”176
The expert court monitors the agents for the classes. Class representatives must be those who will fairly and adequately protect the class interests177 and owe fiduciary duties to the class.178 The selection of counsel at
the outset of the lawsuits is one of the most important tasks of the court
with which the lawsuits are filed.179 In selecting lead counsel, “the weight
that other potential bidders might be able to free ride on the first bidders’ efforts.
170
See supra Part III.A.2.a. Class action lawsuits may also be filed. When bidders file lawsuits,
however, class action plaintiffs tend to take a backseat to the bidders. See also Thompson & Thomas,
The New Look, supra note 84, at 139–40.
171
See, e.g., Kingsbridge Capital Group v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 87, at *4–5
(Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1989); Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 778 (D.
Del. 1988).
172
Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23(a). The court rules governing class actions in Delaware are “modeled substantially upon Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, §
9.03[a] (citing Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 9154, 920 (Del. 1994)). For the limitation of the opt-out
right, see, for example, In re Phila. Stock Exch., Inc., 945 A.2d 1123 (Del. 2008) (stating that opt out as
of right is available only from a class certified by Court of Chancery Rule 23(b)(3)). In European jurisdictions, “opt-in” class actions seem to predominate. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 96, at 301, and authorities cited therein.
173
See infra Part IV.A.1.a.ii.
174
The Delaware General Corporation Law does not authorize a class appraisal proceeding. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a)–(d) (2014).
175
See, e.g., Dieter v. Prime Computer, Inc., 681 A.2d 1068, 1073 (Del. Ch. 1996).
176
In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., 2012 WL 1020471, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, remanded by BVF Partners L.P. v. New Orleans Emps. Ret. Sys. (In re Celera
Corp. S’holder Litig.), 59 A.3d 418 (Del. 2012). See also In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig.,
879 A.2d 604, 643 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stressing the importance of maintaining the integrity of a representative suit).
177
Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23(a)(4).
178
See, e.g., Barbieri v. Swing-N-Slide Corp., 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at *15–16 (Del. Ch. May 7,
1996).
179
Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23(a)(4). See also Savitt, supra note 136, at 578–81.
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given to the size of a plaintiffs’ holding . . . comes into play when a plaintiff
owns a sufficient stake to provide an economic incentive to monitor counsel
and play a meaningful role in conducting the case.”180
It is also necessary for the court to monitor such representatives and
lawyers on an ongoing basis to avoid or minimize the litigation agency
costs.181 Thus, “[a] trial court has a continuing duty in a class action case to
scrutinize the class attorney to see that he or she is adequately protecting the
interests of the class.”182 A court “must throughout the proceedings, stringently apply the requirement of adequate representation . . . .”183 Thus, for
example, the court may order changes to the lead counsel positions.184 Settlements of class action lawsuits are also subject to court approval.185
An equally potent and “cost efficient” mechanism to control the litigation agency costs (and align the interests of the plaintiffs’ lawyers)186 is the
court’s ability to award or adjust legal fees to the plaintiffs’ lawyers.187 Further, recently the Delaware judiciary crafted a judicial standard that would
reduce “settlement value” from certain types of lawsuits.188
In Delaware, notwithstanding the race to the bottom problem that
might have been created by the prevalence of multijurisdictional lawsuits,189

In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 955 (Del. 2010). See also Del. Ch. Ct. R.
23(a)(4). Other states may still have the first-filer rule, and the divergence in the methods of selecting
lead counsel is one reason for the prevalent multistate jurisdictional lawsuits. See, e.g., Armour et al.,
Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 60, at 1373. For an analysis of the impacts of the lead plaintiff
provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Publ. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), see, for example, James D. Cox et al., Does the Plaintiff
Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587
(2006).
181
See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 9.03[a].
182
In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 955 (quoting 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B.
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:22, at 417 (Thomson West 4th ed. 2002)).
183
Guerine v. J & W Inv., Inc., 544 F.2d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1977).
184
See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 961–64.
185
Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23(e). For the importance of this power, see, for example, Savitt, supra note 136,
at 575.
186
The award of more than $304 million to plaintiffs’ counsel in the context of a derivative suit resulting in an award of more than $2 billion is the most notable recent example. In re S. Peru Copper
Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012).
187
See, e.g., Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 60, at 154–55; Savitt, supra note 136, at 576–
77. For the ability of the court to award legal fees to plaintiffs’ lawyers, see infra Part IV.A.1.a.ii.
188
In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 504 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kahn v. M & F
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
189
See Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed Complaint, 69 BUS.
LAW. 1, 14 (2013) [hereinafter Strine et al., Putting Stockholders First] (“[T]he prevalence of multiforum litigation and the inability or unwillingness of courts to limit such litigation can exacerbate . . .
‘race to the bottom’- type behavior . . . .”). Delaware’s efforts to control litigation agency costs may encourage certain plaintiffs’ lawyers to file in courts outside Delaware. See Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits,
180
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litigation agency costs appear to be constrained at a level not overly excessive relative to the benefits, that is, the reduction of agency costs relating to
the Gatekeeper/shareholder relationship. 190 A delicate balancing act by
“specialist judges”191 appears to have prevented the problems from growing
out of control.192
(ii) Costs of Lawsuits
The Chancery Court is entitled to “make such order concerning costs
in every case as is agreeable to equity.”193 In exercising such authority,194
the court generally allows a prevailing party to recover certain costs from
the losing party. Such costs typically “consist of so-called court costs, witness fees, and statutory delineated charges.”195 In particular cases, the court
can deviate from the norm.196
As to all the more important attorney fees, however, the court generally defers to the American Rule. Under the rule, each litigant is responsible
for the fees of his or her own counsel. 197 Therefore, typically each party
bears his or her costs of attorney’s fees.198 There are certain exceptions to
the rule.199 Under the so-called common fund or substantial (or therapeutic)
benefit doctrine, a litigant or a lawyer who creates a common fund or
achieves a substantial benefit, as the case may be, is entitled to a reasonable

supra note 60, at 155.
190
At least it is not typical for acquisition agreements for control transactions to have a clause specifically providing for a price adjustment directly or indirectly linked to the cost of litigation to defend
fiduciary duty claims raised in connection with the contemplated transaction. As to the level of legal
fees, see infra Part IV.A.1.a.ii.
191
See infra Part IV.A.2.c.
192
See, e.g., Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 60, at 155.
193
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5106 (West 2015). This is viewed as a restatement of “the longexisting rule of equity.” WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 13.01. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 6510 (2015) (providing that courts may award costs relating to declaratory judgments “as may
seem equitable and just”).
194
Del. Ch. Ct. R. 54(d).
195
WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 13.02[b] (footnote omitted).
196
Del. Ch. Ct. R. 54(d).
197
See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 13.03[a] (footnote omitted); WELCH ET AL.,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 11.02[A].
198
See, e.g., In re SS & C Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 948 A.2d 1140, 1149 (Del. Ch. 2008); Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 386 (Del. Ch. 1966).
199
For the types of exceptions, see, for example, Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG v. Johnston, 705 A.2d 225, 231 (Del. Ch. 1997), aff’d, 720 A.2d 542 (Del. 1998). See also ATR-Kim Eng Fin.
Corp. v. Araneta, 2006 WL 3783520, at *22 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006), aff’d, 930 A.2d 928 (Del. 2007);
WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 13.03[a] (giving a list of exceptions). As to the history of and
exceptions to the rule, see Vargo, supra note 104, at 1570–90.
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attorney’s fee.200 The common fund doctrine requires that the fees be paid
out of the funds created by the litigant or lawyer.201 If the created benefits
are therapeutic, however, no funds for such payments exist. In the context
of a shareholder lawsuit, “because the corporation is the only vehicle
through which the costs of obtaining the benefit can be equally shared,”202
the court may obligate the companies to shoulder the fees.203
In the context of shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers, the calculation and allocation of attorneys’ fees are very important.204 The foregoing
rules regarding attorney fees make named plaintiffs in class actions less
concerned with the costs of class action lawsuits.205 On the other hand, the
plaintiffs’ attorneys, who work on a contingent fee basis, have a potentially
significant upside of being rewarded with lucrative fees.206 The Delaware
judiciary has made conscious efforts to craft a fee structure that gives
healthy incentives to plaintiff’s lawyers to solve “a collective action problem that might stifle individual stockholders from litigating general breaches of duty”207 and to seek real benefits in class actions.208
200
See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, §§ 9.05[a], 13.03[e]. These doctrines also apply
in settings other than representative suits. See, e.g., Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162,
1166 (Del. 1988); WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 13.03[e].
201
See Vargo, supra note 104, at 1579–83. For an example of fee awards under the common fund
doctrine, see Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1253 (Del. 2012).
202
Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 141, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1988)
(citing Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 148–49 (Del. 1980)). See also Mills v. Elec.
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970).
203
See, e.g., In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S’holder Litig., 756 A.2d 353, 359–60 (Del. Ch.
1999). See also WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 9.05[g]; WELCH ET AL., MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 5.01[C][6].
204
See supra text accompanying notes103–105.
205
Preliminary injunctions are conditioned on the posting of a bond. However, generally the amount
has not been prohibitively high. See, e.g., Marc Wolinsky & Ben Schireson, Deal Litigation Run Amok:
Diagnosis and Prescriptions, 47 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 1, 6 (2014).
206
See Weiss & White, supra note 55, at 1830 (“[L]itigating merger-related class actions in Delaware Chancery Court appears to be a lucrative area of practice for the plaintiffs’ bar.”). See also Strine et
al., Putting Stockholders First, supra note 189, at 15 n.49 (“The data on attorney’s fee awards in stockholder representative litigation show that it is not the case that Delaware judges are reluctant to award
fees in meritorious cases.”).
207
WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 170, § 11.02[A][1].
See also In re Cox Commc’ns S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 642–48 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re Fuqua Indus., Inc. S’holder Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 133 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that the cost and fee-shifting
mechanisms are used to “economically incentivize” private lawyers). See generally Jason W. Adkins, A
Guide to Predicting the Calculation of Attorneys’ Fees Under Delaware Law for Shareholder Lawsuits,
37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 501 (2012).
208
Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1255 (Del. 2012). In May 2014, the Delaware
Supreme Court, in response to certified questions, rendered a decision stating that a bylaw provision
approved by a board to shift attorney fees in intracorporate litigation to losing claimants is not invalid
per se. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 554–560 (Del. 2014). The case involved
a Delaware non-stock corporation. However, the holding is also applicable to Delaware stock corpora-
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Studies indicate that the fees paid to plaintiffs’ lawyers in relation to
acquisitions have been modest compared to the transaction values.209 For
example, a study focusing on mergers for the years from 1990 to 2001 in
which the target companies were publicly traded Delaware corporations
with deal values in excess of $100 million shows that class action plaintiffs’
lawyers in settled lawsuits earned fees per case of 0.19% of the deal value
on average, ranging from 0.005% to 1.36%.210 According to another study,
for settlements of lawsuits of deals in 2011, the mean attorneys’ fee was
$1.43 million, and the median fee was $580,000. There appears to be no
discernible upward trend from 2005 to 2011. 211 Class action lawsuits involve players other than the plaintiffs’ lawyers, such as judges, lawyers for
the defendants, witnesses, and people involved in document production in
response to discovery requests. The statistical information does not include
the costs relating to these additional players. The magnitude of the fees paid
to plaintiff’s lawyers, however, could be a good indicator of the total costs
of lawsuits. If so, the magnitude of the additional costs may not be prohibitively high. At least it does not appear very likely that the prospect of the
cost of class action lawsuits will significantly deter efficiency-enhancing
transactions.212
(iii) Anticipatory Relief
As described below,213 the Chancery Court has the power to render anticipatory relief. Delaware recognizes issue preclusion.214

tions. After much debate, Delaware amended its corporation law, which now prohibits such fee shifting
in connection with an internal corporate claim. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(f) (2015).
209
See Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 48, at 45 (stating that a percentage of litigation
costs in effect incurred by controllers is small relative to deal values).
210
Weiss & White, supra note 55, at 1831. These figures can be compared against the fees payable
to “investment bankers, lawyers, and accountants in arms-length transaction,” ranging from “1.0% to
2.0% of deal value.” Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 48, at 45.
211
See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 61, at 12, 13 tbl.10 (a study covering 2007–11).
212
See, e.g., Thompson & Thomas, The New Look, supra note 84, at 140. With respect to merger
freeze-outs, see Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 48, at 47. In a recent article Charles
Korsmo and Minor Myers suggest various proposals to reduce attorney agency costs in shareholder class
actions challenging mergers. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829 (2014).
213
See infra Part IV.A.2.a.
214
In Delaware mutuality is no longer required for issue preclusion. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 A. 260, 264 (Del. 1934).
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(b) Asymmetric Information Problems re Initiation and Prosecution
of Lawsuits
(i) Fact-finding
Delaware’s discovery system215 addresses the AIPs during Stage I. 216
Importantly, in the context of lawsuits against Gatekeepers, it allows shareholder plaintiffs to expeditiously delve into and uncover the process of decision making by the Gatekeepers and their advisors, including the documents, e-mail communications, and conversations crucial to their cases.
Subject to certain exceptions, the parties are entitled to obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of any documents, electronically
stored information, or tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.217
“Relevance” is defined broadly.218 The parties may seek information
that is “inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”219 In addition, the court does not have jurors.220 Thus, the judge in charge of the case
reviews the results of the discovery directly without first removing inadmissible evidence.
Discovery tools include depositions, interrogatories, production of
documents, and requests for admission.221 In the context of fiduciary duty
215
DEL. CH. CT. RS. 26–37. The Chancery Court’s discovery rules are “parallel in most respects
their counterparts in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, §
6.01. Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the Chancery Rules do not require the automatic production of initial disclosure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A). For the role of discovery in
shaping the corporate governance in the United States, see Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate Governance: The Missing Story About the “Genius of American Corporate Law,” 63 EMORY L.J. 1384 (2014).
216
See supra Part III.A.1.b. See also Veasey, supra note 56, at 7 (stating that Delaware corporate
jurisprudence has a “fact-intensive aspect”).
217
DEL. CH. CT. R. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, “[n]o longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.”
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (footnote omitted). See also Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing
Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV.
691 (1998). On April 29 of 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States proposed amendments to the
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure.
The
proposed
changes
are
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf. The changes became effective on December 1, 2015. The proportionality factors in the amended Rule 26(b)(1) explicitly include
information asymmetry.
218
See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 215, at 1413–14.
219
Id.
220
See infra note 321 and accompanying text.
221
DEL. CH. CT. RS. 26–37.
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lawsuits relating to control transactions, along with document requests,
depositions222 are typically the most important tool to find out what transpired behind the scenes.223 Depositions may be taken from third parties as
well as from the parties.224
Typically, the parties drive the discovery process, including depositions. Therefore:
Neither leave of court nor the presence of a judge or commissioner was required. Both supporting and hostile witnesses could now
be deposed, including party opponents and their employees. Parties were required to appear on simple notice. Third parties could
be subpoenaed directly without leave of court. Attorneys could
directly examine the witnesses.225
Notice pleading is generally applicable. 226 Therefore, plaintiffs only
need to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for relief to overcome a motion to dismiss. 227 Plaintiffs can pursue discovery only after lawsuits are
filed.228 However, plaintiffs may be able to amend original pleadings after
the commencement of the discovery.229 Therefore, if plaintiffs do not have
enough relevant facts or supporting evidence when they commence lawsuits, it should not necessarily lead to a judgment on the pleadings.
Discovery may be expedited.230 Typically, discovery precedes preliminary injunction hearings.231 This is important since anticipatory relief is of-

222

DEL. CH. CT. RS. 26–31.
See, e.g., WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, §
8.01[B] (“Document requests and depositions are usually the most frequently used discovery tools in
deal litigation.”).
224
DEL. CH. CT. R. 30(a). See also DEL. CH. CT. R. 45 (subpoena to compel the attendance of witnesses).
225
Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 215, at 1411 (footnotes omitted).
226
DEL. CH. CT. R. 8(a)(1). The US Supreme Court now uses “plausibility” to decide if a claim survives a motion to dismiss. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). However, the Delaware Supreme Court has not abandoned its traditional
and less strict “conceivability” standard. See Central Mortg. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg., 27 A.3d 531,
536–37 (Del. 2013).
227
For summary judgment, see infra text accompanying notes 297, 298.
228
Unlike the rules of some other states, the Delaware Chancery Court Rules omitted Rule 27 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Deposition to Perpetuate Testimony). See, e.g., JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL et al., CIVIL PROCEDURE 405 (4th ed. 2005).
229
DEL. CH. CT. R. 15. See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 4.07[a]. Cf. Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988) (involving a claim plaintiffs filed after discovering new
facts in an appraisal proceeding).
230
See infra Part IV.A.2.b.
231
To facilitate efficient discovery before a preliminary injunction hearing, the Chancery Court also
issued the Court of Chancery Guidelines for Expedited Discovery in Advance of a Preliminary Injunction Hearing. DEL. CH. CT., COURT OF CHANCERY GUIDELINES FOR EXPEDITED DISCOVERY IN
ADVANCE
OF
A
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
HEARING
(2013),
223
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ten the most efficient remedy.232
(ii) Burden of Proof
Discovery in Delaware, described immediately above, makes AIPs less
acute. However, in general, it will take more time and will cost more for the
parties who suffer from the AIPs to dig up, uncover, and assemble evidence
on a particular issue.233 The time element is particularly important in the
context of anticipatory interlocutory relief.234 The preponderance of the evidence standard in Delaware makes the possibility of a false negative or
Type II error less likely than when a higher standard of proof is used. 235
Burden shifting, however, may still be effectively used to further ameliorate
the AIPs and avoid judgments that are false negatives or Type II errors.236
Courts can use burden shifting for various reasons. 237 However, the
guiding rule for allocating the burden of proof “put[s] it on the party having
the readier access to knowledge about the fact in question.” 238 This approach has been generally used in the context of shareholder lawsuits
http://courts.state.de.us/chancery/docs/PIDiscoveryGuidelines.pdf.
232
See supra Parts III.B, III.C.
233
See Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 419 (1997).
234
See infra Part IV.A.2.a.i.
235
See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 505 (Del. Ch. 2013) (a similar statement), aff’d by
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014); In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d
531, 548 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that the effect of burden shifting is “slight” when the standard to be
applied is the preponderance standard, since “the outcome of very few cases hinges on what happens if
in [sic] the evidence is in equipoise”). However, there are also certain areas in which the Delaware
Chancery Court has applied higher evidentiary standards, such as a clear and convincing standard. For
example, the court requires a plaintiff to show his or her entitlement to specific performance by clear
and convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re IBP S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 52 (Del. Ch. 2001) (noting
that New York’s evidentiary standard is a preponderance standard).
236
See, e.g., Andrew Johnston, Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the
City Code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422, 441 (2007) (suggesting that in England, to lighten the evidentiary
burden of proving an improper purpose of directors when they deploy a defense measure, the common
law could have moved to create a rebuttable presumption that “once the board has notice of a bid then
actions that make the bid less likely to succeed are for an improper purpose”).
237
James, supra note 108, at 58 (“The allocation is made on the basis of one or more of several variable factors.”).
238
Id. at 60. Similarly:
In determining whether the normal allocation of the burden of proof should be altered, the
courts consider the knowledge of the parties concerning the particular fact, the availability of
the evidence to the parties . . . .
. . . The court may also consider [in allocating the burden of proof] which party will usually
be best situated to carry or meet the burden of proof. The party with greater expertise and access to relevant information should bear the evidentiary burdens of production of evidence
and persuasion.
31A C.J.S. Evidence § 196 (2014) (footnote omitted).
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against corporate fiduciaries involving the duty of loyalty.239
In fiduciary duty cases in Delaware, “a great deal of judicial time and
energy is devoted to explicating and refining . . . burden-shifting rules.”240
Fiduciary duty standards may contain context-specific pronouncements relating to the allocation of the burden of proof.241 The Delaware legislature
recognizes the judiciary’s burden-shifting practice in enacting Section 203
of the General Corporation Law, the Delaware General Assembly specifically acknowledged “the case law development of directors’ fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in responding to challenges to control or the burden
of proof with regard to compliance with those duties.”242 There is no obvious indication that the Delaware judiciary is deviating from the general
practice described in the preceding paragraph.
2. Strategies to Avoid Ex Post Restorative Relief to Undo a
Shareholder Collective Decision or Transaction
Under the current federal tender offer and proxy rules, we do not see
control transactions that are signed and closed simultaneously.243 As shown
below, Delaware’s judiciary has in its arsenal the power to issue various
types of anticipatory relief having varying degrees of formality and speed.
The judiciary’s speed, expertise, and flexibility—each backed by equity
tradition—help it engage in anticipatory adjudication without suffering
from excessive administrative or error costs. Conditions for the issuance of
anticipatory relief are also largely conducive to efficiency-enhancing resolutions to shareholder disputes with Gatekeepers. The expertise helps manage the attorney agency costs relating to class actions, especially those that
may arise in class actions to seek anticipatory relief. Thus, Delaware’s judiciary is equipped to follow the strategy to implement the solutions outlined
in Part III.C.2. above. In anticipatory adjudication there is less need for pre-

239
See, e.g., Cooter & Freedman, supra note 107, at 1053–56 (giving examples of allocating the
burden to corporate fiduciaries when they have easier access to relevant information).
240
CHARLES M. YABLON, A Theory of Presumptions, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY, AND RISK 227, 231
(2003). See also Charles M. Yablon, On the Allocation of Burdens of Proof in Corporate Law: An Essay
on Fairness and Fuzzy Sets, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 497 (1991).
241
See, e.g., Allen et al., Function over Form, supra note 117 (describing various judicial standards
with attendant allocations of the burden of proof); Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 48, at 63
fig.1. (showing the allocation of the burden of proof for each judicial standard applicable to a particular
freeze-out scenario).
242
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (synopsis) (reprinted in DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 23.03) (emphasis added)).
243
See supra Part II.C. In addition, as to transactions of any significant size, premerger notification
is also required. See generally 1 LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF
COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES, AND DIVISIONS § 5.04, at 5-183 to 5-184.11, § 5.09, at 5-228 to 5-240
(2012) (describing premerger notification rules of U.S. and certain non-U.S. jurisdictions).
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dictability. 244 Widely acknowledged indeterminacy, 245 mushiness, 246 or
muddiness247 of the decisions of the Delaware judiciary may be attributable
to the judiciary’s frequent use of anticipatory relief. 248 Further, notwithstanding the “mushiness” and “muddiness,” because of the Chancery
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, 249 there is less “indeterminacy” than when
multiple courts apply such standards.
(a) Anticipatory Relief
“[T]he Court of Chancery has broad flexibility and discretion with respect to the relief it may award”250 or has broad discretion to “fashion such
relief as the facts of a given case may dictate.”251 In exercising such power,
the court issues anticipatory relief, such as declaratory judgments, temporary restraining orders (TROs), preliminary injunctions, and permanent injunctions. Here we will focus on the last three types of remedies. 252 The
Court of Chancery, if necessary, compels obedience to its in personam orders using its contempt powers.253

244

See supra Part III.C.2.
Kamar, supra note 151, at 1909.
246
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1009, 1101–03 (1997) (characterizing Delaware’s fiduciary duty case law as “mushy”).
247
Fisch, supra note 151, at 1083.
248
Id. (“Cases in which a court is considering a request for preliminary relief are apt to appear more
indeterminate than cases in which the litigants have developed a complete factual and legal record.”). Cf.
Kamar, supra note 151, at 1939 (“[A] more plausible explanation links the indeterminacy of Delaware
law to the influence of the corporate bar, judicial preferences, and a court-centered legal culture.”).
249
See infra Part IV.A.2.c.i.
250
WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 12.01[a] (footnote omitted).
251
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983). See also Int’l Telecharge, Inc. v. Bomarko, Inc., 766 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 2000); GPC XLI L.L.C. v. Loral Space & Communs. Consol.
Litig., 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 136, at *119 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008) (“Our Supreme Court has emphasized the broad remedial power of this court to address breaches of the duty of loyalty”). See also
WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 12.01[a] (footnote omitted); Jack B. Jacobs, The Uneasy Truce
Between Law and Equity in Modern Business Enterprise Jurisprudence, 8 DEL. L. REV. 1, 5–9 (2005) (a
transcribed version of the Regent’s Lecture that Justice Jack B. Jacobs gave at the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law on Feb. 3, 2005, in Los Angeles); Myron T. Steele & J.W. Verret, Delaware’s Guidance: Ensuring Equity for the Modern Witenagemot, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 189, 191–92
(2007).
252
In some situations shareholders sought declaratory judgments. See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys.,
Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) (plaintiff seeking both declaratory and injunctive remedies);
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011) (same). For the explicit
authority of the court to render declaratory judgments, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6501–13 (2015).
See also Del. Ch. Ct. R. 57. Sometimes the threshold issue is whether the claim is ripe: the court does
not entertain the request unless the issue is fit for review in a situation where hardship will not result if it
withholds its judgment. See, e.g., Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 740 (Del. Ch. 2007).
253
See WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, §§ 12.01, 12.02[b].
245
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(i) Interlocutory Injunctions
TROs and preliminary injunctions are interlocutory injunctions. Unlike
a TRO, a motion for a preliminary injunction is typically heard after the
parties have had an opportunity to take discovery and develop a record.254
Unlike permanent injunctions, however, preliminary injunctions may be issued without having a full trial. Thus, it takes less time for the court to decide on motions for preliminary injunctions than permanent injunctions.255
In the context of control transactions, preliminary injunctions have
been the most important tool for shareholders when they challenge Gatekeepers.256 In a preliminary injunction proceeding, the applicant must show:
(i) that there is a reasonable probability of success on the merits, (ii) that he
or she will suffer an irreparable injury if such relief does not issue, and (iii)
that the balance of the equities favors the issuance of the injunction, that is,
that the harm from the injunction will not invite greater harm to the defendants, the public, or other identified interests. 257 These conditions are not
mechanically applied, and the court may take into account the strength or
weakness of the showing of each element to come to a final resolution.258
Both factual and legal issues can affect the likelihood of success. If the
issues are factual, however, due to the absence of a full trial, the court
seems reluctant to resolve them. 259 This approach helps the court reduce
254

See supra text accompanying note 231.
See, e.g., City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (ordering
a redemption of a poison pill; criticized as a “narrow and rigid construction of Unocal” and “reject[ed] . . . as not in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis” by Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989)).
256
See, e.g., WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATIONs, supra note 169, §
10.03[B][2] (“Deal litigation frequently involves a request by the plaintiff for a preliminary injunction
preventing the parties to a merger or stock purchase agreement from completing the transaction.”); Savitt, supra note 136, at 590 n.56 (stating the Chancery Court’s “receptivity to preliminary injunction
applications”).
257
See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 435 (Del. Ch. 2012); In re Del Monte
Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 829–30, 39 (Del. Ch. 2011); Lennane v. ASK Computer Sys.,
Inc., 1990 WL 154150, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 1990). The Chancery Court has on occasion formulated
the requirement differently and replaced the third element with the following two: “(3) a balance of the
harms plaintiffs would suffer in the absence of an injunction against the harms defendant would suffer
by the issuance of the injunction; and (4) the public interest.” In re CheckFree Corp. S’holders Litig.,
2007 WL 3262188, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2007). See also Wayne County Employees’ Retirement Sys.
v. Corti, 954 A.2d 319, 329 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2008) (indicating that the modified formulation is in accord
with eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)); WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note
135, § 10.02[b][5]. The court, however, considers the fourth factor of the four-factor articulation within
the third factor of the more common three-factor articulation. See, e.g., Braunschweiger v. Am. Home
Shield Corp., 1989 WL 128571, *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1980).
258
See, e.g., In re TWA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21,
1988).
259
See, e.g., In re Digex, Inc. S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1188 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2000); WOLFE &
255
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false positives or Type I errors in preliminary injunction proceedings.260
“Harm is irreparable unless ‘alternative legal redress [is] clearly available and [is] as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt
administration as the remedy in equity.’”261 If monetary damages are adequate, the requirement is not satisfied. Difficulty in calculating damages,
however, may also lead to the inadequacy.262 Further, if defendants do not
have financial resources to pay potential damage awards or are not creditworthy,263 or if the law limits damage claims, 264 the adequacy of damage
relief is also questionable. When controllers are sued in relation to freezeouts, however, their ability to pay typically is not an issue.265 In addition,
Section 102(b)(7) does not protect the controllers.266 In general, this should
mean that it is more likely for the court to issue preliminary injunctions
when directors are the only defendants than otherwise. Thus, the second requirement is applied generally in a manner to select cases where the use of
PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.02[b][2].
260
Thus, the court tends not to resolve “factual indeterminacy.” For the terminology, see infra note
301. For the error costs of anticipatory adjudication, see supra note 157. The approach will not reduce
false negative decisions. However, the plaintiffs may have opportunities to seek relief after a trial, such
as permanent injunctions and damage remedies in later proceedings.
261
In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 838 (Del. Ch. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting T. Rowe Price Recovery Fund, L.P. v. Rubin, 770 A.2d 536, 557
(Del. Ch. 2000).
262
See, e.g., In re Staples, Inc., 792 A.2d 934, 960 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“[A]n after-the-fact damages
case is not a precise or efficient method by which to remedy disclosure deficiencies.”); see also Savitt,
supra note 136, at 583. As to the prevalence of disclosure only cases, see, for example, Strine et al., Putting Stockholders First, supra note 189, at 8–9.
263
See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 448 (Del. Ch. 2012) (stating that a
defendant may be wealthy but not likely to be wealthy enough to pay a potential adverse judgment).
264
See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods, 25 A.3d at 838 (“Exculpation under Section 102(b)(7) can render empty the promise of post closing damages.”) (“For directors who have relied on qualified advisors
chosen with reasonable care, Section 141(e) provides another powerful defense.”); see also WOLFE &
PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.02[b][4][ii].
265
See, e.g., In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 420 (Del. Ch. 2010) (denying a motion for preliminary injunction, stating, among others things, that “[n]o question has been raised . . . to
cast doubt on [the controller’s] solvency or ability to satisfy a damages award”). The availability of appraisal rights may be considered to tip the balance in favor of not granting injunctive relief. See, e.g., In
re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 210 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Lear Corp. S’holders
Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 123 (Del. Ch. 2007); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. System v. Crawford, 918 A.2d
1172, 1185 (Del. Ch. 2007); Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., 2013 WL 2181518, at *22 (Del. Ch.
May 21, 2013); In re Answers Corp. S’holders Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *38 n.87 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 11, 2011). It, however, does not necessarily preclude the availability of anticipatory relief. See, e.g.,
Cede & Co., v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hung Chem.
Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Del. 1985); cf. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del.
2001) (stating that absent fraud or misleading or inadequate disclosure, a short-form merger is contested
only in an appraisal proceeding). Importantly, the direct and immediate benefits of such rights accrue
only to those who have voted against such organic change and take other steps to perfect the rights. As
to the hurdles of Delaware’s appraisal rights, see supra note 86.
266
See, e.g., In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holder Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014).
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injunctions may be warranted under the analysis of Part III.C. above.
To satisfy the irreparable injury condition in preliminary injunction
proceedings, there must also be a threat of an injury that will occur before a
trial and will not be fully remediable by final equitable relief, such as permanent injunctions267 and rescissions.268 In Delaware, this determination often translates into a determination whether the final relief can be rendered
before a collective action by shareholders on the recommendation by the
defendant Gatekeeper. Often, after the shareholder decision date, due to the
TPs anticipatory relief also becomes inadequate. Thus, for example, the
Chancery Court once stated that a shareholder vote:
[C]an be reversed or . . . declared invalid, the effect of reversing
any exercise of ‘the will of the stockholder’, even for their own
benefit, is to create an insurmountable obstacle of confusion and
antipathy. The Plaintiffs will not be able to achieve the real remedy, i.e., a fair proxy contest with an informed electorate. This disadvantage in waging a later contest substantially tips the “balance
of harms” in favor of the Plaintiffs.269
This is entirely consistent with Part III.C. above.
Further, the court does not grant a preliminary injunction if the “harm,
discounted by its likelihood, is greater than harm to any other person that
the granting of the relief would occasion, discounted by its probability of its
occurring.”270 Even if the court decisions are rendered before shareholder
decision dates, it is possible that the decisions or conduct of the Gatekeepers have already caused procedural harms that are not easily reversible often
due to the twin problems. In such cases, injunctions have restorative effects.271 The balancing of the equities requirement allows the court to refrain from rendering preliminary injunctions in such situations, which is not
inconsistent with Part III.C. above.
Delaware allows mandatory preliminary injunctions. For example, in a
contested acquisition, if the target has already adopted a rights plan and the
267
See, e.g., Gradient OC Master, Ltd. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 930 A.2d 104, 132 (Del. Ch. 2007);
City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 795 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also WOLFE &
PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.02[b][4][i].
268
Also rescissory damages, i.e., “a ‘money award designed to be as nearly as possible the financial
equivalent of rescission.’” MAXXAM, Inc./Federated Dev. S’holders Litig. v. MAXXAM, Inc., 659
A.2d 760, 775 n.15 (Del. Ch. 1995). Sometimes this requirement is considered only implicitly. See, e.g.,
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
269
American Pac. Corp. v. Super Foods, Servs., Inc., 1982 WL 8767, at *326 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6,
1982); see also Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, 2014 WL 1922029, at *24 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (making a similar statement in a case involving a flawed proxy context for the election of directors).
270
Crown Books Corp. v. Bookstop, Inc., 1990 WL 26166, at *731 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1990); Pitts v.
City of Wilmington, 2009 WL 1204492, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2009), reconsideration denied, 2009
WL 1515580 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2009).
271
See supra notes 112, 135.
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bidder needs to avoid a dilution resulting from the rights plan, the bidder
may seek an affirmative injunction requesting that the target board redeem
the plan before a trial.272 In addition, the availability of a mandatory injunction sometimes allows the court to fine-tune its remedy.273 They are restorative. If the court decisions are rendered before the shareholder decision
date, however, they do not reverse shareholder decisions. Therefore, mandatory preliminary injunctions are consistent with Parts III.B. and III.C.
above.274
“An applicant for a TRO requires the applicant to show a colorable
claim, an imminent irreparable harm that will be suffered if the TRO does
not issue, and a balance of equities favoring issuance of the TRO.”275 A motion for a TRO may be due if, from a timing standpoint, the plaintiff is not
in a position to go through “discovery, develop a record, and present legal
arguments to the court in an orderly, if expedited, fashion,”276 and TROs
generally provide for scheduling for related preliminary injunction proceedings and limit their durations based on such schedules.277 TROs can be issued through ex parte proceedings278 but are uncommon in the context of
control transactions.279 For the reasons stated above in relation to prelimi272

See, e.g., Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital
Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 552 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 1988 WL 108332, at *18–19 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 559 A.2d 1261
(Del. 1989). There are situations where shareholders have time to seek permanent injunctions. See the
first two cases cited in supra note 252.
273
For example, when a disclosure claim relating to proxy materials is made, the court may choose
to obligate a supplemental disclosure rather than completely enjoin the shareholders meeting to which
the proxy materials relate.
274
Generally, mandatory injunctions need to meet higher thresholds. See, e.g., Pomilio v. Caserta,
215 A.2d 924, 925 (Del. 1965) (stating that mandatory injunctions are “issuable only in the exercise of
extraordinary judicial caution”); Steiner v. Simmons, 111 A.2d 574, 575 (Del. 1955) (stating that a mandatory injunction “will not issue unless the legal right to be protected is clearly established”); In re El
Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 451 n.61 (Del. Ch. 2012). Mandatory preliminary injunctions,
if proved to be wrong, may have irreversible consequences in which the court proceeds even more cautiously. See, e.g., Kingsbridge Capital Group v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 87, at *13
(“a great likelihood of eventual success should a full trial be held”).
275
WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 10.03[A].
“[T]he merit based standard for a TRO is often lower than for a preliminary injunction,” and “the emphasis is on the risk of imminent irreparable harm.” Id.
276
WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.02[a].
277
Id.; see, e.g., Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1228 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal
dismissed on the basis of mootness, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988) (indicating that expedited discovery ensued after the issuance of a TRO).
278
Del. Ch. Ct. R. 65(b). See Frederick P. Santarelli, Preliminary Injunctions in Delaware: The
Need for a Clearer Standard, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 107 (1988).
279
WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 10.03[B][1][a].
For an exception, see MacAndrews & Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc. 501 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Del. 1986).
Further, they cannot last more than ten days unless extended by the court during the original period. Del.
Ch. Ct. R. 65(b).
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nary injunctions, conditions for TROs are also consistent with Parts III.B.
and II.C. above.
(ii) Permanent Injunctions
“To obtain injunctive relief, [the applicant] must not only prove ‘actual
success on the merits,’ but also ‘irreparable harm’ and that ‘the harm resulting from a failure to issue an injunction outweighs the harm to [the other
party] if the court issues the injunction.’”280 Thus, as indicated in the context of preliminary injunctions,281 the court may not issue permanent injunctions unless the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injuries. The primary issue is whether damage remedies would provide full and effective relief,282
and if not, the irreparable injury requirement is typically met.283 As to the
balancing of the equities requirement,284 it is an important factor in crafting
the relief.285 These conditions for permanent injunctions are also generally
consistent with Parts III.B. and III.C.286
(b) Speed
The following long quotation from a 1987 remark by an associate justice of the Delaware Supreme Court vividly illustrates how takeover disputes were brought and resolved in Delaware:
First, let me explain the legal context in which some of the more
recent, “celebrated” cases have arisen. The Unocal and Revlon
cases are perfect examples. The court of chancery almost invariably gets the case on short notice, usually in the context of a preliminary injunction to enjoin one side or the other. The injunction
is either granted or denied, and immediately—in fact, even before
the order is issued—calls come to the supreme court, generally

280
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1144 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(quoting COPI of Del., Inc. v. Kelly, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 136, at *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1996)), aff’d,
68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012) (as corrected on July 12, 2012). See also Airo Assocs., L.P. v. Hayward, 2003
Del. Ch. LEXIS 112, at *24–25 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 2003); cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
281
See infra Part IV.A.2.a.i.
282
See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45, at *68–69 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 6, 2012); In re Siliconix Inc., S’holders Litig., 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *17 (Del. Ch. June 13,
2001).
283
WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 12.02[e].
284
Id. § 12.02[f].
285
Id.; see also Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208, 1227–28
(Del. 2012) (stating that the Chancery Court crafted the appealed injunctive remedy with relative equities in mind).
286
Plaintiffs sometimes seek redemption of rights plans. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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from both counsel, saying: “We understand that at four o’clock
today the court of chancery is going to release its decision in the
XYZ case, and no matter who wins, the loser is going to seek an
immediate conference to apply for an interlocutory appeal.” The
justice preliminarily responsible for hearing such matters that
month gives the parties an appointment at four o’clock, or shortly
thereafter. . . . What we do, after the motion justice confers with
the court, is to set the case down for briefing and oral argument
on a very tight schedule. One brief may be due the next day, the
answering brief two days later, and a reply brief a day later, brief
oral argument the following day, and a decision announced from
the bench either at the conclusion of the oral argument, or the
next morning before the stock exchanges open officially.287
The foregoing remains valid today.288 Equally important for shareholders seeking anticipatory adjudication is a credible commitment to timely adjudication. “The State of Delaware’s investment in a Chancery Court and a
Supreme Court that can act with the speed and expertise to meet the business community’s needs is an important element of service it provides to its
corporate domiciliaries and their stockholders.”289
Therefore, “motions for expedited proceedings . . . are available procedural avenues in virtually any suit commenced in the Court of Chancery in
which such treatment is shown to be necessary.” 290 The court upon motion291 ordinarily gives expedited treatment when interlocutory injunctions
are sought.292 Proceedings for permanent relief—which requires a trial un287

Andrew G. T. Moore, II and Bayless Manning, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO
L. REV. 779, 780 (1987) (remarks by Andrew G.T. Moore, II) (footnote omitted). See also William H.
Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of
Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992) (“Because the Court of Chancery . . . has no jurisdiction over criminal and tort cases . . . corporate litigation can proceed quickly and effectively. The Delaware Supreme Court, similarly, is poised to act quickly in important corporate cases.”); Box v. Box, 697
A.2d 395, 398 (Del. 1997) (citing Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist’s article).
288
See Black & Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model, supra note 15, at 1914 (stating that [Delaware]
judges involved in takeover contests make decisions overnight to ensure that judicial delay does not kill
a challenged transaction); Kurt M. Heyman, Expedited Proceedings in the Delaware Court of Chancery:
Things of the Past?, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 145, 145 (1998) (“In that time, the court developed an estimable reputation for its willingness and ability to hear litigants on an expedited basis and to render decisions quickly enough to keep pace with the fast-moving demands of business.”) (footnote omitted).
289
Leo E. Strine, Jr., “Mediation-Only” Filings in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Can New Value
Be Added by One of America’s Business Courts?, 53 DUKE L.J. 585, 588 (2003).
290
WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 8.01.
291
Id. A motion for a summary judgment, a TRO, or a preliminary injunction must accompany a
motion for an expedited proceeding. Del. Ch. Ct. R. 3(bb)(1).
292
See, e.g., Savitt, supra note 136, at 582–84. If such treatment is granted, various default periods
are shortened. Thus, “[e]xpedited cases are unique. The Court gives them priority. Counsel should give
them similar priority.” DEL. CH. CT., GUIDELINES TO HELP LAWYERS PRACTICING IN THE COURT OF
CHANCERY II.4.e.i., http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/docs/CompleteGuidelines2014.pdf [hereinafter
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less a summary judgment can be issued—may also be expedited.293 When a
request for expedited treatment is granted, the parties move on a fast-track
basis, know more about the timing of the court events in advance,294 and if
feasible, adjust deal schedules. The court is also ready and willing to move
fast if it is legitimately necessary from a deal perspective.295 Since there is
no jury, it does not slow the court.296 The Chancery Court also has the ability to summarily dispose of a claim when “there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”297 Summary judgment is a method for prompt disposition of actions in which there is no genuine material factual issue, and it may be issued without a trial.298
Under certain circumstances, the Delaware Supreme Court also allows
expedited appeals299 in which the case briefing, oral argument, and decision
are conducted and rendered in a compressed time frame. 300 To meet the
needs of the parties, it is not unusual for the supreme court to announce its
decisions promptly after oral argument and issue full-blown written opinions later.301
GUIDELINES TO HELP LAWYERS]. With respect to unusual instances in which the court refused to grant
such treatment, see WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.07.
293
Obviously, however, due to the heavy costs of such an expedited process imposed on the court as
well as the respondents, the court needs to have the power to refuse to entertain such requests: “[T]he
court is likely to deny an application for expedition if there is no colorable theory of irreparable harm or
if the plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in bringing their companion motion for interim equitable relief.”
Heyman, supra note 288, at 146. See also, e.g., In re Blockbuster Entertainment Corp. S’holders’ Litig.,
1994 WL 89011 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 1994) (denying a motion for a scheduling conference due to the plaintiff’s delay in filing a lawsuit despite the party’s awareness of the transaction the party sought to enjoin
temporarily). With respect to the use of laches to deny expedition, see WELCH ET AL., MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 2.02[C][1]. If the court becomes strict in granting
the expedited treatment that plaintiffs’ lawyers request, it could encourage them to file lawsuits elsewhere. See, e.g., Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 61, at 1367.
294
See WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.07.
295
The Chancery Court’s uncrowded docket helps it move quickly when necessary. See infra text
accompanying note 308.
296
See infra text accompanying notes 321–322. In other states, litigants opt out of the use of juries if
they are available. See infra text accompanying note 350.
297
Del. Ch. Ct. R. 56(c). See generally Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second
Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990).
298
Summary judgments issue when only “lexical indeterminacy” exits and there is no “fact-based
indeterminacy.” For the distinction between “lexical indeterminacy” and “fact-based indeterminacy” and
the implications of the distinction, see Bray, supra note 100.
299
Del. Sup. Ct. R. 25(d). See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del.
1998); Interco Inc. v. City Capital Assocs. L.P., 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
300
WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 12.07[B].
301
See, e.g., Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012) (a
formal opinion dated July 10, 2012, and as corrected on July 12, 2012, issued after announcing its decision on May 31, 2012); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 828 (Del. 1993) (a
short order was issued on Dec. 9, 1993, followed by a full written opinion on Feb. 4, 1994); Paramount
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The judiciary also has a weapon to encourage shareholders not to sit
idle when they have chances to seek anticipatory relief. It can use the equitable doctrine of laches. 302 In expedited proceedings the judiciary gives
them priority but also expects counsel to give similar priority.303
(c) Expertise and Flexibility
(i) Chancery Court
The Delaware Court of Chancery is a court of equity304 and is a court
of limited jurisdiction.305 No other courts in Delaware handle equity.306 Under the jurisdictional setup, the court’s docket turned out to consist significantly of corporate matters—in particular corporate governance matters relating to public company mergers and acquisitions (M&As)—which makes
the court a specialist in the area.307 The arrangement also contributes to “[a]
sufficiently un-crowded docket [that] permits urgent cases to be resolved
expeditiously.”308
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1990) (a written opinion dated Feb. 26, 1990
and revised Mar. 9, 1990, explaining the rationale for a bench ruling rendered on July 24, 1989, Literary
Partners, L.P. v. Time Inc., 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989)); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946 (Del. 1985) (a written opinion dated June 10, 1985, explaining the rationale for an oral ruling rendered on May 17, 1985).
302
See, e.g., Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, *21 n.128 (Del. Ch.
July 29, 2008) (citing the possible use of the doctrine of laches to bar a claim for monetary damages for
a defective disclosure when the shareholder had an ample opportunity to seek an injunctive remedy). For
the use of laches to deny a motion for expedition, see supra note 293. In expedited proceedings, the judiciary gives them priority but also expects counsel to give similar priority.
303
See GUIDELINES TO HELP LAWYERS, supra note 292, at II.4.e.i.
304
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (2014) (“The Court of Chancery shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine all matters and causes in equity.”).
305
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 342 (2014) (“The Court of Chancery shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other
court or jurisdiction of this State.”); Clark v. Teeven Holding Co., 625 A.2d 869, 875 (Del. Ch. 1992)
(stating that the court is a general court of equity having “the same jurisdiction as the English High
Court of Chancery had in 1776”). Its subject matter jurisdiction was expanded, for example, by the Delaware Business Corporation Act. See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 2.02. That the
Chancery Court is a court of equity does not necessarily preclude it from awarding damages. For example, claims for damages for violation of equitable rights, such as those based on fiduciary obligations,
are within the court’s jurisdiction. See Harman v. Masoneilan Int’l, Inc., 442 A2d 487, 500 (Del. 1982).
See also WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 12.10[2].
306
See Dreyfuss, supra note 159, at 8. Delaware regards class actions as well as derivative suits equitable in nature. Id. at 7.
307
See id. at 5–8. “Delaware’s small size and its many corporate charters” contribute to the concentration. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 85 NW. U. L.
REV. 542, 589 (1990).
308
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749, 1760 (2006).
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The chancellor and four vice chancellors309 are nominated by the Governor of Delaware and confirmed by the state’s Senate for 12-year terms.310
The nomination and confirmation process focuses on the expertise and
competence of the appointees and is generally divorced from party politics.311 Judges are appointed to the court on “their expertise in Delaware
corporate law and cannot help but become even more expert by virtue of
their deep and continuous exposure to that law.”312 “[T]he five Delaware
Chancery judges frequently compare notes about . . . emerging corporate
law issues, which enable[] them to begin mulling over new developments
long before a particular dispute arises.” 313 These traditions and practices
further enhance the quality of and coherence in the adjudications the court
makes.314
In the 1960s, the court was more deferential to decisions made by fiduciaries in relation to control transactions than it is today.315 By the mid1980s, “equitable principles took on an entirely new dimension,”316 and the
court started to assert its abilities and powers related to equity more in adjudicating disputes relating to control transactions.317 Such tradition remains
intact.318 As a court of equity, the court is less constrained by precedents
and the range of available remedies, and it resolves disputes based on the
309

DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 2; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 307 (2014).
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (as amended through 1997).
311
Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1603. See also David A. Skeel, Jr., The
Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127, 133–34 (1997) (in connection with
the selection of Delaware Supreme Court Justices).
312
Savitt, supra note 136, at 585.
313
Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1749. See also Savitt, supra note 136, at 595 (“The judges consult with one another on thorny new matters, further ensuring that each has a substantially complete
view of the field.”).
314
See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 159, at 16–19. The quality and coherence may be lost if nonDelaware courts render decisions on Delaware corporation law issues. For the recent surge of lawsuits
filed with non-Delaware courts, see supra note 61.
315
Jacobs, supra note 251, at 6 (“[B]efore the 1970s, corporate law jurisprudence fell closer to the
‘law’ than the ‘equity’ side. . . . [T]he 1960s were the tail end of a decades-long era during which courts
were far less skeptical about the motivations, and were far more confident of the decisions, of corporate
managers and boards than they are today.”).
316
Id. at 8.
317
The court started to favor the equity side in the 1970s, and this trend accelerated in the 1980s. See
id. at 4–9 (referring to, as examples of cases creating such a shift to the equity side, Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Blasius Indus., Inc. v.
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
318
See generally Jacobs, supra note 251, at 9–15. Recently, a noted M&A litigator made the following observation regarding the Chancery Court’s evolving jurisprudence: “[A] system of mergers and
acquisition regulation that resembles old-fashioned equitable judging, but which yields special benefits
typically obtained only through the operation of modern regulatory agencies.” Savitt, supra note 136, at
571.
310
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particular facts of the disputes brought before it.319 The court’s broad discretion to fashion remedies allows it to craft prescriptions that are efficiency
enhancing under the particular set of facts.320
As a court of equity, the Chancery Court has no juries. 321 This assures
that the court resolves factual issues quickly, even in situations in which trials need to be held,322 and without the risk of making errors that may result
from having a lay jury.323
(ii) Supreme Court
Decisions of the Court of Chancery may be appealed directly to the
Delaware Supreme Court, and “[i]f needed, appeals from the Court of
Chancery are heard by the Delaware Supreme Court quickly and decided
promptly after oral argument.”324
The Supreme Court justices are, like the judges of the Chancery Court,
nominated by the Governor of Delaware and confirmed by the state’s senate.325 As with the nomination and confirmation of Chancery Court judges,326 the process is largely divorced from party politics and focuses on the
expertise and competence of the appointees.327 “[N]ot all of the Supreme
Court’s cases are corporate law cases. . . . But the corporate law cases have
319
See Steele & Verrett, supra note 251, at 191 (“The Delaware Court of Chancery, as an equity
court, has wide latitude to craft remedies and mold precedent to fit particular fact patterns in the tradition
of the English High Court of Chancery.”). See also William B. Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of
Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1096 (1999); Susan Black,
A New Look at Preliminary Injunctions: Can Principles from the Past Offer Any Guidelines to Decision
Makers in the Future?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1984); Kamar, supra note 151, at 1943; Fisch, supra
note 151, at 1071.
320
See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 814, 818–19 (Del. Ch. 2011) (preliminarily enjoining the board of a target company from holding a stockholder meeting for twenty days
to allow a potential topping bid). As to the efficiency-enhancing effects, see Part III.C.2 above.
321
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10; Park Oil, Inc. v. Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 407 A.2d 533, 535 (Del.
1979); Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Park Oil, Inc., 385 A.2d 147, 150 (Del. Ch. 1978).
322
See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 151, at 1077; Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen’s Jurisprudence
and the Theory of Corporate Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 703–04 (1992) (stating that the absence of a
jury enables the court “to respond rapidly to parties’ requests”).
323
See, e.g., Gilson et al., supra note 89, at 207 n.105 (“A lay jury as the trier of fact is a significant
independent source of potential error in complex commercial cases.”). As a court of equity, the court
traditionally does not have the power to award penalties. See, e.g., Beals v. Washington Int’l, Inc., 386
A.2d 1156, 1159 (Del. Ch. 1979) (regarding punitive damages); WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, §
2.05.
324
Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1605.
325
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
326
See supra Part IV.A.2.c.i.
327
Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1603. The Delaware Constitution provides that three of the justices are of “one major political party” and two are of “the other major political
party.” DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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an obvious prominence.”328 Since the beginning of 2014, four justices have
retired from the court. Out of the four replacements, three are experienced
in corporate control matters.329 The fact that there is only one trial court,
and only one appellate review of the trial court decisions contributes further
to consistent and speedy resolution of disputes related to control transactions.330
B. Other States
1. Strategies to Reduce the Twin Problems of Initiation and
Prosecution of Lawsuits
(a) Collective Action Problems re Initiation and Prosecution of
Lawsuits
Most states recognize opt-out class actions, and as in Delaware, 331
many states have class action systems based on Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.332 Thus, Delaware is not unique in this respect.
Neither the common fund doctrine333 nor the substantial benefit doctrine334
is unique to Delaware’s judiciary.335 Further, issue preclusion, which can be
used to address or ameliorate CAPs in relation to lawsuits against Gatekeepers, is not unique to Delaware either.336
328
Skeel, supra note 311, at 134 n.21. See also Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the
Creation and Jurisdiction of Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 216 n.583 (2004) (calling the Delaware Supreme Court “a pre-eminent ‘business court’” due to the importance of the corporate
cases it deals with and the time the court spends on corporate matters); Dreyfuss, supra note 159, at 28–
29.
329
See, e.g., Markell’s Supreme Court, and a Missed Opportunity, DELAWARELIBERAL.NET (Feb.
24,
2015),
http://www.delawareliberal.net/2015/02/24/markells-supreme-court-and-a-missedopportunity; see also Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1602 (“[S]everal of the
five supreme court justices . . . are former members of the chancery court.”).
330
See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 159, at 28.
331
See supra note 172.
332
See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 228, at 774; CLASS ACTION & DERIVATIVE SUITS
COMM. OF ABA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTION: FIFTY-STATE SURVEY 2012–2013 (Elizabeth J. Cabraser
& Fabrice N. Vincent eds., 2013).
333
Ferdinand S. Tinio, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions, 38 A.L.R. 3d 1384, §§ 4[a], 4[b] (1971);
Knebel v. Capital Nat’l Bank in Austin, 519 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. 1975) (citing 49 A.L.R. 1149, 1150,
1170, 1171; 107 A.L.R. 749) (stating that the doctrine “has been recognized with approval in Texas and
elsewhere, particularly in federal jurisdictions”); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 65 (2014).
334
See, e.g., Tinio, supra note 333, § 4[c]; 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 67 (2014).
335
For a compilation of cases relating to attorneys’ fees in class actions generally, see Tinio, supra
note 333; 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES § 7:10 (3d ed. 2013); Adolf Homburger, State Class
Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1971).
336
See generally, e.g., 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments §§ 487–500 (2014). Unlike Delaware, however,
some courts still require that both parties to the proceedings be identical. See id. § 491.
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(b) Asymmetric Information Problems re Initiation and Prosecution
of Lawsuits
Again, nearly all states have discovery. 337 As in Delaware, 338 many
states have discovery regimes based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.339 Delaware is not known to have standards for the burden of proof
that are systemically different from those of other jurisdictions.340 Further,
burden-shifting341 techniques that can be used to address or ameliorate AIPs
in relation to lawsuits against Gatekeepers are not unique to Delaware.342
2. Strategies to Avoid Ex post Restorative Relief to Undo a
Shareholder Collective Decision or Transaction
(a) Anticipatory Adjudication
In deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctions, generally, the
following are the “four most important factors”:
(1) the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff if
the injunction is not granted;
(2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that
granting the injunction would inflict on defendant;
(3) the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and
(4) the public interest.343
The approach is substantially analogous to that of Delaware.344 The same is
true with respect to both permanent injunctions345 and TROs.346
337

See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 228, at 397.
See supra note 215.
339
See, e.g., 23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositions and Discovery § 2 (2014).
340
See generally, 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 173 (2014); 32A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 1624, 1627
(2014); RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURES 1344–32
(10th ed. 2010.)
341
See generally, e.g., 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 203 (2014); 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 175 (2013).
See also supra text accompanying notes 240–242.
342
See supra text accompanying notes 240–242.
343
11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 122–24 (3d ed.
2013).
344
See supra Part IV.A.2.a. Delaware’s regular formulation does not explicitly mention the fourth
requirement. However, when appropriate Delaware takes the forth requirement into account. See supra
note 257.
345
See generally 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 28 (2014). As to Delaware, see supra Part IV.A.2.a.ii.
With respect to permanent injunctions, the U.S. Supreme Court recently stated that the following are the
requirements:
(1) that [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warrant338
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Declaratory judgments are also available in non-Delaware jurisdictions.347 Therefore, in non-Delaware jurisdictions in the United States generally, anticipatory adjudication is an available tool to address the TPs or
the issues the TPs present.
(b) Speed
It has been observed that courts in states other than Delaware “also
move quickly on high profile corporate cases where time is of the essence.”348 As stated, there has been a significant recent increase in the number of lawsuits filed outside Delaware.349 Since it is not likely that plaintiffs’ lawyers will file lawsuits with courts they know will not be able to
move speedily, the increase also seems to suggest that there are nonDelaware courts that can render decisions quickly. The existence of a jury
could slow the judicial proceedings. However, the parties do not appear to
have incentives to choose a jury trial.350
(c) Expertise and Flexibility
There are a number of specialized business courts.351 No other judiciary, however, is remotely as specialized as the Delaware judiciary with respect to shareholder lawsuits against corporate fiduciaries of public companies, such as those against Gatekeepers. The number of courts of equity in

ed; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The Delaware Chancery Court noted that
the Supreme Court’s formulation is in accord with the Chancery Court’s formulation of requirements for
preliminary injunctions. Wayne Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Corti, 954 A.2d 319, 329 (Del. Ch. 2008). For
the analyses of the Supreme Court case, see, for example, Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s
Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012); Rachel
M. Janutis, The Supreme Court’s Unremarkable Decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 597 (2010).
346
See generally, e.g., 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 31. Unlike Delaware’s, however, this formulation
maintains a merit standard almost identical with the one for preliminary injunctions. For Delaware’s
formulation, see supra note 277.
347
See generally, e.g., 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 169 (2014).
348
Black, supra note 307, at 590.
349
See supra text accompanying note 61.
350
See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 477 (2015) (“No transaction in our sample is decided by a jury . . . .”).
351
See Bach & Applebaum, supra note 328, at 147; Lee Applebaum, The Steady Growth of Business
Courts in National Center for State Courts, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2011 70 (2011),
http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2011/home/Specialized-CourtsServices/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends/Author%20PDFs/Applebaum.ashx. This should
not suggest that specialization of judges occurs only in a specialized court. See supra note 159.
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the United States is small.352 Further, at the turn of the twentieth century the
Chancery Court of Delaware adhered more closely to the English Chancery
Court than did those of any other states.353 Therefore, the Chancery Court of
Delaware is almost systemically different from most others in the United
States with respect to its ability to handle shareholder lawsuits against
Gatekeepers.
C. Summary
U.S. state judiciaries generally have tools to satisfy the Stage I prerequisites. However, this is not necessarily the case with respect to the Stage II
prerequisites. Delaware’s judiciary is unique compared to the other state judiciaries in its ability to engage in anticipatory adjudication in relation to
shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers. In large measure, Delaware’s judiciary has strategies, tools, and attributes to implement the solutions to the
TPs or the issues they raise at Stage II. The speed, expertise, and flexibility
of the Delaware judiciary are particularly crucial for anticipatory adjudication, and the supremacy of Delaware’s judiciary in shareholder lawsuits
against Gatekeepers has normative foundations. The court’s expertise and
specialization also makes it most qualified to alleviate attorney agency costs,
especially in opt-out class actions seeking anticipatory adjudication. The
“indeterminacy” of its judgments in the context of anticipatory adjudication
is not as malignant as the term implies and is even benign.
V. NON-US JURISDICTIONS
A. Introduction
There is no single perfect solution for the dilemmas identified in Parts
II.A. and II.B. that works for all jurisdictions 354 or all companies.355 Presumably, judiciaries are the default institutions that solve legal disputes in
most countries. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to examine whether nonU.S. jurisdictions, as in the United States, have judiciaries equipped to intervene and solve the dilemmas. There appears to be no reason for non-U.S.
judiciaries to be spared from the CAPs and the AIPs that plague the judiciaries in the United States. Do they have effective strategies and tools to
352
See, e.g., Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 903 (1990); see also WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 1.01.
353
See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 1772–1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 840 (1993).
354
See, e.g., Black & Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model, supra note 15, at 1952–63 (proposing
models for emerging markets).
355
See, e.g., Enriques et al., The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law, supra note 37, at 5
(“[I]ndividual companies should be able to decide ‘who decides.’”).
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solve TPs? Japan is a rare jurisdiction that has given directors and controlling shareholders the authority to Gatekeep for dispersed shareholders and,
without a designated substitute organ or institution, lets judiciaries police
them.356 Japan’s experience will be used to illustrate possible differences
between the judiciaries in the United States and elsewhere and to highlight
international ramifications of the use of judiciaries to police Gatekeepers.
This section first confirms that Japan basically uses the U.S. model.
Part V.B. then examines whether Japan’s judiciary satisfies the Stage I prerequisites and the Stage II prerequisites. Part V.C. considers the feasibility
of judicial policing in other non-U.S. jurisdictions.
B. Japan
1. Background
(a) Landscape
A recent study indicates that Japan’s listed companies have dispersed
ownership structures. While those structures are not as straightforward as
the level of dispersion suggests,357 the TPs in Japan appear to be no less
acute than those in the United Kingdom or the United States. There are also
controlled companies with dispersed minority shareholders.358 The minority
shareholders also suffer from the TPs.
The provisions of Japanese Companies Act (JPN Companies Act) are
more shareholder-centric than those of the Delaware General Corporation
Law.359 The business and affairs of the companies, however, are managed
356

The Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal appears to be another example. See,
e.g., J. van Bekkum et al., Corporate Governance in the Netherlands, 14.3 ELEC. J. COMP. L. 22 para.
3.2.2. (2010), www.ejcl.org/143/abs143-17.html.
357
See, e.g., Julian Franks et al., The Ownership of Japanese Corporations in the 20th Century 47
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper Series No. 410/2014, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397142 (“Japan has . . . become more outside in
relating to the presence of outside investors but it has not in the Anglo-American sense.”); Edward Rock
et al., Fundamental Changes, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ch. 7, § 3.7 (Reinier Kraakman et al., 2d ed., 2009) (pointing out, for example,
the existence of manager-friendly shareholders having business ties with the issuers); Rafael La Porta et
al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).
358
“356 or 15.6% of TSE-listed companies have controlling shareholders. Out of these, 67.7%
(10.6% overall) have parent companies, and 32.3% (5.1% overall) have controlling shareholders other
than parent companies.” TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE INC., TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER ON
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
2013
7
(2013),
http://www.tse.or.jp/rules/cg/whitepaper/b7gje60000005ob1-att/b7gje6000003ukm8.pdf.
359
This is not surprising, since corporation laws in the United States, in particular the Delaware
General Corporation Law, are the most board centric among those in Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. See generally, Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure:
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by or are under the direction of boards of directors.360 Most of the major
techniques to effect control transactions in Delaware or their functional
equivalents now exist in Japan. Controllers can freeze out minority shareholders with a two-thirds supermajority vote.361 In general, Japanese companies are able to issue or distribute shares or share warrants without specific shareholder approval and without being subject to shareholder
preemption rights.362
The Japanese tender offer rules and the U.K. Takeover Code have features referred to by similar nomenclatures. As described below, however,
Japan regulates control transactions fundamentally differently from how the
Takeover Panel does under the Takeover Code. Rather, the combination of
the JPN Companies Act and tender offer and proxy rules presents a regime
much closer to the U.S. model. As in the United States,363 in Japan the task
of policing Gatekeepers in control transactions falls on the judiciary.364
The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, supra note 117, § 3.7. In June 2014 the JPN Companies Act
was significantly amended. See Kaishahō no ichibu wo kaiseisuru hōritsu [Law to Make Partial
Amendments to the Companies Act], Law No. 90 of 2014 (Japan). The amendments made the JPN
Companies Act slightly less enabling.
360
Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 362 (Japan). Most Japanese companies
listed on the exchanges in Japan have two boards, a board of directors and a board of statutory auditors.
Statutory auditors have compliance functions. Id. art. 390. It is a common view, however, that they have
not effectively performed such functions. See, e.g., KENJIRO EGASHIRA, KABUSHIKIKAISHAHŌ [LAW OF
STOCK CORPORATIONS] 511–11 (5th ed. 2015). A small fraction of Japanese public companies have
boards of directors only. Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 404 (Japan). For the percentage of the Japanese companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange with boards of directors only, see TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE
INC., supra note 358, at 14 (stating that these companies “account for only 2.2% of TSE-listed companies”). After the 2014 JPN Company Act Amendments, Japanese companies are allowed to have “audit
committees” in their boards of directors. Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 2, para. 1, item 11-2, art 326, para 2,
art. 327, para. 1, item 3 (Japan). Either way, for practical purposes these types of boards of directors
have functions largely analogous to those of Delaware corporations in relation to control transactions.
Unless otherwise stated, however, this paper focuses on the companies with both a board of directors
and a board of statutory auditors.
361
See infra Part V.B.1.b.ii.
362
Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 201, para. 1 (Japan). Due to the 2014 JPN Company Act Amendments,
shareholder approval generally is now required when the transaction would create a majority owner of
the issuer and shareholders owning 10% or more object to the transaction. Id. art. 206, para. 2. Cf.
TOKYO
STOCK
EXCHANGE
INC.,
SECURITIES
LISTING
REGULATIONS
78–79
http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/rules-participants/rules/regulations/tvdivq0000001vytatt/securities_listing_regulations_20141201.pdf (making the requirement not mandatory).
363
See supra Part II.C.
364
See, e.g., TOSHIYUKI TAMAI, KAISHAHŌ NO KISEIKANWA NI OKERU SHIHŌ NO YAKUWARI [ROLE
OF JUDICIARY AFTER LIBERALIZATION OF CORPORATION LAW] 302–03 (2009) (stating that the Japanese
judiciary should play roles similar to the Delaware judiciary). In one respect the JPN Companies Act
relies more on the judiciary, since it does not have an antitakeover statute analogous to Section 203 of
the Delaware General Corporation Law. See infra note 513. “Internationally, corporate law rules are to a
large extent publicly enforced.” Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1605. In this
respect Japan follows the international norm, and the JPN Companies Act has retained, among others,
provisions criminalizing certain director misbehavior. See, e.g., Law No. 86 of 2005, arts. 960 (violation
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In the second half of the last decade, the Japanese judiciary showed its
willingness to assume such a role by essentially referring to a standard that
evokes Unocal in determining whether the distribution or issuance of share
warrants uses as a defense measure should be enjoined.365 Transplantation
of additional enhanced substantive judicial standards to determine Gatekeepers’ compliance with their duties in relation to control transactions has
also been discussed.366 There seems to be a growing shared sense, however,
that policing by the Japanese judiciary has been less than optimal. The disenchantments are expressed mainly as proposals either to tweak the current
regime or to adopt a regime similar to the U.K. model.367 The underlying
assumption of these views is that in general the Japanese judiciary has operated at suboptimal levels.368

of duties, including fiduciary duties), 964 (false disclosures), 967 (receipt of bribe) (Japan).
365
For the provisions of the JPN Companies Act that were relied on, see infra text accompanying
notes 500–504. For chronological developments in the last 10 years, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005); Kenichi
Osugi, Transplanting Poison Pills in Foreign Soil, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EAST
ASIA Part I.2 (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2008); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce for the Japanese
Soul? Courts, Corporations, and Communities–A Comment on Haley’s View of Japanese Law, 8 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 348–56 (2009) [hereinafter Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce]; Armour et al.,
The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes, supra note 86, at 250–57.
366
For example, in the REX II Tokyo High Court decision, the court acknowledged directors’ general duties to make a fair disclosure and to achieve an objectively fair price for shareholders. See infra
note 571. However, first, the court did not explicitly state that directors owe fiduciary duties directly to
shareholders. Second, it is unclear if the duty to achieve a fair price is an obligation analogous to the
Revlon duty in Delaware. See Hidefusa Iida, Rekkusu hōrudingusu songaibaishō seikyūjiken kōsai
hanketsu no kentō (jō) [Examination of REX Holdings Damage Suits Tokyo High Court Judgment Part
I], 2022 SHŌJI 4, 8–9 (2014); Hidefusa Iida, Rekkusu hōrudingusu songaibaishō seikyūjiken kōsai
hanketsu no kentō (ge) [Examination of REX Holdings Damage Suits Tokyo High Court Judgment Part
II], 2023 SHŌJI 17, 21–23 (2014). See also SHIRAI, supra note 139, at 505 (recommending an adoption
of the Revlon duty). As to the duty to disclose under Delaware law, see, for example, Arnold v. Soc’y
for Sav. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994); as to the Revlon duty in Delaware, see Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986). As to controllers’ fiduciary
duties to minority shareholders, see infra text accompanying note 417.
367
See generally, Hidefusa Iida, Kōkaikaitsuke kisei no kaikaku–Ōshūgata no gimuteki
kōkaikaitsuke no taishutsuken no kangaekata wo donyūsubeki ka [Reforming Tender Offer Regulation:
Should A Mandatory Bid Rule Used in Europe Be Introduced?], 1933 SHŌJI 14 (2011); WATARU
TANAKA, KIGYŌBAISHŪ TO BŌEISAKU [CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DEFENSES] 394–406 (2012).
368
In 2004 when Japanese lawyers were cooking up Japanese-style pills, Ronald Gilson warned that
“it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the weight of” “the burden of assuring the sensible operation of the poison pill.” See Ronald J. Gilson, The Poison Pill in Japan: The Missing Infrastructure,
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 21, 42 (2004). The warning was timely but was not well heeded. There are
optimistic views as to the future transformation of the Japanese judiciary as well. See, e.g., SHIRAI, supra note 139, at 533–34.
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(b) Basic Legal Framework for Control Transactions
Under the JPN Companies Act, one may acquire 100% of another
company through a merger369 or a share exchange370 using cash as a consideration. Due mostly to the dual entity-level tax of the target or controlled
company and the shareholder-level tax applicable in one-step cash acquisitions,371 cash freeze-outs have been effected through de facto reverse stock
splits.372 Further, in most control transactions—including friendly acquisitions—tender offers precede the de facto reverse stock splits. This could be
due in part to a perceived reduction of risks arising from the direct involvement of Gatekeepers in freezing out minority shareholders in the de
facto reverse stock splits.373
(i) Tender Offer
Japan’s tender offer rules, when legislated in 1971, were largely modeled after the Williams Act enacted in the United States in 1968.374 However, due to significant amendments in 1990 and in the last decade, the rules
have diverged in many respects from their U.S. counterpart. The current
Japanese rules are highly technical, and it is difficult to see any single coherent policy behind them. As described below, the rules require that certain share purchases be made in the form of a formal (or conventional) tender offer (the JPN MBR) and are often referred to with names identical with
or similar to those used to refer to the U.K. MBR, such as “mandatory offer
rules”375 or “mandatory bid rules.”376
369

Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 2, para. 1, no. 27 (Japan).
Id. no. 31.
371
Hōjinzei hō [Corporation Tax Act], Law No. 34 of 1965, arts. 62, 62-9 (Japan). The entity-level
tax is questionable from a tax policy standpoint. The JPN Companies Act does allow forward triangular
mergers but does not allow reverse triangular mergers. See, e.g., id. art. 749, para. 1 (not requiring that a
merger agreement include a provision relating to consideration payable to the surviving companies’
shareholders).
372
The de facto reverse stock split requires at least conceptually successive amendments to the subject company’s articles of incorporation followed by a redemption of all the outstanding shares for a new
class of stock at a ratio that would cause all the shareholders other than the shareholder who would become the sole owner to notionally receive fractions of the new class of stock payable in cash. See Law
No. 86 of 2005, art. 108, para. 1, no. 7, art. 111, para. 2, no. 1, art. 171, para. 1, no. 1, item i, art. 173,
art. 234, para. 1, no. 2 (Japan). After the 2014 JPN Company Act Amendments, it is clear that actual
reverse stock splits may be used to squeeze out minority shareholders. See id. arts. 182-4, -5 (appraisal
rights).
373
See infra text accompanying notes 419–421. This combined with the entity-level tax creates a
perverse effect analogous to one that existed at least before the adoption of the unified standard by the
Delaware Chancery Court in In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holder Litig., 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010). See,
e.g., Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs, supra note 16.
374
With respect to the Williams Act, see supra Part II.C.
375
Tomotaka Fujita, The Takeover Regulation in Japan: Peculiar Developments in the Mandatory
370
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They generally require a tender offer for anyone to purchase voting
shares of a reporting company through any off-market377 transaction: (i) if,
after the purchase, the purchaser would have acquired shares from eleven or
more persons during the sixty-one day period ending on the date of the relevant purchase and would own more than 5% of the voting shares of the
target company,378 or (ii) if, after the purchase, the purchaser would have
acquired shares from ten or fewer persons during the sixty-one day period
ending on the date of the relevant purchase and would own more than onethird of the voting shares of the target company.379 Further, the following
may not be made outside a tender offer: (a) any on-market purchase executed on a non-auction market of an exchange after which the acquiring person
would own more than one-third of the voting shares of the target company,380 and (b) when a person acquires in a three-month period more than
10% of a company’s voting shares more than 5% of which consist of shares
acquired off market or on a non-auction market of an exchange and, after
the acquisitions, owns more than one-third of the shares of the company,
the purchases of outstanding shares among such acquisitions. 381 No offmarket purchase, however, needs to be made through a tender offer if, after
the relevant purchase, the purchaser would not have made off-market purchases from eleven or more persons during the sixty-one day period ending
on the date of the relevant purchase, has already owned more than 50% of
the target company as of the first of the off-market purchases during the sixty day period, and would own less than two-thirds of the voting shares of

Offer Rule, 3 UT SOFT L. REV. 24, 30 (2011).
376
Davies & Hopt, supra note 19, § 8.2.5.4; Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Institutional
Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity Through Deals, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS:
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 295, 306 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003). Hereinafter the Japanese tender offer rules requiring that share purchases be made
through tender offers will be the JPN MBR.
377
For the purposes of the application of the rule described in (i), certain trading through designated
alternative trading systems is treated as on-market trading. Kinyūshōhin torihikihō [Financial Instruments and Exchange Act], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 1 (Japan); Kinyūshōhin torihikihō
shikōrei [Financial Instruments and Exchange Act Cabinet Order], Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art.
6-2, para. 2, no. 2, para. 3 (Japan).
378
Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 1, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 1 (Japan); Cabinet Order No.
321 of 1965, art. 6-2, para. 3, art. 7 (Japan).
379
Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 2 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 6-2,
para. 3 (Japan). However, subject to the exception described in (C) below, no purchases through an alternative trading market may be made if, after the purchase, the purchaser’s ownership percentage would
exceed 1/3. See Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 6 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965,
art. 7, para. 7, no. 1 (Japan).
380
Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 3 (Japan).
381
Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 4 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 7, paras. 2–4 (Japan).
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the target.382
Under the tender offer rules, tender offer periods must be at least twenty business days, but unless an exception is applicable, not longer than sixty
business days.383 The offers must be made to all holders and at the same
prices.384 In general, no purchases outside the tender offers may be made
during the tender offer periods.385 Partial tender offers are prohibited when
the offerors have the potential to acquire two-thirds or more of the shares
through such offers.386 There is a proration requirement when a partial offer
is made.387
As indicated, similar nomenclature is used to refer to the JPN MBR
and the U.K. MBR. The two, however, call for fundamentally different
roles for the boards of the target companies.388 As stated,389 the U.K. MBR
requires holders of 30% or more of the shares of a company to launch a
general offer for the remaining shares at the best price paid for shares during the preceding twelve months. This minimizes shareholder CAPs and
coercive effects that would result but for the requirement.
First, the JPN MBR does not prohibit partial offers except in cases
where the bidders through the offers would end up owning two-thirds or
more of the target shares. Second, while the JPN MBR obligates the offerors to give the same prices to all tendering shareholders,390 it permits the
bidders to pay less than the prices they pay before the commencement of
the tender offers. Third, they do not require those who have acquired control to make an offer to buy the remaining shares. The effects of the Japanese tender offer rules are much closer to the combined effects of the Rules
on Substantial Acquisition of Shares (or the SARs), abolished in 2006, and
382
Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1 (proviso) (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 6-2,
para. 1, no. 4 (Japan).
383
Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 2 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 8, para. 1
(Japan). Therefore, for example, a bidder who has launched a tender offer may have to launch a new
tender offer if the Japanese judiciary fails to resolve the bidder’s dispute with the target before the initial
tender offer period ends.
384
Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 3 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 8, paras. 2–3
(Japan).
385
Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-5 (Japan).
386
Id. art. 27-2, para. 5; Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 8, para. 5, no. 3 (Japan); Hakkōsha igai
no mononiyoru kabuken tō no kōkaikaitsuke no kaiji ni kansuru naikakufurei [Prime Minister’s Office
Ordinance Concerning Disclosure Relating to Third Party Tender Offers for Shares, etc.], Ministry of
Fin. Ordinance No. 38 of 1990, art. 5 (Japan).
387
Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-13, para. 5 (Japan). Further, there are rules modeled on Sections
13(d) and 13(g) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. arts. 27-23 to 27-30.
388
See, e.g., Fujita, supra note 375, at 24. The JPN MBR is not the proration version of the equal
opportunity rule either. See Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales, supra note 18, at 960.
389
See supra Part II.C.
390
Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 2 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 8, para. 2
(Japan).
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Rule 5 of the Takeover Code except that the Japanese rules slow down
share accumulations more significantly than the U.K. rules. 391 Therefore,
the JPN MBR does not address the coordination/coerciveness issues that the
U.K. MBR addresses. For example, the JPN MBR does not prevent a coercive two-step acquisition. Thus, unlike the U.K. MBR, the JPN MBR cannot afford to adopt the no-frustrating action rule. By default, the Japanese
judiciary is put in a position to police target boards’ Gatekeeping activities.392
(ii) Freeze-outs
Freeze-out transactions may be used as the second step in noncontrollers’ acquisitions of corporate control393 or as preexisting controllers’ minority freeze-out transactions. Under the JPN Companies Act, there are several
ways to freeze out minority shareholders for cash, provided either that a
two-thirds supermajority vote is obtained at a shareholders’ meeting394 or
that the controllers own 90% or more of the company. 395 Due to the same

391

See RS 2005/4 Issued on 21 April 2005.
For a prominent example of the use of a poison pill in Japan, see Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug.
7, 2007, Hei 19 (kyo) no. 30, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2215 (Japan),
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20070927142919.pdf. The four authorities cited in supra note 366
discuss the case. A number of Japanese companies have adopted a variation of a rights plan (or poison
pill) in the United States. See, e.g., HIDEKI KANDA, KAISHAHŌ [COMPANY LAW] 162 n.3 (17th ed.
2015) [hereinafter KANDA, COMPANY LAW] (giving rights plans and golden shares as examples of possible defense measures). As of the end of July 2013, approximately 14.5% of Japanese public corporations in Japan had such plans. Mogi Miki & Koji Tani, Tekitaitekibaishū bōeisaku no dōnyū jyōkyō [Status of the Adoption of Defense Measures against Hostile Acquisitions; An Analysis After June 2013
Shareholder Meeting Season], 2012 SHŌJI 49, 50 (2013). Authorized shares specified in the issuer’s articles of incorporation may not exceed four times as much as the outstanding shares. Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 37, para. 3, art. 113, paras. 3–4, art. 184, para. 2 (Japan). Thus, the
dilutive effects of Japanese poison pills are limited. Staggered boards are possible. However, the maximum term of office is two years. Id. art. 332. In addition, shareholders can remove board members for
no cause at any time at a shareholders meeting. Id. art. 341. At the substantive law level, these make
Japanese pills weaker than the pills for Delaware corporations. See, e.g., TANAKA, supra note 367, at
317–21 (a preprint of an article with Peng Xu) (giving an example where a Japanese company lost to a
hostile suitor in a proxy fight despite the use of a pill). As to the strength of poison pills combined with
staggered boards, see Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards, supra note
154; Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a
Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2002).
393
Note that the de facto reverse stock split method described in note 372 does not work unless the
acquiring person is already the largest shareholder of the subject company.
394
See supra text accompanying notes 369–371.
395
Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 784, para. 1 (short-form mergers and share exchanges) (Japan). After
the 2014 JPN Company Act Amendments, it is possible for a shareholder owning 90% or more of a
company to choose to buy out the remaining shareholders if the company’s board consents to the buyout. Id. arts. 179 to 179-10.
392
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Japanese tax that makes one-step cash acquisitions unpopular,396 however,
most freeze-outs have been effected through de facto reverse stock splits.397
The controllers, whether they become controllers after the first step of
a two-step transaction or are preexisting controllers, are not prohibited from
voting their shares if shareholder consent is required. 398 Moreover, if the
freeze-out is the second step of a two-step acquisition, there is no statutory
requirement that the proceeds payable to the minority on a per share basis
should be no less than the price paid in the first step tender offer.399 Thus,
the regime for freeze-outs in Japan is closer to that in the United States, and
if there is anyone that can step in to fill the gap and police controllers acting
as Gatekeepers in freeze-out transactions, it is the Japanese judiciary.
The JPN MBR economically discourages bidders from establishing
control positions short of 100% ownership, because they are unable to subsequently resell the entire controlling positions except in response to a tender offer. The all holders rule, the same price rule, and the proration requirement make it impossible for the controller-resellers to obtain the prices
that reflect the control premiums the controlling interests should otherwise
command. Rule 5.2(a) of the Takeover Code allows controllers to sell their
positions to others outside an offer. However, the U.K. MBR obligates the
buyers of such positions to make a general offer. Therefore, as in Japan,
those buying from the controllers are unable to pay control premiums exclusively to the controllers. Consequently, the U.K. MBR also economically
discourages the establishment of control positions. As indicated, however,
unlike the U.K. MBR, in general the JPN MBR does not prevent partial offers. Thus, if bidders wish, it is easy in Japan for the bidders to establish
controlling positions owning the percentage of shares desirable for the bidders.400 If the controllers later wish to resell their interests without sharing
the control premiums with the minority shareholders, they may first try to
freeze out the minority shareholders at a price reflecting a minority discount
and then sell their entire interests to third parties.401 Thus, there may be a
stronger need for the Japanese judiciary to police controllers in freeze-out
transactions than in the United States.
2. Strategies to Reduce the Twin Problems of Initiation and
396

See supra text accompanying note 371.
See supra note 372.
398
For the possibility of a revocation of the shareholder resolutions, see infra text accompanying
note 418.
399
For anticipatory relief that may be available for minority shareholders, see infra Part V.B.3.a.i.
400
As to the percentage of controlled companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, see supra note
358.
401
Alternatively, the controllers may first sell up to one-third of the controlled company shares at a
premium and subsequently sell a portion of the rest in response to a tender offer. The strategy should
permit the controllers to partially escape the predicament of the JPN MBR.
397
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Prosecution of Lawsuits
(a) Collective Action Problems re: Initiation and Prosecution of
Lawsuits
The circumstances in which shareholders have direct claims against
Gatekeepers are limited. Japan lacks opt-out class actions. Further, the rules
and current practices regarding allocation of costs of lawsuits do not help
alleviate CAPs. The Japanese Supreme Court also declined to follow a
scholarly suggestion402 to recognize issue preclusion under certain circumstances.403
(i) Class Actions
Plaintiffs’ lawyers seem to use postal mail404 and Internet sites405 to attract shareholders willing to join in filing shareholder lawsuits. In December 2013, a class action act was enacted.406 The act adopts an opt-in system
that allows a qualified consumer organization to file lawsuits seeking the
enforcement of certain types of monetary claims by individuals against
businesses relating to contracts between the individuals and the businesses.407 At least preliminarily, the act does not seem to have any applicability
to shareholder claims against Gatekeepers.408
At present the list of recognized shareholder fiduciary duty claims
against Gatekeepers is small. There is, however, room for the Japanese judiciary to consider additional types of shareholder fiduciary duty claims. 409
The small size of the list appears to be a reflection of the scarcity of shareholder fiduciary duty lawsuits that—to a significant extent—have resulted
402

See, e.g., MAKOKO ITO, MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 563–69 (4th ed. 2014).
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 20, 1956, Shō 29 (o) no. 110, 10 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 965 (Japan). The JPN Companies Act has provisions that expand the binding effects of judgments to rescind or declare void certain corporate actions beyond the immediate parties to
the lawsuits. Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 828 (Japan). For example, a court
decision to declare a shareholder resolution void has such effects. Id.
404
Shareholders are entitled to inspect share registers. Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 125 (Japan).
405
See, e.g., Kazunari Otsuka, Naze nihondewa shōkensoshō ga kappatsuka shina no ka [Why in
Japan Securities Lawsuits Have Not Been Vibrant?], KINYŪZAISEIJIJŌ, June 3, 2013, at 14 (Japan).
406
Shōhisha no zaisantekihigai no shūdantekina kaifuku no tameno minjitetsuzuki no tokurei ni kansuru hōritsu [Law Relating to Special Civil Procedural Measures for the Collective Recovery of Financial Damages Suffered by Consumers], Law No. 96 of 2013 (Japan). The law, however, has not taken
effect yet.
407
Id. art. 3.
408
Under the traditionally prevailing view, Japanese corporations are not contractual constructs, and
there are no contractual relationships between shareholders and directors. See, e.g., EGASHIRA, supra
note 360, at 56–58.
409
See infra notes 412, 417.
403
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from the procedural deficiencies discussed in this Part V.B.2., which has
deprived the Japanese judiciary of the opportunities to exercise “lawmaking
and law enforcement powers”410 and to expand the list of such direct claims.
Directors owe statutory duties of care and loyalty to companies.411 Under the traditionally prevailing view, they do not owe fiduciary duties directly to shareholders.412 The growing trend, however, is toward a view that
they in fact owe such duties.413 Anyone, including a shareholder, has a statutory right to directly sue directors for damages if the directors knowingly
or grossly negligently breach their duties and as a consequence cause damages to the person.414 Shareholders may also directly sue directors for damages under a tort theory.415 Finally, the JPN Companies Act provides specific circumstances in which shareholders may seek to enjoin certain corporate
and director actions.416
Under the prevailing view, controlling shareholders do not owe fiduciary duties either to the companies or to minority shareholders.417 If a share410
Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duties in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions:
Lessons from the Incompleteness of Law Theory, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS:
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 78, 78 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003).
411
Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, arts. 330 (subjecting directors to the same duties that agents generally owe to their principals), 355 (imposing the duty of loyalty) (Japan). The duty
of loyalty provision is a 1950 transplant from the United States. For the historical origin of the duty of
loyalty and analysis of how after a long incubation period it started to show signs of life, see Hideki
Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 893–96 (2003). As stated, a recent case recognized directors’ duty to disclose. See infra note 571.
412
For various positions on this issue, see Yo Ota & Masahiro Yano, Taikō-teki baishū teian wo
uketa taishōkaisha torishimariyaku ha ikani kōdōsubeki ka: Wagakuni kaishahō to Reburon “gimu”
[How Should Target Directors Act When Competing Bids Surface?: Our Company Act and Revlon “Duty”], in M&A HŌMU NO SAISENTAN [FRONTIERS OF M&A LAW] 42–46 (Masakazu Iwakura & Yo Ota
eds., 2010).
413
See, e.g., id. at 45–46 (listing academic authorities taking this position); TAMAI, supra note 364,
at 306–09.
414
Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 429, para. 1 (Japan). See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Nov. 26,
1969, no. 11, 23 Saikō Saibansho Minji Hanreishū [MINSHŪ] 2150; Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo
Dist. Ct.] Sep. 29, 2011, Hei 22 (wa) no. 26190, 1375 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 187 (Japan) (denying
directors’ liabilities to shareholders under Article 429, paragraph 1, for damages claimed to have been
caused by a share exchange). There are conflicting views as to whether directors owe liabilities to shareholders when the shareholders indirectly suffer damages due to damages the company has suffered. See,
e.g., EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 504 n.3.
415
MINPŌ [CIV. C.] arts. 709, 710 (Japan).
416
See infra Part V.B.3.a.i.
417
See, e.g., EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 432–33, 444–45; Mitsuo Kondo, Commentaries on Article 355 of the Companies Act, in KAISHAHŌ KONMENTĀRU [8 COMMENTARIES ON COMPANIES ACT:
ORGANS (2)] 57 (Seiichi Ochiai ed., 2009). Cf. TAMAI, supra note 364, at 309–13. In the REX II Tokyo
High Court decision, the court responded to plaintiffs’ claims under both Article 429 of the JPN Companies Act and Article 709 of the Japanese Civil Code (a tort claim for damages). See infra note 571.
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holder resolution to effect a freeze-out is “severely unjust” due to a vote
cast by a controller, however, minority shareholders are statutorily authorized to request that a court revoke the resolution.418 Further, under an increasingly influential view, in such a case the minority shareholders should
be able to seek a provisional injunction of the freeze-out transaction.419 In
considering the unjustness of a shareholder resolution to effect a virtual reverse stock split to effect the freeze-out, the court may take into account the
availability of appraisal or equivalent rights420 as a factor against the unjustness.421 This makes the efficacy of the revocation right less certain.
(ii) Costs of Lawsuits
In principle, the loser must reimburse the winner for certain expenses
the winner directly incurs and pay the court filing fees and certain expenses
the court incurs in relation to court proceedings, such as fees payable to
witnesses and postage. 422 On the other hand, attorney fees are generally
borne by the respective parties regardless of the outcome. 423 There is no
prohibition against contingency fees. These rules are similar to those pre418
Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 831, para. 1, no. 3 (Japan). See, e.g.,
EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 365.
419
See infra text accompanying notes 522–523.
420
As in the case of the appraisal rights in Delaware, such minority shareholders must clear procedural hurdles. See Law No. 86 of 2005, arts. 116, 117, 172 (Japan). It has been suggested that despite
these hurdles, due to the lack or weakness of other means to remedy wrongs, appraisal rights have been
forced to play a more important role than their counterparts in Delaware. See Tomotaka Fujita,
Shinkaishahō ni okeru kabushikikaitori seikyūken seido [Appraisal Right Regime under the New Companies Act], in KIGYŌHŌ NO RIRON JŌKAN [1 THEORIES ON BUSINESS LAW] 261, 284 (Etsuro Kuronuma
& Tomotaka Fujita eds., 2007). For articles describing procedural hurdles in Delaware, see supra note
84. Unlike in Delaware, however, in Japan there is no statutory prohibition against the counting of value
arising from the relevant transaction in determining the fair value of shares. See Law No. 86 of 2005, art.
116 (Japan); for Delaware, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(f) (2014).
421
See, e.g., Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Aug. 24, 1990, Shō 63 (wa) no. 6541, 1331
HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 136, aff’d Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Jan. 1, 1990, Hei 1 (ne) no.
2921, 77 SHIRYŌBAN SHŌJI HŌMU [SHIRYŌBAN SHŌJI HŌMU] 193 (Japan). As to the law on a similar
point in Delaware, see supra note 266. The author’s gut sense, however, is that Japanese courts weigh
the availability against shareholders more heavily than the Delaware judiciary.
422
MINJI SOSHŌ HŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 61 (Japan); Minji soshō hiyō tō ni kansuru
hōritsu [Act on the Cost etc. of Civil Lawsuits], Law No. 40 of 1971, art. 2 (Japan); Minji hozenhō [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 7 (Japan). As to exceptions to the general rule,
see MINJI SOSHŌ HŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] arts. 62–63 (Japan). As to the costs of lawsuits in general, see ITO, supra note 402, at 581–86; TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN JAPAN §§ 13.01–13.09 (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009) [hereinafter
HATTORI & HENDERSON, Civil PROCEDURE IN JAPAN].
423
Further, tortfeasors may be obligated to reimburse victims for attorneys’ fees that victims incur in
prosecuting their claims in court. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 27, 1969, Shō 41 (o) no. 280,
23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2, 441 (Japan). Note that shareholder lawsuits against
corporate fiduciaries may be based on a tort theory. See supra text accompanying note 415.
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vailing in the United States.424 There is, however, no general statutory or
established case law doctrine in Japan similar to the common fund doctrine
or the substantial benefit doctrine in Delaware.425 As to a shareholder suit to
enjoin directors’ illegal actions, due to its similarity to a derivative suit,
provisions relating to derivative suits426 may be made applicable by analogy. For example, if shareholders win, they may recover attorneys’ fees from
the companies.427 The derivative suit provisions, however, limit the recovery to “an amount that is deemed appropriate,”428 and courts in Japan have
not been as liberal as those in Delaware.429 Thus, neither shareholders’ nor
plaintiffs’ lawyers see strong economic incentives to file shareholder lawsuits.430
(iii) Anticipatory Relief
As to the availability of anticipatory relief in Japan, see below Part
V.B.3.a.
(b) Asymmetric Information Problems re Initiation and Prosecution
of Lawsuits
With respect to civil lawsuits, Japan generally follows an adversarial
system431 as opposed to an inquisitorial system.432 However, there is no ef424

See supra Parts IV.A.1.a.ii., IV.B.1.a.
For the Delaware law doctrines, see supra Part IV.A.1.a.ii.
426
Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 852, para. 1 (Japan).
427
See EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 496; KANDA, COMPANY LAW, supra note 392, at 273.
428
Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 852, para. 1 (Japan).
429
For example, a court granted only $800,000 (at the exchange rate of US$1 = yen 100) in a derivative suit in which the company recovered more than $105 million after six years from the filing to the
favorable judgment. Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] July 14, 2010, Hei 20 (wa) no. 16888,
2093 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 138 (Japan). This should be contrasted with the example in Delaware described in supra note 188.
430
See, e.g., Otsuka, supra note 405, at 11.
431
See, e.g., MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) arts. 159 (effect of a failure to dispute a factual allegation by
the opposing party), 179 (effect of an admission of fact) (Japan). See generally ITO, supra note 402, at
295–309. With respect to provisional remedies, however, this principle is somewhat tempered. See
HIROSHI SEGI, MINJI HOZENHŌ SHINTEIBAN [PROVISIONAL REMEDIES LAW–NEWLY REVISED] ¶ 211
(2014) [hereinafter SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES].
432
In appraisal proceedings resulting from minority shareholder freeze-outs, the court is empowered
to initiate and conduct factual investigations. Hishō-jiken tetsuzukihō [Noncontentious Cases Procedures
Act], Law No. 51 of 2012, arts. 49–53 (Japan). In view of the relatively weak fact-finding tools in
shareholder lawsuits, in some cases it could be strategically better for plaintiffs to sue for damages after
the conclusion of appraisal proceedings in which the inquisitorial system should not prevail. Note that
the damage lawsuits resulting in the REX II Tokyo High Court decision were filed after the REX I Supreme Court determination. See infra Part V.D. See also SHIRAI, supra note 139, at 513 n.1773 (noting
the Tokyo High Court’s request in the REX I appraisal proceeding to the target company to disclose a
425
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fective discovery or substantial functional equivalent in Japan. Written interrogatories are mostly dysfunctional.433 Other main fact-finding tools may
involve courts, which do not foster speedy disclosure or discovery of
facts.434 If plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to support their claims,
technically the courts may dismiss the claims prior to formal fact-finding
before judges.435 It is even more difficult in provisional injunction settings
for shareholders to find facts to support their claims.436 In addition, courts
generally set a high threshold for the burden of proof and have not used
burden-shifting flexibly in the context of shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers. Therefore, the judiciary system does not adequately address AIPs
at Stage I.437
(i) Fact-finding in Regular Proceedings
The Code of Civil Procedure of Japan provides for written interrogatories.438 A prospective plaintiff may initiate a mutual exchange of written
questions.439 The prospective defendant—if [s]he has responded to the prospective plaintiff’s inquiries—is entitled to send his or her own written inquiry. The parties may use a similar procedure once a lawsuit commences.440 Surprisingly, however, there is no direct sanction against a recipient’s
valuation report used in connection with the MBO to support a statement that there is willingness among
judges to force disclosure of corporate information to shareholder plaintiffs).
433
See infra note 443.
434
Presumably, a lack of available information in provisional injunction proceedings sometimes
makes presiding judges nervous when they render decisions. See, e.g., Masahito Monguchi and Kenjiro
Egashira, Kaishahō no rippō to saiban 8-kikan (2) [Drafting of Company Law and Judging], in
KAISHAHŌ KONMENTĀRU 8 KIKAN (2) [8 COMMENTARIES ON COMPANIES ACT: ORGANS (2)] (Seiichi
Ochiai ed., 2010) [hereinafter Monguchi/Egashira Dialogue]. Judge Monguchi was a carrier judge and
spent several years each at the Tokyo District Court and the Tokyo High Court.
435
See, e.g., Sachio Ota, Amerikahō ni okeru purīdingu yōkenron no aratana tenkai [New Developments in Pleading Requirements under American Law], 19 HIKAKUHŌBUNKA 79, 94–96 (2011); see
also ITO, supra note 402, at 196–97. MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 133, para. 2, no. 2 (Japan); Minji
soshō kisoku [Rules of Civil Procedure], Supreme Court Rule No. 5 of 1996, art. 53, para. 1 (Japan).
436
See, e.g., Norimitsu Arai, Emu ando ei jidai no minji hozen: Tekitaitekibaishū ni okeru karishobun wo chūshin ni shite [Provisional Remedies in the Era of M&As: Focusing on Provisional Injunctions Relating to Hostile Acquisitions], 1317 JURISUTO 221, 224–25 (2006).
437
See, e.g., Otsuka, supra note 405, at 12 (stating that, due to difficulties in assembling facts to
prove their cases, securities holders and their lawyers have been hesitant to file lawsuits).
438
See generally HATTORI & HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 422,
§§ 7.08[8][c], 7.08[8][d].
439
MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) arts. 132-2 to 132-3 (Japan). For a general description, see HATTORI &
HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 422, § 7.06[8][d]. With respect to the system’s
legislative background, see, for example, ITO, supra note 402, at 312.
440
MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 163 (Japan). The basic concept in this article was inspired by the
interrogatories under Rule 33 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ITO, supra note 402, at 272
n.82.
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failure to comply with a request. 441 Due to this and other reasons, these
written interrogatory tools are unattractive, and their use has been almost
negligible.442
Further, the prospective plaintiff who has initiated the mutual exchange of interrogatories and the prospective defendant who has responded
to the prospective plaintiff’s interrogatories may each request via a court a
production of documents constituting evidence clearly necessary for the requestors but difficult for the requestors to obtain.443 However, the recipient
does not have any legal obligation to comply. This strategy relies on the recipient’s goodwill and voluntary cooperation, which is encouraged by the
court.444 The use of this tool has been negligible.445
The parties may, upon application to the court, seek to take testimonies
from experts, witnesses, and other parties to the lawsuit, and seek court orders for document production.446 Such an application, however, must concretely identify the facts to be proved,447 which, strictly applied, could present an undue challenge if the plaintiff does not know much about what
transpired on the defendant’s part.448 If a witness fails to appear for no justi441
See id. at 273, 314. The lawyer representing the delinquent party, however, may possibly be in
violation of his or her ethical duties. Id. at 271, 312 n.164.
442
See, e.g., Yoshiki Yamaura et al., Shōko dēta shūshū no hōhō to jijitsu nintei [Means to Collect
Evidence/Data and Findings of Fact], 1248 HANTA 5, 12–17 (2007) (transcript of a roundtable discussion held on July 16, 2007; remarks by various participants). For litigators in the United States this may
not be a surprise at all, since they know that written interrogatories in the United States have not been
very effective. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 215, at 1410. Attorneys may request that their bar
associations send inquiries to various organizations (but not to individuals). Bengoshihō [Lawyers’
Law], Law No. 205 of 1949, art. 23-2 (Japan). However, the effects of noncompliance by the recipients
are similarly unclear. See, e.g., Nagoya Kōtō Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Feb. 8, 2013, Hei 25 (ne) no.
212, 1430 KIN’YŪ SHŌJI HANREI [KINHAN] 25 (Japan).
443
MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) arts. 132-4 to 132-9 (Japan). Article 23-2 allows lawyers to request that
their bar associations seek information from public authorities and other organizations to supply information that relates to matters the lawyers handle. Bengoshihō [Lawyers’ Law], Law No. 205 of 1949,
art. 23-2 (Japan). However, the consequences of noncompliance with the request are unclear. For its
legal effects, see, for example, Ōsaka Kōtō saibansho [Osaka High Court] Jan. 30, 2007, Hei 18 (ne) no.
779, 1962 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 78 (Japan); Nagoya Kōtō Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Feb. 8, 2013,
Hei 25 (ne) no. 212, 1430 KIN’YŪ SHŌJI HANREI [KINHAN] 25 (Japan). At least in the context of typical
control transactions, its use, if any, seems to have been limited.
444
See ITO, supra note 402, at 315.
445
SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, SAIBAN NO JINSOKU-KA NI KAKARU KENSHŌ NI KANSURU
HŌKOKUSHO 4-KAI [REPORT ON THE EXAMINATION OF SPEEDIER RESOLUTION OF CASES (4TH)] 27–29
(2012), http://www.courts.go.jp/about/siryo/hokoku_04_hokokusyo/index.html; Yamaura et al., supra
note 442, at 17–19.
446
See generally ITO, supra note 402, at 330–31. The court can deny such requests if the evidence is
unnecessary. MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 181, para. 1 (Japan). See ITO, supra note 402, at 371 n.281.
447
MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 180, para. 1 (Japan); Minji soshō kisoku [Rules of Civil Procedure],
Supreme Court Rule No. 5 of 1996, art. 99, para. 1 (Japan). To call a witness, the party must set forth
individual and specific inquiries to be addressed. Id. art. 107.
448
See, e.g., MIKIO AKIYAMA ET AL., KONMENTĀRU MINJI SOSHŌHŌ 4 [COMMENTARIES ON CIVIL
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fiable reason, the court has the power to impose civil fines. The witness
may also be subject to criminal fines and detention.449 However, Japanese
courts have rarely imposed such sanctions.450 In fact, judges discourage parties from calling unwilling witnesses. 451 Witnesses have to testify under
oath and are subject to perjury charges.452 Witnesses are rarely if ever criminally sanctioned for lying,453 and presumably they are not infrequently untruthful.454 Further, parties who testify are not subject to the penalty of perjury if they lie under oath.455
Parties by motion may ask the court to issue an order to any person to
produce specific documents in his or her possession.456 There are exceptions
to the general rule. For example, documents are exempt if they are for the
exclusive use of the person to whom the order is directed.457 The language
of the exemption may be broadly interpreted to cover many types of necessary documents in shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers.458 With respect
to specifically identifiable documents, the court may not be as restrictive as
one might have feared.459 At any rate, the party who seeks the court order
PROCEDURE LAW 4] 72–73 (2010).
449
MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) arts. 192–94 (Japan).
450
See Watashi wa shōnin to shite yōkyū o mieru koto o kyohi shitai nodesuga, . . . [I Want to Refuse Request to Appear as a Witness, but . . .], NPO HŌJIN NO HŌTEKI SEKYURITI KURABU [NPO LEGAL
SECURITY CLUB] (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.hou-nattoku.com/consult/689.php. In a blog article, one
practitioner speculates that such practice is a reflection of the pervasive attitude of judges in Japan that
the parties should feel lucky if witnesses willingly show up to assist them. See Naze shōnin no gimu o
mushi shite imasu [Why Witness Obligation is Neglected Practice of Law], PRACTICE OF LAW (May 3,
2004, 8:42 AM), http://blog.livedoor.jp/kazsin/archives/504337.html.
451
A noted scholar stated that despite the available sanctions, it is difficult to force witnesses to appear against their will. ITO, supra note 402, at 386. Further, there is a risk that witnesses who are forced
to appear are less likely to give testimony favorable to the parties calling them. If the witnesses lie, it is
difficult to prosecute them.
452
KEIHŌ (PEN. C.) arts. 169, 171 (Japan) (imprisonment for a period of three months to ten years).
453
Id. at 775 (“[E]nforcement of the perjury law is very weak.”). The United States seems to have a
similar problem although perhaps to a lesser extent. See Matthew L. Lifflander, The Economic Truth
About
Lying,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Mar.
25,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324532004578360941582888094.html.
454
See, e.g., Yasuhei Taniguchi, Code of Civil Procedure of Japan, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767, 775
(1997) (“[M]ost witnesses are partisan and not always trustworthy”).
455
They may, however, be subject to civil fines of not more than yen 100,000 (US$1,000 at the exchange rate of US$1 = yen 100). MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 209 (Japan).
456
MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) arts. 219, 220, 222–24 (Japan).
457
Id. art. 220, para. 1, no. 4, item (d).
458
See ITO, supra note 402, at 419 n.394. This exemption, however, does not cover documents legally required to be created.
459
For example, in a recent case involving a derivative suit to recover damages that directors allegedly inflicted on a company, a court ordered the company to produce internal memorandums and documents showing agendas for executive committee meetings relating to the selection of various professionals, including valuation firms and law firms, hired in relation to the examination of a management
buyout. Kōbe Chihō Saibansho [Kobe Dist. Ct.] May 8, 2012, Hei 22 (mo) nos. 230, 231, 1398 KIN’YŪ
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must provide a description and the gist of the document, and the facts the
document seeks to prove.460 This requirement, however, is often challenging in shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers, particularly with respect to
documents not legally required to be prepared, such as e-mails. When it is
“extremely difficult” to give such a description or gist, then the requirement
is relaxed, and it is enough for the petitioner to provide information sufficient for the holder of the document to identify the requested document.461
In such a case the petitioner must ask the court to request that the holder
clarify the description and gist of the document.462 However, this method of
requesting documents has not been very effective.463
Under the JPN Companies Act, subject to certain curve outs, a shareholder who owns 3% or more of the voting rights of the outstanding shares
for six months or longer is entitled to inspect the accounting books and records of the company.464 The Act also grants shareholders the right to inspect
other specified types of records.465 Further, in relation to tender offers and
proxy fights, there are disclosure requirements. These are all helpful but are
not necessarily unedited “raw materials” that reveal facts that actually transpired beyond the view of dispersed shareholders.
(ii) Fact Finding in Provisional Injunctions
Parties seeking provisional injunctions must make a “rough showing”
(somei) of both the existence of a relevant legal relationship to be protected
and the need for such provisional injunctions to avoid severe damage or
imminent danger. 466 Under this standard, the level of proof required for
SHŌJI HANREI [KINHAN]

40 (Japan). According to a blog run by the lawyers for the plaintiffs, the determination was later upheld by both the Osaka High Court and the Japanese Supreme Court. Masatoshi
Kato, Sharure bunsho teishutsu meirei saikōsai kettei [Supreme Court’s Determination on Charle Document Production Order], KŌBE SOYOKAZE HŌRITSU JIMUSHO KŌSHIKI BLOG (April 18, 2013, 9:34
PM), http://www.soyokaze.ws/mt/archives/cat2/index.html.
460
MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 221 (Japan). For the consequences of noncompliance, see id. art.
224, para. 1, art. 225, para. 1.
461
Id. art. 222.
462
If the court issues such request, it does not have any direct means to force the holder to make the
clarification. However, the recipient’s failure could lead to a deemed admission. See ITO, supra note
402, at 410 n.371. Cf. AKIYAMA ET AL., supra note 448, at 439–41.
463
Id. at 433.
464
Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 433 (Japan).
465
See, e.g., id. art. 125, para. 2 (a list of shareholders), art. 371, para. 2 (board minutes), art. 394,
para. 2 (minutes of statutory auditor meetings), art. 442, para. 3 (certain accounting documents), art.
782, para. 3 (surviving corporations’ merger and other similar agreements), art. 794 (disappearing corporations’ merger and other similar agreements). The scope of the accessible documents and records
seems narrower than the “books and records” that Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law covers. Further, the curve outs under the JPN Companies Act are wider than those under Section
220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
466
Minji hozenhō [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of 1989, arts. 13, 23, para. 2 (Ja-
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provisional injunction proceedings is lower than the one required in regular
proceedings. 467 However, in general, judges in Japan appear to impose a
standard no lower than the preponderance standard in Delaware.468
The court procedure for provisional injunctions is informal and abbreviated relative to the procedure required to render definitive judgments,
such as permanent injunctions. These characterizations are particularly true
with respect to the fact-finding aspect of the procedure.469 In provisional injunction proceedings, the court confers (shinjin), orally or in writing, with
the parties.470 The court may, to clarify the parties’ positions on disputed
factual matters, hear statements from those who (i) administer affairs for the
parties, such as independent contractors or professional advisors, including
attorneys, or (ii) assist the parties with respect to the administration of such
affairs, such as officers or employees of a company that is a party to the
proceedings.471 The court may seek such statements at the suggestion of an
opposing party or let the opposing party directly ask questions.472
The parties may submit documentary evidence to the court.473 In addition, during a face-to-face conference that both parties can attend, the court
may hear testimonies from the parties or third parties who have been designated by one of the parties and have agreed to appear.474 However, testimonies are not made under oath.475 In addition, the court does not have a legal
means to compel testimonies of third parties, and third-party testimonies
have been taken only infrequently.476 The court may at its discretion choose

pan).
467

See infra text accompanying note 483.
See, e.g., SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 245 (stating that under the standard a
tentative conviction of the truth is required), ¶¶ 248–52, ¶ 253–2; Ito, supra note 402, at 331 (stating that
“a substantial level of likelihood” of veracity is required); AKIYAMA ET AL, supra note 448, at 132 (a
likelihood that permits a tentative conviction). As to the need (hitsuyōsei), see SEGI, PROVISIONAL
REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 253.
469
In general, however, the court may not issue a provisional injunction without having a face-toface informal conference that the party against whom the injunction is directed can attend. Law No. 91
of 1989, art. 23, para. 4 (Japan). However, the requirement will be waived if the passage of time necessary to have such a conference or trial would frustrate the purpose of the provisional injunction. Id.
470
Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 7 (incorporating by reference, among others, MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.),
art. 87, para. 2 (Japan)) (Japan).
471
Id. art. 9. Cf. MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 151, para. 1, no. 2 (Japan). See SEGI, PROVISIONAL
REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶¶ 221, 228–30.
472
Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 7 (incorporating by reference, among others, MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.)
art. 149, para. 3 (Japan)) (Japan). See SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 231.
473
See SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 221.
474
Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 7 (incorporating, among others, MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 187 (Japan)) (Japan). Cf. SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 222 (stating the existence of a contrary view).
475
See SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 221.
476
See id.
468
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to have a formal fact-finding procedure before judges.477 At such procedure,
evidence must be taken pursuant to the formalities generally applicable to
the proceeding.478 It is rare, at best, for a court to hold such a proceeding.479
Moreover, the required showing must be made through evidence that
can be examined “immediately.”480 Because of this requirement, in practice,
document production orders are not issued in provisional injunction proceedings.481 It also means that there are no scheduled testimonies.482
(iii) Allocation of Burden of Proof
In general, Japan’s standard of proof for civil cases is substantially
higher than the preponderance standard in Delaware and requires a judge to
form a conviction as to the existence of a fact to be proved.483 Therefore,
the information asymmetry between shareholders and Gatekeepers in Japan
poses a greater problem than it does in Delaware.484
From time to time, Japanese courts have shifted burdens of proof or
used presumptions or inferences to impose a persuasion burden on the parties who otherwise do not have that burden even when there are no explicit
statutory mandates to do so.485 For example, in connection with employee
dismissal cases, Japanese courts have reversed the usual burden of proof to
aid dismissed employees.486
However, the importance of burden shifting in lawsuits against Gatekeepers is yet to be widely recognized, 487 and we have not seen flexible
477

Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 3 (Japan).
See SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 223.
479
See, e.g., id.
480
MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 87, para. 2 (Japan).
480
Id. art. 188.
481
See AKIYAMA ET AL., supra note 448, at 134.
482
Id.
483
See ITO, supra note 402, at 331–33; Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan and the
United States, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263, 264 (2004); HATTORI & HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN
JAPAN, supra note 422, § 7.06[9][b] (stating that “the majority of judges appear to require a 70 to 80
percent probability”); AKIYAMA ET AL., supra note 448, at 132 (an 80% level of conviction).
484
It is true that, for example, when directors are involved in specified types of related party transactions without complying with statutorily prescribed ex ante safeguards, the directors’ failure to observe
their fiduciary duties are statutorily presumed. Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art.
356, para. 1, nos. 2–3, art. 365, art. 423, para. 3 (Japan). However, neither MBOs nor freeze-outs necessarily involve such specified types of related party transactions.
485
See, e.g., HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 422 (3d ed. 2009); KOJI SHINDO, MINJISOSHOHŌ [CIVIL
PROCEDURE LAW] 615–20 (5th ed. 2009).
486
See, e.g., Takeshi Araki, Flexibility in Japanese Employment Relations and the Role of the Judiciary, in JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 249, 253–54 (Hiroshi
Oda ed., 1994).
487
More recently, several commentators have advocated burden shifting in relation to shareholder
478
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burden shifting or the use of presumptions in that area.488 One may speculate that the REX II Tokyo High Court decision,489 which involves a selfdealing transaction (a controller freeze-out or at least an MBO), might have
been decided differently if the burden had been shifted to the defendants.490
3. Strategies to Avoid Ex Post Restorative Relief to Undo a
Shareholder Collective Decision or Transaction
Tender offer and proxy (or its equivalent) rules in Japan create a window of time for the judiciary to render anticipatory relief. Japanese courts
can render, among others, provisional injunctions, permanent injunctions,491
and declaratory judgments. 492 However, Japanese courts are not equity
courts, and their power to render injunctive relief outside statutorily authorized circumstances has been limited, and is, at best, of an uncertain scope.
Further, the level of the courts’ discretion in rendering injunctions appears a
lot less than that of the Delaware Chancery Court. They might frustrate the
Japanese courts’ efforts to decide flexibly and to take full account of the efficiency considerations discussed in Part III.C. above in issuing injunctions.
Specialization of judges focusing on disputes relating to control transactions
is incomplete and weak. The courts in Japan, in dealing with preliminary
injunction proceedings, have been remarkably speedy. However, the speed
has been due in part to the absence of any fact-finding mechanisms that are
meaningful in the context of shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers.493
Thus, Japan’s judiciary has not played catch-up with the role recently thrust

lawsuits against Gatekeepers. See, e.g., Hidesato Iida, MBO wo okonau torishimariyaku no gimu to daisansha ni taisuru sekinin [Duties of Directors Participating in MBO and Duties to Third Parties], 1437
JURISUTO 96 (2012) (arguing that in MBOs, directors should owe the burden of proving the fairness of
the transactions); Ota & Yano, supra note 412, at 87, 88 n.138 (suggesting burden shifting when a competing bid emerges during an MBO).
488
This does not mean that burden shifting has not happened. See, e.g., KANDA, COMPANY LAW,
supra note 392, at 151 n.1 (describing a case where the court effectively shifted a burden of persuasion
from one party to the other).
489
See infra note 571.
490
See, e.g., Iida, supra note 487, at 99–100 (arguing that burden shifting in the JPN Companies Act
applicable to certain types of self-dealings should be applied to MBOs); SHIRAI, supra note 139, at 502–
03 (arguing that MBOs should be subject to a standard similar to the entire fairness standard in Delaware and that in such situations directors should bear the burden of proving the fairness).
491
Japanese courts now have a means to compel compliance with injunctive remedies, both permanent and provisional: the courts can impose monetary sanctions. Minji shikkōhō [Civil Execution Act],
Law No. 4 of 1979, art. 172 (Japan), Minji hozenhō [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of
1989, art. 52, para. 2 (Japan). See HIROSHI SEGI, MINJI HOZENHŌ NYŪMON [INTRODUCTION TO THE
CIVIL PROVISIONAL REMEDIES ACT] 240–42 (2011) [hereinafter SEGI, INTRODUCTION].
492
As to the types of remedies Japanese courts may employ, see generally ITO, supra note 402, at
158–63.
493
See infra Part V.B.3.b.
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on it, and in particular, is not able to expertly render anticipatory relief in
the context of shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers.
(a) Anticipatory Relief
(i) Permanent Injunctions
Several provisions in the JPN Companies Act explicitly allow shareholders to seek injunctive remedies. These provisions can be used to enjoin
certain Gatekeeper actions taken in violation of their fiduciary obligations
or transactions resulting from or attributable to such Gatekeeper actions.
However, at least under the currently prevailing view, these provisions do
not cover many situations where injunctive remedies would be available
under the Delaware law.494
First, any shareholder who has held shares for six months or longer
may enjoin directors from taking an action in violation of law if such action
might result in irreparable damages to the corporation. 495 “Violation of
law” includes a violation of the directors’ fiduciary duties.496 However, the
power may be exercised with respect only to director actions that would
cause damages to the “corporation,” and such damages must be “irreparable.” But for the two requirements, this right could have been potent ammunition for shareholders to challenge defense measures. There are many
instances where director actions taken in relation to control transactions
would cause damages to shareholders but not to the corporation. Commentators have proposed various interpretations to temper the limitation.497 The
494
The 2014 JPN Company Act Amendments added several provisions that allow shareholders to
seek injunctive relief in relation to certain squeeze out transactions. Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law
No. 86 of 2005, arts. 784–2, 796–2, 805–2 (Japan). However, the injunctions are available only when
the transactions fail to comply with the technical requirements of the JPN Companies Act or articles of
incorporation. See HIROAKI TAKAGI, YASUSHI KANOKOGI & SABURO SAKAMOTO, HŌSEISHINGIKAI
KAISHAHŌ BUKAI DAIJYŪYONKAI GIJIROKU [MINUTES OF THE FOURTEENTH MEETING OF THE
CORPORATE LAW COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM] 32–33 (2011),
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000081570.pdf. Thus breach of fiduciary duties does not directly trigger
the newly added injunction provisions. For the possible availability of provisional injunctions, see infra
text accompanying note 526.
495
Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 360, paras. 1, 3 (Japan).
496
See EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 495, and cases cited therein. Note that, unlike the derivative
suit, to seek damages from directors under Article 847 of the JPN Companies Act the shareholder does
not have to first demand that the company enforce its claim against the directors. Cf. infra text accompanying note 500.
497
See, e.g., Masao Yanaga, Ichijirushiku futōna gappeijōken to sashitome/
songaibaishō seikyū [Extremely Unjust Merger Terms and Injunctions/Damage Suits], in KIGYŌHŌ NO
RIRON JŌKAN [1 THEORIES ON BUSINESS LAW] 623, 627 n.3, 630–32 (Etsuro Kuronuma & Tomotaka
Fujita eds., 2007); HŌSEISHINGIKAI KAISHAHŌ BUKAI DAISANKAI GIJIROKU [MINUTES OF THE THIRD
MEETING OF THE CORPORATE LAW COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM] 43 (2010)
(statement of Wataru Tanaka), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000052523.pdf.
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results of such efforts are still uncertain.498 Further, “irreparable damage” is
a threshold higher than “severe damage.”499
Second, shareholders may sue the company to seek an injunction
against an issuance of shares or stock warrants if the issuance would violate
the law or is severely unjust500 and may have unfavorable consequences for
the shareholders.501 When target companies attempt to issue new shares or
share warrants as a defense measure, plaintiffs commonly try to rely on this
statutory authority to enjoin the issuances.502 Further, the provisions to enjoin the issuance of shares or share warrants can be applied to certain analogous transactions. For example, in Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund
(Offshore), L.P. v. Bull-Dog Sauce Co., 503 the Japanese Supreme Court
agreed that Article 247 could be applied by analogy to a distribution to
shareholders of stock warrants constituting a poison pill.504
Third, in the case of a short-form merger or a short-form share exchange,505 minority shareholders of the controlled corporation, who do not

498

The Tokyo District Court, however, recently held that the difference between the actual issue
price of equity securities and the issue price that could have been achieved but for directors’ breach of
their fiduciary duties constitutes damages to the company. Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.]
May 10, 2010, Hei 22 (yo) no. 20040, 1343 KIN’YŪ SHŌJI HANREI [KINHAN] 21.
499
See Masafumi Nakahigashi, Kigyosaihen wo meguru kaishahōsei no kadai [Corporate Law Design Issues Relating to Corporate Restructuring], 1437 JURISUTO 17, 20 (2011) (stating the difficulty of
satisfying the higher threshold). Statutory auditors have similar rights except that they can seek an injunction against a director action that is violative of the directors’ fiduciary duties and might result in
severe damages to the company. Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 385, para. 1, art. 386, para. 1 (Japan).
500
Under the prevailing view, violation of the law is a violation by the issuing company and does
not include a breach of fiduciary duties by directors. However, if the board decides to issue shares or
share warrants in violation of the fiduciary duties of the board members, it could constitute an unjust
issuance. See, e.g., Wataru Tanaka, Kakushu sashitomeseikyūken no seishitsu, yōken oyobi kōka [Nature, Prerequisites and Effects of Various Injunctive Claims], in KAISHASAIBAN NI KAKARU RIRON NO
TŌŌTATSUTEN [FRONTIERS OF THEORIES FOR CORPORATE LAWSUITS] 2, 17–18 (Hiroyuki Kansaku et
al. eds., 2014).
501
Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 210 (as to the issuance of shares), art. 247 (as to the issuance of stock
warrants) (Japan).
502
See, e.g., Tokyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] March 23, 2005, Hei 17 (ra) no. 429, 1899
HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 56; Tokyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] July 29, 2005, Hei 17 (ra) no. 942,
1909 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 87.
503
BESSATSU SHŌJI HŌMU HENSHUB
̄ U, 311 BURUDOKKU SŌSU JIKEN NO HOT̄ EKI KENTŌ: BAISHŪ
BOE
̄ ISAKU NI KANSURU SAIBAN KEIKA TO IGI KINKYŪ SHUPPAN [311 LEGAL EXAMINATION OF THE
BULL-DOG SAUCE CASE: TRIAL COURSE ON ANTI-TAKEOVER MEASURES AND THE SIGNFICANCE OF
EMERGENCY PUBLISHING] 438 (2007). Due to the discriminatory nature of the rights plan deployed in
the case, the hostile bidder alleged a violation of the principal of the equality of shareholders. See Law
No. 86 of 2005, art. 109, para. 1 (Japan). If there was indeed such a violation, it would have given a separate ground for the injunction. The court, however, rejected the argument.
504
For the analysis of the case, see Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce, supra note 365, at 353–56.
505
Note that these are not popular methods to effect minority freeze-outs. See supra text accompanying notes 394–397.

127

128 DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

X

2/10/2016 10:35 PM

36:45 (2016)

have a chance to vote,506 can seek to enjoin the transaction when considerations payable to the shareholders are “extremely unjust” and the transaction
could result in damages to the shareholders.507
Furthermore, if literally interpreted, the foregoing injunction provisions do not authorize an affirmative injunction.508 Therefore, for example,
once a poison pill is adopted and warrants are actually distributed to shareholders, under the literal interpretation the court will not be able to give an
order to redeem the warrants. 509 The lack of affirmative injunctions also
makes it difficult for shareholders to challenge friendly acquisitions. In Japan, bidders typically launch friendly tender offers without prior agreements with the targets.510 This could mean that there is no action by the target board for shareholders to stop. Under tender offer rules, targets’ boards
are obligated to issue recommendation statements.511 Shareholders, however, may not have the opportunity to seek a negative injunction against the
recommendation statements if they are announced simultaneously with the
commencement of tender offers.
In general, the Japanese courts have issued injunctions when there are
no specific statutory authorizations in the JPN Companies Act. For example, they have issued injunctions against certain types of interference with
ownership rights, environmental rights, intellectual property rights, and privacy rights.512 However, there are no standard theories behind the court’s
practices, and it is quite uncertain in what additional areas the courts will
506

Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 784, para. 1, art. 796, para. 1 (Japan).
Id. art. 784, para. 2, art. 796, para. 2. Minority shareholders also have a statutory appraisal right.
Id. art. 785, para. 1, para. 2, no. 2, art. 786, art. 797, para. 1. para. 2, no. 2, art. 798. The holders of
shares that are subject to the buyout right described in supra note 395 are similarly allowed to seek an
injunction of the buyout or a statutory appraisal.
508
The statutory term yameru literally means “stop” or “cease.” Recently, in an antitrust context the
Commercial Division of the Tokyo District Court stated that language of similar import does not prevent
it from issuing an affirmative injunction. See Tōkyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] June 19, 2014,
Hei 23 (wa) no. 32660, 2232 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 102 (relating to an injunction under Shitekidokusen
oyobi kōseitorihiki no kakuho ni kansureu hōritsu [Dokusenkinshihō] [Antimonopoly Act], Law No. 4
of 1947, art. 24 (Japan)).
509
In Delaware this is not the case. See supra text accompanying note 272.
510
Japan does not have antitakeover provisions similar to Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Ironically, the lack of antitakeover provisions magnifies the problem of not having affirmative injunctions to challenge control transactions. If Japan had such provisions, parties to friendly
transactions would be encouraged to enter into acquisition agreements, which would give shareholders a
chance to seek negative injunctions against the transactions.
511
Kinyūshōhin torihikihō [Financial Instruments and Exchange Act], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 2710, para. 1 (Japan); Hakkōshaigainomono ni yoru kabukentō no kōkaikaitsuke no kaiji ni kansuru naikakufurei [Disclosure Rules Relating to Third Party Tender Offers], Law No. 38 of 1971, art. 25, para.
1, no. 3 (Japan).
512
See, e.g., Yanaga, supra note 500, at 632, 638 n.19; Akira Tokutsu, Minji hozenhō idete kaishahō
horobu? [Will the Emergence of the Provisional Remedies Act Bring about the Demise of the Companies
Act?], 82 HŌRITSUJIHŌ 28, 30 (2011).
507
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entertain requests for injunctive remedies.513 Some scholars are attempting
to expand the scope of available permanent injunctions.514 The results of
their attempts are uncertain.
(ii) Provisional Injunctions
Under the literal language of the Provisional Remedies Act, a court
may issue a provisional injunction if the plaintiff roughly shows a legal relationship to be protected and the need for the provisional injunction515 in
order to avoid severe damage or an imminent danger.516 Despite the broad
language, however, the available scope of provisional injunctions—in relation to control transactions based on a claim under the JPN Companies
Act—has been limited and uncertain.
A traditionally prevailing view is that general provisional injunctions
should be available to protect a right only in situations where the right is of
a nature that entitles the holder of such right to a permanent injunction.517
As described above,518 however, the availability of permanent injunctions
for shareholders, in relation to control transactions, has been limited or at
best uncertain. This could result in a very narrow availability of provisional
injunctions in the context of control transactions.
Recently, scholars have attempted to more broadly decouple the availability of provisional injunctions from specific provisions of the JPN Companies Act authorizing permanent injunctions. 519 Despite the traditional
view, in some cases Japanese courts have issued provisional injunctions to
protect rights granted under the JPN Companies Act even if the Act does
not explicitly authorize permanent injunctions to protect the rights.520 In relying at least in part on such precedents, one academic has suggested that
provisional injunctions should be available for rights that would entitle their
owners to obtain specific performance.521 The JPN Companies Act explicitly entitles shareholders to request that a court revoke a severely unjust
513
See, e.g., the authorities referenced in Yanaga, supra note 497, at 638 n.19. For an extensive
analysis of legal theories that analyze civil law cases in Japan, see MUNENORI NEMOTO,
SASHITOMESEIKYŪKEN NO RIRON [THEORIES FOR INJUNCTIONS] (2011).
514
See, e.g., Yanaga, supra note 497, at 632–33; SHIRAI, supra note 139, at 515–19.
515
Karisashitome; the term can also be translated as “interlocutory injunction.” Delaware has two
types of interlocutory remedies, temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. See supra Part
IV.A.2.a. Japan has ex parte and non–ex parte proceedings too. See generally HATTORI & HENDERSON,
supra note 422, §§ 6.1–6.08.
516
See supra text accompanying note 466.
517
Tokutsu, supra note 512, at 31.
518
See supra Part V.B.3.a.i.
519
See, e.g., Yanaga, supra note 497, at 632, 638 n.19; Tokutsu, supra note 512, at 30.
520
See, e.g., Tokutsu, supra note 512, at 30, and authorities cited therein.
521
Id. at 31.
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shareholder resolution if such a resolution passed owing to a vote by a
shareholder especially interested with respect to the resolution.522 Under the
recent scholarly view, to protect the revocation right the minority shareholders should be able to provisionally enjoin a transaction, such as a merger, it is authorized to enjoin as a result of the severely unjust shareholder
resolution.523 However, the ultimate outcome of the scholarly attempt is uncertain. 524 As stated, 525 under the prevailing view, permanent injunctions
explicitly sanctioned by the JPN Companies Act do not allow affirmative
injunctions. This position, despite the examples of affirmative provisional
injunctions in Article 24 of the Provisional Remedies Act,526 may further
inhibit their use in the context of control transactions.
(b) Speed
In general, Japanese courts are not known for speedy handling of cases. 527 Unlike Delaware, no formal expedited proceeding exists in Japan.
Based on the author’s observation of recent high-profile provisional injunction proceedings relating to control transactions, in general Japanese courts
have handled them with amazing speed and without causing undue delays
in the execution of control transactions.528 This is largely due to informal
and abbreviated procedures applicable to such proceedings 529 and the
courts’ keen awareness of the time constraints under which the parties oper522

See supra text accompanying note 418.
Tokutsu, supra note 512, at 31. See also Kōfu Chihō Saibansho [Kōfu Dist. Ct.] June 28, 1960,
Shō 35 (yo) no. 61, 237 HANREJIHŌ [HANJI] 30 (Japan); EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 366; Yanaga,
supra note 497, at 634–35.
524
The JPN Provisional Remedies Act does not require a court to balance equities in determining if
provisional remedies should be issued. As to the Delaware requirement, see supra Part IV.A.2.a.i. The
permanent injunction provisions of the JPN Companies Act do not contain such a requirement either.
See supra Part V.B.3.a.i. The absence of the specific authorization for the court to consider the equities
may tempt it to choose to apply the statutory requirements strictly and discourage robust use of injunctions. However, this concern may be unwarranted. For example, in rejecting a motion in which a petitioner sought a provisional order that prohibits the respondent from holding a shareholders meeting, the
Tokyo High Court referred to potential hardships to the respondent if such a motion were granted.
Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] June 28, 2005, Hei 17 (ra) no. 1012, 1911 HANREI JIHŌ
[HANJI] 163 (Japan).
525
See supra Part V.B.3.a.i.
526
Article 24 gives several examples of the types of orders the court may give.
527
See, e.g., Carl. F. Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure Code: Has It Fostered A Rule of Law
Dispute Resolution Mechanism?, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 511, 542–70 (2004); Takeshi Kojima, Japanese
Civil Procedure, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 689 (1997). In recognition of the problem, Japan enacted a
law designed to encourage speedy resolution of lawsuits. Saiban no jinsokuka ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on
the Expediting of Trials], Law No. 107 of 2003 (Japan). MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 157 (Japan).
528
For an example, see infra note 535. See also Arai, supra note 436, at 226. This does not seem
unique to the Japanese courts.
529
SEGI, INTRODUCTION, supra note 491, at 44–45.
523
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ate.530 For example, as indicated,531 no formal fact-finding procedures exist,
and unless a trial has been held, the court is not required to give compehensive reasons for its order.532 However, the courts’ use of more robust factfinding measures to solve AIPs may undermine their ability to render timely
decisions.
Defendants in provisional remedy proceedings could have three possible appeal opportunities.533 One justifiably wonders if the involvement of
four separate tribunals—three of which conduct factual inquiries 534 —is
warranted.
With respect to regular court proceedings, as one might expect, there is
no rule prohibiting the courts and parties from moving expeditiously. Rather, Japanese courts have reserved power to press the parties to move
speedily.535
(c) Expertise and Flexibility
(i) Courts
The courts of first instance for civil cases are generally district courts
located throughout Japan (fifty altogether). 536 The final judgments of the
530
Monguchi/Egashira Dialogue, supra note 434, at 11–12 (Judge Monguchi’s remarks that in rare
instances judges in the Commercial Division of the Tokyo District Court may try to get up to speed in
anticipation of possible preliminary injunction proceedings with novel issues and the time constraints
may become the most pressing issues that judges in the Commercial Division face when they handle
such proceedings).
531
See supra Part V.B.2.b.ii.
532
Minji hozenhō [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 16 (Japan).
533
See infra text accompanying notes 540–543. One example is Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co.,
Ltd. v. UFJ Holdings Co. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 30, 2004, Hei 16 (kyo) no. 19, 58 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO
MINJI
HANREISHŪ
[MINSHŪ]
1763
(Japan),
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/js_20100319120824143614.pdf. The plaintiff commenced the provisional injunction proceeding on July 16, 2005 at the Tokyo District Court, which granted the injunction.
UFJ made an interlocutory appeal to another panel in the court that affirmed on August 4 the earlier determination of the court. UFJ further appealed the determination to the Tokyo High Court, which on
August 11 rescinded the lower court’s determination. The Japanese Supreme Court affirmed the Tokyo
High Court’s determination on August 30.
534
Minji hozenhō [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of 1989, arts. 23, para. 4, 29, 41,
para. 4 (Japan).
535
See generally ITO, supra note 402, at 227–37. Anecdotally, delays in court proceedings are often
attributable to the habits of judges and lawyers involved in lawsuits. See, e.g., Yamaura et al., supra note
442, at 13–14 (speculating that lawyers do not want to have quick resolutions of matters they handle,
since quick resolutions mean less stable income). Some habits and traditions that existed before World
War II seem to have endured despite the efforts to change them after World War II. See, e.g., ALFRED
OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN, 130–34 (1979).
536
Saibanshohō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 24 (Japan) (district courts have jurisdiction
over all matters of first instance unless otherwise provided by law).
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district courts are generally appealable to the respective high courts (numbering eight) covering the regions in which the districts courts reside.537 The
high courts’ final judgments may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Japan if the judgment involves an error interpreting the Constitution of Japan,
or otherwise violates it.538 The Japanese Supreme Court may decide to entertain an appeal from the high court if the judgment conflicts with Japanese
Supreme Court precedents or involves an important interpretive issue.539
Decisions of the district courts granting provisional remedies may be
appealed to panels of separate judges of the same district courts.540 The decisions these separate panels and the original decisions of the district courts
denying provisional remedies are appealable to the high courts.541 The high
court decisions are further appealable to the Japanese Supreme Court if they
involve errors in interpreting the Constitution of Japan or otherwise violate
it.542 Appeals of high court decisions are also possible when the high courts
that render the decisions allow the appeals on the basis that the judgments
conflict with Japanese Supreme Court precedents or involve important interpretive issues.543
The Cabinet nominates the chief judge and appoints associate judges
of the Japanese Supreme Court.544 The Japanese Supreme Court nominates
lower court judges. 545 The lower court judges are appointed for ten-year
terms that may be renewed.546 With certain exceptions—in particular several of the current members of the Japanese Supreme Court—judges are
mostly career judges.547 No jurors are present at Japanese civil proceedings.
(ii) Weak Specialization
“[H]istorically, common law judges have been more comfortable than

537

MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 281, para. 1 (Japan).
Id. art. 312, paras. 1, 3 (Japan).
539
Id. art. 318 (Japan).
540
Minji hozenhō [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 26 (Japan). See, e.g.,
supra note 533.
541
MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 328, para. 1 (Japan); Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 41 (Japan).
542
MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 336 (Japan); Saibanshohō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1989, art. 7,
para. 1, no. 2 (Japan).
543
MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 337 (Japan); Law No. 59 of 1989, art. 7, para. 1, no. 2 (Japan).
544
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 6, para. 2, art. 79, para. 1 (Japan); Law No.
59 of 1989, art. 39 (Japan). They will retire at age 70. Id. ¶ 5.
545
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 40, para. 1 (Japan); Law No. 59 of 1989, art.
40, para. 1 (Japan).
546
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 80, para. 1 (Japan); Law No. 59 of 1989, art.
40, para. 3 (Japan).
547
See generally HATTORI & HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN supra note 422, § 3.02.
538
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their civil law counterparts in working with open-ended standards,”548 and,
anecdotally, Japanese judges prefer not to “interpret” standards. However,
they seem to shed such a mind-set when they are put on the spot. Thus, they
interpret broadly phrased constitutional 549 and statutory provisions, 550 including the fiduciary duty provisions in the JPN Companies Act.551 There
are certain “judge-made” laws as well.552 Perhaps Japanese judges are more
comfortable interpreting standards than judges in Continental Europe. 553
Thus, in policing Gatekeepers, the judiciary is required to apply amorphous
standards, which should not necessarily be fatal.
Due to the heavy concentration of headquarters of public Japanese
companies in Tokyo and Osaka, however, lawsuits relating to control transactions tend to be filed with the Tokyo District Court or the Osaka District
Court. Based on their respective internal rules, these courts have Commercial Divisions554 to deal with a high percentage of the disputes relating to
control transactions. This specialization, however, is incomplete. First, not
all cases are filed with the two district courts. Second, typically judges, including those in the Commercial Divisions, have frequent rotations in the

548

Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 411, at 895.
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81 (Japan).
550
See, e.g., the Japanese Civil Code: “The exercise of rights and performance of duties must be
done with good conscience and sincerity.” MINPŌ (CIV. C.) art. 1, para. 1, no. 1 (Japan). “No abuse of
rights is permissible” is another example. See id. art. 1, para. 1, no. 2 (Japan).
551
Kanda and Milhaupt point out Japanese courts’ successful applications of “duty of loyalty” provisions of Article 254–3 of the Commercial Code that were statutorily introduced into company law after World War II and are now in Article 355 of the JPN Companies Act. See Kanda & Milhaupt, supra
note 411, at 895–96.
552
See, e.g., Shoji Shinoda, Hanrei ni yoru hō no sōzō [Creation of Law by Judicial Precedents], in
HANREI TO SONO YOMIKATA [JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS AND HOW THEY SHOULD BE READ] 219 (Tsugio
Nakano ed., 3d ed. 2009).
553
There are commentaries possibly justifying the conjecture. See NOBUYOSHI TOSHITANI, NIHON
NO HŌ WO KANGAERU [REFLECTIONS ON JAPANESE LAW] 27 (2d ed. 2013) (suggesting that Japanese
Civil Code provisions are much simpler than those of France and Germany); ATSUSHI OMURA, HŌGEN,
KAISHAKU, MINPŌGAKU [SOURCE OF LAW, INTERPRETATION, CIVIL LAW STUDY] 69 (3d ed. 2003) (stating that judgments in Japan in civil cases in many ways look more similar to those in the United States
than to those in France).
554
For the Tokyo District Court, see TOKYO DISTRICT COURT, TOKYŌ CHIHŌ SAIBANSHO OYOBI
KAN’NAI KAN’I SAIBANSHO NO HEISEI 25-NENDO NI OKERU SAIBANKAN NO HAICHI, SAIBANJIMU NO
BUNPAI OYOBI DAIRI JYUNJO, KAITEI NO HIWARI NARABINI SHIHŌGYŌUSEIJIMU NO DAIRI JYUNJO NI
TSUITE NO SADAME [RULES FOR THE TOKYO DISTRICT COURT AND SUMMARY COURTS WITHIN ITS
JURISDICTION ON JUDGES’ ASSIGNMENTS, ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL TASKS AND SUBSTITUTION
SEQUENCE, COURT IN SESSIONS, AND SEQUENCE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION SUBSTITUTION] art. 9,
para. 4 (2015) (this document and its prior versions respectively as of April 19, 2012, June 25, 2013 and
May 14, 2014 are on file with the author). For the Commercial Division of the Osaka District Court, see
Ōsaka chihōsaibansho ōsakakateisaibansho [Summary Court of the Osaka District Court], NIHON NO
SAIBANSHO [JAPANESE COURTS], http://www.courts.go.jp/osaka/saiban/minji4/dai1_1/index.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2016).
549
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judicial system.555 Third, not all control transaction cases are assigned internally to the Commercial Divisions. Further, there is no specialization at
the high court level.556
C. Other Non-US Jurisdictions
The broad discovery and opt-out class action systems in the United
States are uniquely American.557 Many civil law countries require a higher
level of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard in the United
States.558 The same is true with respect to issue preclusion. 559 “European
countries usually adopt the ‘English rule’ . . . [and] the final sum cannot be
negotiated in advance by the plaintiff and her lawyer, because it is a cost

555
For example, of the thirteen judges and associate judges in the Commercial Division of the Tokyo District Court on April 19, 2012, seven, twelve and all rotated out of the division by June 25, 2013,
and April 1, 2014, respectively. For the names of the judges and associate judges in the division on April
19, 2012, June 25, 2013, May 14, 2014 and April 15, 2015, see TOKYO DISTRICT COURT, supra note
554, annex 1–2 (on file with the author).
556
See Arai, supra note 436, at 227 (recommending that the Tokyo and Osaka High Courts should
have special commercial divisions). Recently, the need to implement measures to enhance the specialization of judges dealing with finance and commercial matters has been discussed at both the agency and
the political levels. See, e.g., HŌSEISHINGIKAI KAISHAHŌ BUKAI DAISANKAI GIJIROKU [MINUTES OF THE
THIRD MEETING OF THE CORPORATE LAW COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM] 11
(2010) (statement of Futoshi Nasuno), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000052523.pdf; CORP.
GOVERNANCE COMM., LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY ECON. RES. COMM., KŌSEINA M&A RŪRU NI
KANSURU
TEIGEN
[PROPOSALS
RELATING
TO
FAIR
M&A
RULES]
5
(2005),
http://www.jimin.jp/election/results/sen_san22/seisaku/2005/pdf/seisaku-006.pdf.
557
With respect to discovery, see, for example, Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 215, at 1389–90.
With respect to opt-out class actions, see, for example, id. at 69; Coffee, supra note 96, at 301 n.37 (focusing on European jurisdictions); Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation
Come to Europe?, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS ACTIONS IN EUROPE 37 (Jürgen G. Backhaus
et al. eds., 2012); CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN
EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS (2008); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation across the Atlantic and
the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19–37 (2009). Moreover, the transplant of
discovery and class action systems are “very hard, won’t work very well if attempted, or both.” Black,
supra note 91, at 1594, 1601–02. See also Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the
Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case 4 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law Working Paper
No. 40/2005, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=730403 (indicating “class action and discovery rules” as “US institutions”). Moreover, in some jurisdictions the judiciaries have inquisitorial rather than adversarial systems. See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and
Comparative Procedure, AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 283–84 (2002). Inquisitorial jurisdictions may require an
entirely different approach to solve AIPs (asymmetric information problems) in relation to the Stage I
prerequisites.
558
See, e.g., Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 110, at 243 (“In civil-law countries, the standard
seems strange to us: a civil claimant must in effect convince the trier of fact that the claimant’s assertions are true.”).
559
See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using Preclusion to Share
Procedural Choices, 63 TUL. L. REV. 29, 78 (1988); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil: A Model for
Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 384–85 (2003).
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that the loser has to face.”560 Also, the loser pays aspect disincentivizes potential plaintiffs. 561 It appears that the rule applied by courts “ends up
chilling lawyers’ activism as [private attorneys general].”562 Thus, in general, judiciaries in non-U.S. jurisdictions find meeting the Stage I prerequisites difficult.
As to the Stage II prerequisites, injunctions, including interlocutory injunctions, may not be available in lawsuits against fiduciaries as readily,
broadly, and flexibly as in the United States.563 They may not have specialized judiciaries that focus on corporate matters and can move quickly and
flexibly.564 Judges in European countries may be less comfortable applying
broad standards than judges in Japan,565 let alone in the United States.566
Thus, in general, those judiciaries will also find it difficult to satisfy the
Stage II prerequisites.
D. Summary
To date there have been few, if any, successful hostile acquisitions under the current JPN Companies Act, which was enacted in 2005.567 There
were a couple of successful legal challenges against defense measures
adopted in the middle of the last decade.568 The defeated defense measures
were very primitive. The judges were able to rule on the legality of the
measures without looking beyond the four corners of the public disclosures
made in relation to the adoption or the use of the measures.569 Those challenges were not brought by dispersed shareholders. However, advisors on
the defense side quickly became more sophisticated and able to create a facade that, on the surface, passes muster under the Unocal standard. Soon,
560
Ferrarini & Giudici, supra note 557, at 49; see also Gomez & Saez, supra note 12, at 276 n.30
(stating that a contingency fee arrangement “is still formally not acceptable in several Continental European jurisdictions”).
561
Gomez & Saez, supra note 12, at 276 n.30.
562
Id.
563
For example, Fernando Gomez and Maria Isabel Saez discussed only class action damage suits to
enforce the no-frustration rule under the EU Takeover Directive. See Gomez & Saez, supra note 12. For
the no-frustration rule, see EU Takeover Directive, supra note 17, art. 9. See also Wendy A. Kennett,
Enforcement of Judgments in Europe, 5 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 321 (1997).
564
See, e.g., Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1, supra note 120,
at 715 (with respect to Russia).
565
See supra note 553.
566
Judges in civil law countries are generally less experienced in interpreting standards. See, e.g.,
Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000); Coffee, supra note 129, at 28.
567
See TANAKA, supra note 367, at 326, 338.
568
For examples, see, for example, Osugi, supra note 365, at 43–49; Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce,
supra note 365, at 348–50.
569
See Arai, supra note 436, at 223. They should have met the standards for summary judgments in
Delaware. See supra text accompanying notes 297, 299.
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due primarily to the AIPs relating to lawsuits, hurdles for hostile suitors became exceedingly high. Poor prospects of having a day in court or success
in court discourage potential hostile acquisition attempts if the boards of potential target companies resist acquisition attempts in violation of their fiduciary duties. Other shareholders fared worse, since they also had CAPs.
With respect to friendly acquisitions, including MBOs and freeze-outs, the
narrow scope of available injunctive remedies further discourages shareholders from seeking anticipatory adjudication. They tend to sit idle until
transactions are completed and then seek a de facto appraisal proceeding.
Damage suits have also been uncommon.
This is illustrated by two legal proceedings relating to a two-step acquisition of REX Holdings Inc. (REX) completed in 2007 by (i) an individual who is a founder, a representative director, and a de facto 29.61% owner
(the Founder) and (ii) a private equity fund (the Fund). The initial agreement between the Founder and the Fund contemplated the Founder’s postbuyout stake of 3%–5%. However, after a postdiligence negotiation, the
buyout price went down significantly, and the Founder’s postbuyout stake
increased to 33.4%, a figure higher than the prebuyout stake. In relation to
the transaction, the buyout group did not implement any notable measures
to mitigate the Founder’s conflict of interest. Despite the obvious shortcomings, no one sought to enjoin the first step tender offer or the second step
freeze-out. Shortly after the completion of the transaction, an appraisal proceeding (the REX I proceeding) commenced, and in 2009 the Japanese Supreme Court confirmed a valuation by the Tokyo High Court that was substantially higher than the price offered in the two-step acquisition. 570
Piggybacking on the successful Japanese Supreme Court appraisal determination, 114 shareholders filed damage lawsuits (the REX II proceeding)
against the Founder and certain other former officers of the company alleging the defendants’ violated their fiduciary duties in relation to the second
step freeze-out transaction. In the damage proceeding, the Tokyo High
Court571 refused to grant any damage awards despite the much higher valuation given in the REX I Supreme Court determination. The case was appealed to the Japanese Supreme Court, which is yet to announce its decision. The chronology of the two related proceedings—particularly the
absence of any injunction proceeding—shows that the Japanese judiciary
does not have effective strategies and tools to solve the TPs relating to
shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers.572
570
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 29, 2009, Hei 20 (ku) no. 1037/ Hei 20 (kyo) no. 48, 1326
KIN’YŪ SHŌJI HANREI [KINHAN] 35 (Japan). For an analysis of the REX I proceeding, see, for example,
Wataru Tanaka, Going Private and the Role of Courts: A Comparison of Delaware and Japan, 3 U.
TOKYO SOFT L. REV. 12, 16–18 (2011).
571
Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Apr. 17, 2013, Hei 23 (ne) no. 2230, 2190 HANREI JIHŌ
[HANJI] 96 [hereinafter REX II Tokyo High Court decision] (appeal pending).
572
In Delaware a class action damage lawsuit may follow a favorable appraisal decision. See In re
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It appears that many or most judiciaries elsewhere in the world would
not fare any better than the Japanese judiciary in a similar situation.573 For
example, Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giucidi took a dim view of securities
damage suits in Continental European countries. 574 However, the TPs at
Stage I in shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers are more acute than
those in securities actions for damages. In addition, in lawsuits against
Gatekeepers—unlike securities actions for damage suits—there is often a
need for anticipatory relief. Thus, the observation of Ferrarini and Giucidi
apply more strongly to shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers.
VI. INTENSITY OF GATEKEEPING AND EX POST JUDICIAL
AND EX ANTE NONJUDICIAL POLICING
A. United States
The ex post judicial policing of Gatekeepers is a possible solution to
solve dilemmas of control transaction governance.575 However, ex post judicial policing faces its own dilemmas. These dilemmas all relate to the
TPs.576 Delaware’s judiciary has been revealed as the best-equipped in the
United States to deal with such dilemmas. This does not mean, however,
that the Delaware judiciary is perfect577 and can completely solve or eliminate the dilemmas. The more capable it is, the more Gatekeeping power it
should be able to give to Gatekeepers. The more confidence one has in the
Delaware judiciary, the more power one is willing to give to boards and
vice versa.
There have been heated disagreements on the proper limit of Gatekeepers’ roles. However, to a substantial extent, this debate might have
Orchard Enter., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2014). However, the factual circumstance is
entirely different from that of the REX buyout transaction. The Delaware case involved a controller
freeze-out after the controller’s failure to sell its position. See id. at 12. Therefore it appeared unlikely
for a third-party bidder to surface to acquire the company at a price acceptable to the controller. In addition, the controller has the ability to pay damages. A preliminary injunction did not appear to lead to an
arms-length negotiation between the controller and a purported independent committee. See supra Parts
III.C.1.b.ii., III.C.2. Thus it seemed strategically sensible for potential plaintiffs to seek damages from
the controller after the completion of the transaction.
573
The Enterprise Chamber in the Netherlands may be an exception. See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, The
Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Corporate Governance Disputes in the United States and in the
EU, Paper presented at the OECD Exploratory Meeting on Resolution of Corporate Governance Related
Disputes
20–21
(Mar.
20,
2006),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/37188750.pdf.
574
See Ferrarini & Giudici, supra note 557, at 41–56.
575
See supra Part II.C.
576
See supra Part II.D.
577
See, e.g., William T. Allen, The Pride and the Hope of Delaware Corporate Law, 25 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 70, 72 (2000).
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been a proxy for a debate on the court’s capability. Disagreements as to the
outer limit of the judiciary’s capability could create disagreements as to the
proper limit on Gatekeepers’ roles. In recent years, despite sharp criticisms
by several noted academics,578 Delaware’s judiciary has been reluctant to
tighten the Gatekeeping roles of corporate boards.579 This could mean that
the Delaware judiciary thinks more highly of its own overall capabilities
than those critics do. It seems worthwhile to examine whether this is indeed
the case.
The standards that non-Delaware judiciaries can optimally apply and
enforce are different from those the Delaware judiciary can optimally apply
and enforce. Thus, if non-Delaware judiciaries transplant and use Delaware
standards, there could be too many false negatives and false positives. They
should consider cutting back corporate fiduciaries’ Gatekeeping roles to
make the fiduciaries’ tasks less demanding. For example, non-Delaware
states might want to limit the use of defense measures—such as poison
pills—to those that protect against well-defined structural coercions,580 given that structural coercion is more objectively identifiable than substantive
coercion. 581 The collective interests of shareholders are also more easily
identifiable than the interests of all the constituents. The removal of these
from what the Gatekeepers are allowed to consider would markedly reduce
the need for and the complexity of anticipatory adjudication.582 This in turn
might reduce their competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis Delaware and level
the playing field.583 Shareholders of Delaware corporations may file lawsuits with non-Delaware judiciaries. There is a risk that plaintiff shareholders would file these lawsuits hoping to see many false positive decisions. 584
If true, it seems reasonable for Delaware corporations to adopt forum selection certificates or bylaws.585
Michal Barzuza has pointed out that to varying degrees and depending
on the anti-takeover statutes under which they operate courts in nonDelaware states use standards less exacting than those that Delaware uses to
determine directors’ compliance with their fiduciary duties in connection
with change in control transactions.586 Based on this observation, she has
suggested federal legislation to obligate all states to use the Delaware judi578
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 162–211;
Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto, supra note 7; Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 151.
579
See the authorities cited in supra note 51.
580
For structural coercion, see the authorities cited in supra note 48.
581
For substantive coercion, see supra note 73.
582
See supra Part II.D.2.a.
583
See Kamar, supra note 151, at 1954 (stating that the jurisdictional competition “may not be a race
among equals”).
584
See supra text accompanying notes 60–61.
585
See supra note 63.
586
See Barzuza, supra note 52.
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cial standards as the minimum for policing the conduct of directors in such
transactions.587 This position, however, mistakenly assumes that “all judiciaries are created equal” and ignores that non-Delaware judiciaries are not
necessarily equipped to handle such fine instruments, particularly in the
context of anticipatory adjudication. The non-Delaware judges, if they are
unsure of how to properly use the fine instruments, may try to hide behind
the more-deferential and less-exacting business judgment rule. Rather, Barzuza should propose that the non-Delaware states consider cutting back the
powers of Gatekeepers.
B. Non-US Jurisdictions
Shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers are unique, and courts, even
if they are generally competent, are not necessarily effective in handling
such lawsuits.588 Before any jurisdiction chooses to have Gatekeepers under
its corporation law,589 it needs to make certain that its judiciary is equipped
to police Gatekeepers.590 In view of the potentially large gap existing judiciaries must bridge to satisfy the prerequisites, one choice is to have a specialized court with strategies, tools, and attributes that enable it to satisfy
the prerequisites. This adaptation could be the least disruptive to the overall
judicial system.591 Over time this court will develop expertise in the field.
The administrative cost of maintaining a judiciary that can meet the prerequisites can also be made minimal.592
With respect to directors acting as Gatekeepers, a possible interim
measure is to give directors only a limited Gatekeeping role similar to the
one suggested for non-Delaware jurisdictions in the United States.593 An alternative can be judicial adoption of the no-frustration rule under the Takeover Code.594 Under these approaches, “[t]he impact of management action
587

See id.
Cf. Kamar, supra note 151, at 1954–55 (“It is implausible that courts in [Germany, Britain, and
Japan] are inherently less equipped than their American counterparts to handle corporate disputes.”).
589
Some EU countries have opted out of the no-frustration rule. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. If the company laws of the relevant jurisdictions give the local companies devices that function
as defense measures, those who opt out might unwittingly put their judiciaries on the spot.
590
For an analysis of transplants of fiduciary duties in civil law countries in Europe, see Pistor &
Xu, supra note 410.
591
A small change may speed up a judicial reform that typically does not move quickly. See, e.g.,
Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–10
(2008).
592
This might be the approach the Netherlands took when it established the Enterprise Chamber.
See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 573. To resolve disputes relating to freeze-outs, Ronald Gilson and Alan
Schwartz suggested the establishment of “an EU-level-specialized commercial court.” Gilson &
Schwartz, supra note 160, at 179.
593
See supra Part VI.A (third paragraph).
594
See supra note 38. Gilson once suggested this approach. See Gilson, Structural Approach, supra
588
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on the opportunity for shareholder decision is a relatively narrow factual
question.”595 Due to the objective nature of the prohibitions, the normative
force of the Stage I prerequisites should be less.596 As stated,597 depending
on its capability and attributes, each judiciary has a substantive judicial
standard it can use optimally. As its capabilities and attributes improve, it
can shift to another standard that allows it to attain a higher optimal equilibrium point.598 Creative use of existing tools and changes to uncodified traditions—such as allowing for flexible burden shifting and lowering the level
of the burden of proof—should also be considered. The Internet might also
lessen CAPs at Stage I. These approaches still require the availability of
strong and flexible anticipatory adjudication. If controllers act as Gatekeepers, it is essential for the judiciary to meet the Stage I prerequisites.599
If a no-frustration rule exists, the TPs—particularly the AIPs—may be
fewer in lawsuits to enforce the rule, but they would still need to be resolved. If the judiciaries are far from being able to meet the Stage I prerequisites, therefore, we have to abandon the interim approach and consider an
approach in which neither board members nor controllers act as Gatekeepers. That is the approach of the Takeover Code.600 Under this approach, the
Stage I prerequisites become substantially irrelevant, since shareholders do
not have to initiate and prosecute proceedings to police the control transactions. This means that the tasks of the boards and the controllers are far
more straightforward and simple, and no less importantly, the tasks do not
force them to make numerous intricate decisions imbued with strong or outright conflicts of interest: 601 “rules” or “regulations,” rather than “standards,” generally now regulate the conduct of the directors and controllers.
Thus, a nonjudicial body, organ, or institution can credibly assume the policing roles that would otherwise fall upon judiciaries. The nonjudicial
body’s ex ante rule making and enforcement release the judiciary from the
problem of implementing restorative relief.602 Thus, the Stage II prerequi-

note 151, at 877–79.
595
See Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 151, at 881–82.
596
It would be necessary for the jurisdiction to have mechanisms similar to the U.K. MBR to prevent structural coercion. See supra text accompanying notes 389–391. Under the market standard, such
mechanisms are unnecessary. For the market standard, see supra note 7.
597
See supra Part V.C.
598
It may be true that “the effectiveness of judicial review . . . is more important than the details of
the legal standard that a country adopts.” Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 160, at 164–65. However, as
indicated, different substantive rules may require different types of competence from the courts that apply the rules.
599
In the context of freeze-outs, anticipatory adjudication is less important. See supra Part III.C.2.
600
See supra Part II.A. (first paragraph).
601
See supra Part II.D.
602
At least the review of these decisions can be made “in real time.” Armour & Skeel, supra note 8,
at 1744.
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sites are also irrelevant.603 This regime, however, would require shareholder
protections similar to the U.K. MBR and restrictive freeze-out rules, and
these restrictions have anti-efficiency aspects.604
VII. CONCLUSION
Upon reflection, it should become quickly obvious that shareholder
CAPs and AIPs of companies with partially or wholly dispersed shareholders generate root issues relating to both the governance of the companies
and the policing of their control transactions, including freeze-outs, that are
often induced by the governance issues. The ex post policing by a judiciary
of these control transactions calls for unique judicial attributes. The Delaware judiciary has speed, expertise and flexibility. Those are features doctrinally called for and specially suited to ex post policing. That is why it is
the best in the business. While less suited to engage in such ex post policing
than the Delaware judiciary, other judiciaries in the United States in general
have the most critical of the procedures and attributes necessary to engage
in such policing. However, for example, class action and discovery are
uniquely American but are crucial for effective ex post judicial policing.
There are others features that are unusual outside of the United States. Thus,
at least ex post judicial policing will not work in many jurisdictions outside
of the United States. The scopes of corporate fiduciaries’ gatekeeping roles
in control transactions, however, have positive relationships with the severity of the twin problems relating to shareholder lawsuits against the fiduciaries and the complexity and difficulty of ex post judicial policing.
What do these suggest? To a substantial extent, the ongoing debate as
to the scope of board veto power in relation to third party acquisitions could
be a disagreement as to the ability of the Delaware judiciary to police board
members: “Yes, the Delaware judiciary is very sophisticated and the best,
but is it good enough to let directors recognize for example the threat of
substantive coercion as a threat under Unocal?” Non-Delaware judiciaries
should consider applying judicial standards that give fiduciaries less gatekeeping powers than those the Delaware judiciary gives. Multijurisdictional
603
Further, judiciaries may be less efficient than the Takeover Panel in enforcing these principals.
See, e.g., Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1732 (“[T]he United Kingdom’s system has prima facie advantages in terms of procedure—it seems at once quicker, cheaper, and more certain than a system that
relies upon litigation.”); Gomez & Saez, supra note 12. One remaining question is whether it makes
sense, unlike the regime under the Takeover Code, to let controllers remain as Gatekeepers with respect
to freeze-outs.
604
Anti-efficiency aspects of the U.K. MBR, see, for example, Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 19, §§ 8.2.5.4, 8.3.1; PACCES, supra note 13, § 7.4.2.2. The same can be said about the
stringent freeze-out rule in the United Kingdom. For example, minority shareholders might vote down
efficiency enhancing freeze-outs. See supra Part II.B.2. As to the allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement powers between judiciaries and agencies, see Pistor & Xu, supra note 410, at 13–17.

141

142 DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

X

2/10/2016 10:35 PM

36:45 (2016)

litigation involving Delaware companies to arbitrage differences in the relevant qualities of the judiciaries are expected to produce adverse consequences.
Non-U.S. judiciaries in jurisdictions that have companies with at least
partially-dispersed shareholders—such as certain EU countries and Japan—
should keep the gatekeeping roles of corporate fiduciaries significantly below those given to fiduciaries in Delaware if they choose to employ ex post
judicial policing. As their procedures and attributes become more consistent
with the theoretical prerequisites for ex post judicial policing, they can
choose to use another standard that gives a greater gatekeeping role to attain
a higher optimal equilibrium. Depending on the procedures and attributes of
their judiciaries, it may be better for non-U.S. jurisdictions to forgo judicial
policing and resort to nonjudicial organs or bodies—such as those similar to
the Takeover Panel—that promulgate rules to address the twin problems
and engage in ex ante enforcement.
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